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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I focus on two broad research questions derived from a 
theory proposed by Henrich and Gil-White: (i) the use of prestige cues for social 
learning (Chapters 2-4) and (ii) dominance and prestige as two strategies to 
acquire high social rank and social influence in human groups (Chapters 5-6). In 
Chapter 2, I review the literature on the adaptive value and actual use of prestige-
biased social learning, finding mixed support. Chapter 3 tests whether 
information provided by high prestige sources of information is better transmitted 
than information provided by a low prestige source using a transmission chain 
experiment, finding no evidence to support this prediction. Chapter 4 presents 
another transmission chain experiment testing whether dominance and prestige 
cues are better transmitted than medium social rank cues. I find better 
transmission of dominance and prestige cues than medium social rank cues, but 
no reliable differences in the transmission of dominance and prestige cues. 
Chapter 5 reviews the literature on the dominance-prestige distinction and 
related areas of research. It proposes an integrated model to accommodate 
conflicting findings and extend its application to large-scale societies/groups with 
formal hierarchies. In Chapter 6, I find that economic uncertainty and intergroup 
conflict both predict preferences for both dominant and prestigious leaders using 
data from the World Values Survey. I also find that liberal ideology is positively 
related to perceptions of Donald Trump as dominant and Hillary Clinton as 
prestigious and negatively related to perceptions of Hillary Clinton as dominant 
and Donald Trump as prestigious, using survey data collected prior the 2016 US 
Presidential Election. Finally, Chapter 7 presents an overview of the thesis, 
discuss its implications for further research on prestige-biased social learning and 
social hierarchy and outlines new avenues for research.  
9 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I officially started my PhD in January 2017. However, it feels like it started 
in 2011 when, after reading Alex Mesoudi’s book Cultural Evolution, I sat down 
to write a plan to get a scholarship to do a PhD in Cultural Evolution 5 years later. 
Consequently, I would like to thank Alex for writing a book that made me an 
enthusiast of cultural evolution and motivated me to embark in a long-term project 
to upgrade my academic and interdisciplinary skills. I would also like to thank Alex 
for being an excellent supervisor. Alex’ comments on all the chapters of this 
thesis, as well as his support, guidance, and feedback throughout all the phases 
of investigation have been invaluable to me and have helped me to become a 
better researcher.  
The Human Behaviour and Evolution Group (HuBCEG) has put me in 
contact with new stimulating ideas and methods on culture, evolution and 
cognition beyond the focus of my thesis, and I would like to thank each of its 
members for providing me with the ideal intellectual environment to write this 
thesis. I would like to specially thank Shakti Lamba for her help with 
understanding multilevel modelling and her comments on the figures for Chapters 
3 and 6; Alex Thornton for discussing prestige in non-human animals with me 
and his support with my post-doctoral applications; Erik Postma, whose statistical 
insights were very useful to figure out how to analyse the data from the 
transmission chain experiments; Adam Flitton for his crash course in data 
analysis with Stata, discussing with me many of the ideas that led to Chapter 6, 
his comments on multiple drafts for Chapter 6 and his always willingness to talk 
about stats and research methods; Lotty Brand for her enthusiasm in improving 
scientific practices, introducing me into the wonders of preregistration and 
10 
 
Bayesian statistics,  her insightful comments on Chapters 2, 3 and 6 and her 
generous personality (which includes running part of my code from her computer 
and taking me with Dougie to Bude!); Rosie Layfield for being the second coder 
for Chapters 3 and 4, listening to all my plans for the future and exploring Penryn’s 
little secrets with me; Alice Williams for her comments on Chapters 5 and 6; 
Dougie Foster for his comments on Chapter 5 and sending me relevant 
references; and Stefan Gehrig for his comments on Chapter 2 and for discussing 
prestige-biased social learning in artwork with me; Mick Gantley for creating a 
nice work atmosphere in our time in TIC, exploring with me a great part of the 
Cornwall’s coast paths while talking about cultural evolution and other interesting 
topics, and for always lending me a helping hand; Andre Borba for also exploring 
with me a great part of the Cornwall’s coast paths while talking about cultural 
evolution, ethnobotany, multilevel modelling, life, etc; and John McKeown for 
being a great colleague to work with.  
Outside HuBCEG, I would like to thank the Leverhulme Trust for funding 
my PhD; M.D. Sharma for his help with getting access to the University of Exeter’s 
external server and setting up Inuvika to run the regression models for Chapter 
6; Hermant Kakkar and Niro Sivanathan for making their data open so that other 
researchers like me could build on their work; the Economic Innovation Group for 
sharing the data of the Distress Economic Index with me; Matt Gobel for his 
comments on Chapter 2; Joseph Stubbersfield for his comments on Chapter 3 
and for introducing me to propositional analysis and statistical analysis of 
transmission chains experiments with multilevel modelling when I was at Durham; 
Fan Xuan Chen for discussing the relationship between prestige and morality with 
me, which was very useful for clarifying my ideas for Chapter 5; and Erica Mariani 
11 
 
for proofreading my academic website and for playing ping-pong and going for 
walks, teas and tapas with me. 
Before I came to study my PhD at the University of Exeter, several people 
helped me with my project to become a researcher in Cultural Evolution. My 
supervisor at Durham University, Jamie Tehrani, has been a key piece in this 
pathway. His enthusiasm for my research projects has been very motivational 
and I would like to thank him for his guidance during my Master’s and his support 
for my PhD and Post-Doctoral applications. I have also learnt from Jeremy 
Kendal’s advice while writing PhD proposals. Many conversations with Arif Jamal 
during our time at Durham helped me to clarify certain ideas on cultural evolution. 
It was great to travel with him to conferences and study in the dungeon. Elena 
Gaviria and Ángel Gómez at UNED were also very helpful when I asked them 
advice for the steps to take to become a researcher in 2012 and have always 
been willing to support me afterwards. Soledad Ballesteros and the Studies on 
Aging and Neurodegenerative Diseases Research Group at UNED provided me 
with guidance and means to conduct my first experiment on transmission biases. 
Olivier de Clerck and the other lecturers from the modules Evolution, 
Phylogenetics and Microevolution and Speciation at Ghent University taught me 
lots about evolutionary biology and evolutionary research methods. The Erasmus 
scholarship I received in 2010-2011 was very useful for me to learn from multiple 
disciplines in one year (psychology, biology, moral sciences and history) and 
gave me the opportunity to learn about evolutionary psychology, sociobiology and 
memetics. I would especially like to thank Linda van Speybroeck, whose detailed 
feedback on my essays on memetics and sociobiology were very encouraging. 
Raj Khedun helped me a lot with improving my English by talking through Skype 
well late at night. Andy Hall also helped me a lot with my English when I came to 
12 
 
the UK for the first time and kept helping me with my English through Skype while 
I was in Belgium. My interest for evolutionary approaches to human behaviour 
comes from my good friend Ángel Dominguez, who was the first person who 
talked to me about evolutionary psychology and motivated me to read books such 
as The Selfish Gene, The Evolution of Desire and How the Mind Works. I have 
also learnt a lot from my other good friend, Ángel Gonzalez, who is very 
passionate about the anthropology of hunter-gatherers. I would also like to thank 
the people who hired me and the people I worked with at different hospitality jobs 
during my studies of psychology. All those experiences were very useful to 
improve my English, and my dislike for washing up and pulling beers were very 
motivating to study harder.  
Living in Cornwall during my PhD has been great. Walking along the 
Cornish coastal line has been a fantastic experience. Some good ideas for this 
thesis have emerged while walking alone on cliffs with breath-taking sea views. 
Carl Newport’s books Deep Work and Digital Minimalism have also been useful 
to increase my productivity in the final year and keep me focused. Freedom 
software has helped me to remove many online distractions while working at the 
office. Working from a house without internet access during the last four months 
of the PhD has helped me dramatically to focus while writing this thesis.  
This PhD thesis would not have been possible without Laura Opsteyn, who 
was my partner for 8 years and has been my best friend for more than 10. She 
convinced me to try things well outside my comfort zone such as learning English 
and living outside Spain, which have paid off so much. She gave me the 
emotional support I needed to keep myself motivated and overcome difficulties. 
She also helped me to become competent in English. My transformation from not 
13 
 
being able to say a word in English to being able to do a PhD in an English 
university is in a great part thanks to her. I specially thank her for proofreading 
everything I wrote in English for almost 7 years and for having the patience to live 
with a guy who spent most of his time at home among books.  
 Lastly, I would like to thank my parents, who have always believed that 
education was the way to a better future, for providing me with an education well 
beyond the one they could dream of. The pathway I took in 2011 would have 
been much harder without their emotional and economic support. [Me gustaría 
dar las gracias a mis padres, quienes siempre han creído que la educación era 
el mejor camino para un futuro mejor, por darme una educación mucho mejor de 
la que ellos pudieron soñar. El camino que emprendí en 2011 habría sido mucho 
más difícil sin su apoyo emocional y económico.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
FUNDING 
My PhD and all the research presented in this thesis has been funded by 
the Leverhulme Trust (grant RPG-2016-122658 awarded to Alex Mesoudi). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
CHAPTER 1:  
Introductory Remarks 
1.1.- Introduction 
Disciplines as varied as sociology, political sciences, anthropology, 
psychology, archaeology, biology and economics have for a long time recognised 
the importance of social hierarchies in configuring human social life. This 
academic interest is understandable given that social hierarchies are ubiquitous 
in human groups (Von Rueden, 2014) and that the rank that an individual 
occupies within social hierarchies is positively related to important outcomes such 
as greater reproductive success (e.g., Hill, 1984; von Rueden & Jaeggi, 2016), 
greater access to contested resources (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) and better 
subjective wellbeing, self-esteem and health (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 
2015).  
One of the theories of social hierarchy that has generated extensive 
research in the last two decades within the evolutionary human sciences and 
adjacent fields is Henrich and Gil-White’s (2001) theory of the evolution of 
prestige. According to these authors, there exist two independent strategies that 
humans use to attain high social rank and social influence, which they labelled 
‘dominance’ and ‘prestige’. The dominance strategy entails the use of force and 
intimidation to elicit fear in other individuals. The prestige strategy entails the 
display of competence within socially appreciated domains to elicit admiration in 
other individuals. For Henrich and Gil-White, while the dominance strategy is 
common in social animals, the prestige strategy is exclusive to humans and it 
evolved as a way to select models from whom to acquire valuable 
knowledge/skills through social learning.  
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 In this thesis, I focus on two broad research questions derived from 
Henrich and Gil-White’s theory: (i) the use of prestige cues for social learning 
(Chapters 2-4) and (ii) dominance and prestige as two strategies to acquire high 
social rank and social influence in human groups (Chapters 5-6).  
1.2.- Overview of the Thesis 
To address the question about the use of prestige cues for social learning, 
I review the literature on prestige-biased social learning in Chapter 2. I focus on 
three key aspects of Henrich and Gil-White’s theory. First, I discuss whether using 
prestige cues to select models from whom to socially learn is adaptive or not. To 
this end, I analyse whether there is a positive association between being 
prestigious and being competent within a valued domain and between being 
prestigious and being older. Second, I discuss two different types of prestige cues 
that people use to infer competence: first-order and second-order prestige cues. 
First-order prestige cues are cues related to characteristics of the target individual 
that can be assessed directly by the observer to infer competence. Examples of 
first-order prestige cues are being older or being generous. Second-order 
prestige cues are cues related to the behaviour of other individuals towards the 
target individual, which is a more indirect assessment of competence. Examples 
of second-order prestige cues are the amount of sustained attention and 
voluntary deference that individuals receive by others. Third, I explore the 
evidence for and against the actual use of prestige-biased social learning. In this 
review, I find mixed support for the adaptive value and use of prestige-biased 
social learning, provide a refinement of research predictions on prestige-biased 
social learning and present new avenues for research.  
17 
 
In Chapter 2, I find that one of Henrich and Gil-White’s predictions, i.e., 
the greater memorability of information provided by high prestige than low 
prestige individuals, has been completely unexplored. Consequently, I test in 
Chapter 3 this prediction using a transmission chain experimental paradigm 
(Bartlett, 1932; Mesoudi, 2007), which has the advantage of permitting the study 
of the effects of this predicted recall bias over multiple transmission events. I use 
two sets of arguments in favour of and against the replacement of computer 
tablets in primary schools as experimental materials to transmit across the 
chains. Prestige is manipulated by associating each set of arguments to a 
different source using a first-order prestige cue: job titles. These sources vary in 
the amount of prestige and relevance for the topic of the replacements of 
textbooks by computer tablets: the Head of the Department of Education of a 
leading university (high prestige, high relevance), an airline pilot (high prestige, 
low relevance) and a cleaner (low prestige, low relevance). The results do not 
support the prediction: information provided by high prestige sources is not better 
transmitted than information provided by low prestige sources.  
Whereas Chapter 3 focuses on the transmission of information provided 
by high prestige and low prestige sources, Chapter 4 focuses on the transmission 
of social rank cues related to prestige and dominance. As experimental materials, 
I use descriptions of three football players, who are described as either high 
prestige, high dominance or medium social rank using different social rank cues 
(e.g., being admired, being feared, and not arousing strong emotions, 
respectively). I predict that both high prestige cues and high dominance cues are 
better transmitted than medium social rank cues, while high dominance cues are 
better transmitted than high prestige cues. This second prediction is derived from 
the assumption that avoiding the costs inflicted by dominant individuals is more 
18 
 
important than obtaining the social learning and material benefits provided by 
prestigious individuals. The results of the study support the first prediction: high 
prestige and high dominance cues are better transmitted than medium social rank 
cues. However, the results did not support the predicted superior transmission of 
dominance cues over prestige cues, which did not differ in transmission fidelity.  
To address the question about dominance and prestige as two strategies 
to acquire high social rank and social influence, I review the relevant literature on 
this topic in Chapter 5.  I distinguish between three relevant levels of analysis: (i) 
strategies to acquire high social rank and influence, (ii) dimensions of social rank 
and (iii) consequences of the dimensions of social rank. First, I discuss whether 
there are indeed two strategies to acquire high social rank and social influence 
(dominance or prestige) as proposed by Henrich and Gil-White, only one 
(competence; Chapais, 2015; Ridgeway & Diekema, 1989), three (dominance, 
competence and altruism/morality; Bai, 2016) or multiple strategies to acquire 
coercively imposed social rank (physical dominance and leverage; Lewis, 2002) 
and multiple strategies or components of the same strategy to acquire voluntarily 
conferred social rank (competence, generosity and social conectedness; 
Anderson & Kilduff, 2009). Second, I analyse dominance and prestige as two 
different dimensions of social rank within small face-to-face groups without formal 
hierarchies and compare this with social psychologists’ distinction between power 
and status. Third, I analyse the similar and differential consequences of 
dominance and prestige dimensions on social influence, attention, deference, 
social learning and fitness. Lastly, I outline a model, which integrates research on 
the dominance-prestige distinction with research on social psychology and 
related fields.  
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One of the problems identified in Chapter 5 with the dominance-prestige 
distinction is its application to large-scale societies with formal positions of 
leadership (e.g., Prime Minister, President) and complex ingroup vs outgroup 
social dynamics. In Chapter 6, I elaborate further my critique of current 
applications of the model to this type of societies and, more specifically, to the 
use of this distinction to explain the recent rise of right-wing populist leaders such 
as Donald Trump (Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017; McAdams, 2017). I also analyse 
data from the World Values Survey to test whether preferences for dominant and 
prestigious leaders could be predicted by economic uncertainty, perceived lack 
of control and intergroup conflict. I find that both economic uncertainty and 
intergroup conflict predict preferences for both dominant and prestigious types of 
political leaders, while perceived lack of control is not a reliable predictor of 
preferences for these types of leaders. Similarly, I re-analyse data collected by 
Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017) to test whether political ideology influences the 
perceptions of the political leaders Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton as dominant 
or prestigious. I find that, rather than leaders being universally perceived as either 
dominant or prestigious, these perceptions are influenced by the ideology of the 
perceiver:  liberal ideology is positively related to perceptions of Donald Trump 
as dominant and Hillary Clinton as prestigious and negatively related to 
perceptions of Hillary Clinton as dominant and Donald Trump as prestigious. I 
also compare the strength of political ideology and economic uncertainty in 
predicting preference for Donald Trump. Contrary to previous claims (Kakkar & 
Sivanathan, 2017), the results show that political ideology is a much stronger 
predictor of preference for Trump than economic uncertainty.  
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In Chapter 7, I summarize all of the thesis findings, integrate the different 
pieces of empirical evidence, and suggest new avenues for research on prestige-
biased social learning and social hierarchy.  
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CHAPTER 2:  
Prestige-biased Social Learning: Current Evidence 
and Outstanding Questions 
This chapter has been previously published as Jiménez, Á. V. & Mesoudi, A. 
(2019). Prestige biased social learning: current evidence and outstanding 
questions. Palgrave Communications, 5:20. doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-0228-
7. It has been adapted with minor revisions.  
Contributions:  
This chapter was conceptualised by Alex Mesoudi and me. Original draft was 
written by me. It was reviewed and edited by Alex Mesoudi and me.  
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2.0.- Abstract 
Cultural evolution theory posits that a major factor in human ecological 
success is our high-fidelity and selective social learning, which permits the 
accumulation of adaptive knowledge and skills over successive generations. One 
way to acquire adaptive social information is by preferentially copying competent 
individuals within a valuable domain (success bias). However, competence within 
a domain is often difficult or impossible to directly assess. Almost 20 years ago, 
Henrich and Gil-White (H&GW) suggested that people use indirect cues of 
success (e.g., differential levels of attention paid to models by other social 
learners) as adaptive short-cuts to select models from whom to learn. They called 
this use of indirect markers of success prestige bias. In this review, I re-visit 
H&GW’s proposal, examining the evidence amassed since for the adaptiveness 
and use of prestige bias in humans. First, I briefly outline H&GW’s theory. 
Second, I analyse whether prestige is associated with competence within 
valuable domains, which is a crucial assumption underlying the adaptiveness of 
prestige bias. Third, I discuss prestige cues that people use to infer success (e.g., 
the amount of voluntary deference and attention received by models). Fourth, I 
examine the evidence for and against the use of prestige bias in human adults 
and children. Finally, I point out limitations in the current literature and present 
new avenues for research on prestige bias.  
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2.1.- Introduction 
Cultural evolution theory posits that a major factor in human ecological 
success is our high-fidelity and selective social learning, which permits the 
accumulation of valuable knowledge and skills over successive generations. One 
of the most cited types of selective social learning in the cultural evolution 
literature is to copy the behaviours of individuals highly respected and admired in 
a social group (i.e., prestigious individuals), known as prestige bias. Almost 20 
years ago, Henrich and Gil-White (henceforth H&GW) developed a theory of the 
evolution of prestige. The distinctive features of this theory were the consideration 
of prestige as an alternative route to dominance to attain and maintain high social 
rank in humans and the relevance attributed to social learning in the evolution of 
prestige (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). In this article, I focus on a crucial aspect of 
H&GW’s theory: the adaptive value and actual use of prestige-biased social 
learning in humans. In the following, I first outline H&GW’s theory. Second, I 
analyse whether prestige is associated with competence within valuable domains 
and older age. Third, I discuss which types of first-order (e.g., age) and second-
order (e.g., the distribution of freely conferred deference) cues of prestige people 
use to infer competence within a valued domain.  Fourth, I examine the evidence 
for and against the use of prestige bias in human adults and children. Finally, I 
point out limitations in the current literature and present new avenues for research 
on prestige bias.  
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2.2.- Social Learning and the Evolution of Prestige 
Following H&GW, social rank1 is defined as a hierarchy of rewards and/or 
displays in which individuals at the top enjoy privileges (e.g., preferential access 
to resources usually without resistance from other in-group members), are 
influential, and receive deference (i.e., manifestations of respect and submission 
to their wishes). High social rank is generally desirable and is positively 
associated with reproductive success in many societies (Betzig, 1988; Chagnon, 
1988; J. Hill, 1984; Mealey, 1985; von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2010; von 
Rueden & Jaeggi, 2016).  
According to H&GW, people use, not necessarily consciously, two distinct 
strategies to acquire and maintain high social rank: dominance and prestige (see 
also Cheng & Tracy, 2014; Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 
2013). The dominance strategy involves causing, or threatening to induce, costs 
to other individuals. If the use of this strategy is successful, this elicits fear in the 
other individuals, who defer and submit to the wishes of the dominant individual 
to avoid the potential costs. In contrast, the prestige strategy involves displaying 
more competence than others in valued domains. If the use of this strategy is 
successful, this elicits admiration in other individuals, who defer and submit to the 
wishes of the prestigious individual in order to gain access to, and thus socially 
learn from, this individual, and to acquire other benefits such as private and public 
goods (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009a; Cheng & Tracy, 2014; Henrich, 2016; Price & 
Van Vugt, 2014; Von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 2008). Although the successful 
use of both strategies leads to receiving deference from other individuals, the key 
                                                          
1 In reality, H&GW use the word “status”. I prefer the word “social rank” as there is an emerging consensus 
in the literature to use social status and prestige as synonyms (e.g. Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015; 
Cheng & Tracy, 2014) or as closely related terms (e.g. Blader & Chen, 2014) 
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distinction between them is that dominant individuals receive coerced deference, 
while prestigious individuals receive voluntary (or ‘freely-conferred’) deference.  
H&GW argue that the dominance strategy is phylogenetically ancestral to 
our species. Humans share this strategy with non-human primates (e.g., de Waal, 
2000) and other social animals. In contrast, H&GW believe that the prestige 
strategy is probably unique to humans (but see Chapais, 2015; Garfield, von 
Rueden, & Hagen, 2018; Horner, Proctor, Bonnie, Whiten, & de Waal, 2010; 
Kendal et al., 2015 for evidence of prestige in non-human animals). This is 
because they assume that the evolution of prestige required high-fidelity social 
learning, which is arguably much more developed in humans than in other 
animals (Herrmann, Call, Hernandez-Lloreda, Hare, & Tomasello, 2007; Tennie, 
Call, & Tomasello, 2009). According to H&GW, the selective pressure that drove 
the evolution of prestige was the need to identify individuals within a group (i.e.,, 
not only kin) with “better-than-average” knowledge/skill from whom to learn (but 
see Barkow, 1989, 2014; Chapais, 2015 for alternative explanations for the 
evolution of prestige). Copying these individuals within domains such as 
medicinal plant knowledge or hunting techniques would have led to the 
acquisition of fitness enhancing knowledge/skills. However, directly inferring 
superior knowledge/skill is often difficult or costly. For instance, accurately 
assessing hunting skill is difficult when hunting highly dispersed large-size game 
in fluctuating environments, in which the variation in caloric returns does not 
depend exclusively on hunting skill (K. Hill & Kintigh, 2009). Under these 
circumstances, the use of less direct but more readily available proxies for 
identifying knowledgeable/skilful individuals may be often adaptive. Such proxies 
include the amount of copying, attention and deference (i.e., costs paid in 
exchange for access to the model) that individuals freely receive. These prestige 
28 
 
cues act as indirect cues of success to select models from whom to learn 
(Henrich, 2016). 
H&GW also formulated a number of predictions derived from their theory 
of the evolution of prestige, and their theory has inspired a number of related 
predictions (Table 1, see also Table 2 for a full list of predictions derived from the 
present review).  
Predictions about prestige, success, age and generosity.  
i) Skilled/knowledgeable individuals are prestigious1  
ii) Older individuals tend to be more prestigious than younger ones 1  
iii) Generous individuals tend to be prestigious 2 
Predictions about behaviours towards knowledgeable/skilful/prestigious individuals 
iv) Knowledgeable/skilful/prestigious individuals receive freely conferred 
deference1 
v) Knowledgeable/skilful/prestigious individuals are paid more attention to 1  
vi) People seek proximity to knowledgeable/skilful/prestigious individuals 1 
vii) People preferentially copy knowledgeable/skilful individuals 1 3 
Predictions about prestige and social learning.  
viii) People preferentially copy prestigious over non-prestigious individuals 1 
ix) When success information is absent or difficult to assess, people 
preferentially copy prestigious individuals 4 
x) The use of prestige-biased social learning is more frequent in younger 
people or people with lack of experience in a given domain5 
xi) Prestigious individuals are influential/copied, even beyond their domain of 
expertise 1 
Table 1. Predictions about Prestige Bias Derived from the Existig Literature. 
1 (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001); 2 (Henrich, 2016); 3 (Boyd & Richerson, 1985); 4 (Atkisson, O'Brien, 
& Mesoudi, 2012); 5 (Little, Caldwell, Jones, & DeBruine, 2015). 
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Predictions about prestige and success (Section 2.3) 
i) Prestigious individuals tend to be successful either in currently 
important domains for a social group or in domains which were 
valued in the recent past.  
ii) Prestigious individuals only achieve social influence when their 
domain of prestige is currently valued for a social group 
iii) The positive association between perceived success within a domain 
and prestige will be higher than the positive association between 
actual success within the same domain and prestige 
Predictions about prestige and age (Section 2.3) 
iv) The association between age and prestige is stronger for domains in 
which there is no clear evidence of success 
v) Older individuals tend to be prestigious in stable environments, while 
younger individuals tend to be prestigious in rapidly changing 
environments 
vi) A positive relationship between age and prestige only holds for ages 
prior reaching the peak on skill. Beyond that point the age-prestige 
relationship will either plateau or decrease depending on the 
importance of the domain for a social group 
Predictions about prestige and social learning (Section 2.5) 
vii) The more positively correlated are prestige and success, the more 
people will use prestige-biased social learning. (2.5.1) 
viii) People will use more prestige-biased social learning when the task 
is relevant and difficult than when the task is irrelevant and easy for 
them(2.5.5) 
ix) Prestigious individuals will be copied more when the variation in 
knowledge/skill within a group is large than when this variation is 
small (2.5.2) 
x) Cross-domain prestige bias should occur more when cues are noisy 
within the tested domain than when these cues are clear (2.5.4) 
xi) Cross-domain prestige bias should occur when there are domain-
general traits like IQ that make people successful across domains 
(2.5.4) 
 
Table 2. Predictions about Prestige Bias Derived from the Present Review 
2.3.- Prestige, Competence and Age 
 H&GW predict that knowledgeable/skilful individuals tend to acquire 
prestige (prediction i in Table 1). This prediction is based on their assumption that 
people defer to knowledgeable/skilful individuals to obtain preferential access to 
them, and consequently increase valuable social learning opportunities. H&GW 
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support their prediction with ethnographies that show that prestige is associated 
with skill/knowledge in valued domains such as hunting (e.g., Holmberg, 1969, 
pp. 144-145; Lee, 1979, pp. 343-344), supernatural knowledge (e.g., Lee, 1979, 
pp. 343-344) or combat (e.g., Patton, 2000) in many foraging societies. More 
formally, this association between prestige and knowledge/skill has been 
supported by a recent study looking at more than 1000 ethnographical texts on 
leadership pertaining to 60 cultures contained in the Human Relations Area Files 
(HRAF) (Garfield, Hubbard, & Hagen, 2019). Moreover, H&GW assumed that 
prestige and skill/knowledge in valued domains is also positively correlated in 
modern post-industrial societies as for the case of male adolescents conferring 
prestige to peers with high athletic skills (Coleman, 1961, pp. 130-135). Similarly, 
H&GW predict that older individuals have higher prestige than younger ones, as 
older individuals have more experience in life and have had time to accumulate 
greater knowledge and refined skills (prediction ii in Table 1). They support this 
prediction with ethnographic evidence (Maxwell & Silverman, 1970; Simmons, 
1945/1970). However, they do not mention modern post-industrial societies, 
which makes it difficult to know whether they assume that this correlation also 
holds in such societies.   
 Reyes-Garcia et al. (2008) tested these predictions with the Tsimane, an 
indigenous population from the Bolivian Amazon. Participants were asked to list 
all the important men in the village and say why they were important. Most of the 
nominations went to people with formal high rank positions (72%), with the 
remaining nominations given due to the nominees’ personal attributes (12.5%), 
including being knowledgeable (2.5%). The initial measure of prestige was the 
number of nominations due to personal attributes. The measure of knowledge 
was ethnobotanical plant knowledge derived using cultural consensus analysis, 
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i.e., the most common response to whether each of 15 plants had medicinal 
properties was considered the correct answer. The results did not support either 
of the two predictions: neither ethnobotanical medicinal knowledge nor age were 
significantly associated with their measure of prestige.  
 However, there are several potential explanations for this null finding. 
When prestige was measured by the raw number of nominations instead of only 
the nominations due to personal attributes, prestige was positively and 
significantly associated with having a formal position the previous year and with 
being born in the 1970s. This latter result might be due to the recent increase in 
life expectancy in this society, which may have disrupted the predicted 
association between prestige and age. Alternatively, Reyes-Garcia et al. suggest 
that the training provided by missionaries to young men to become competent 
bilinguals (Spanish/Tsimane) and spread the biblical message gave men born in 
the 1970s  the skills to “navigate between the two worlds” (p.280). This might 
explain their current higher prestige, as opposed to older men with superior 
ethnobotanical knowledge. 
In the same population, Von Rueden et al. (2008) found a strong positive 
association between hunting ability and respect, i.e., the extent that a person is 
considered worthy of being admired, which can be seen as equivalent to H&GW’s 
prestige. This supports H&GW’s prediction of a positive correlation between 
knowledge/skill and prestige. Nevertheless, hunting is losing its importance in the 
studied village due to acculturation and has no effect on community-wide 
influence, measured as the influence of an individual in the resolution of a dispute 
during a community-wide meeting. Von Rueden et al. (2008) believe that the 
social transformation experienced by the Tsimane society might explain why 
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hunting skill is correlated with respect but not with community-wide influence. 
Conferring respect to people with highly relevant skills in the past might be a 
residue of “old-fashioned” values, but these values do not predict community-
wide influence because these skills are no longer useful. In contrast, currently 
relevant skills (e.g., formal education and Spanish fluency) within this society 
were significant predictors of community-wide influence (see predictions i-ii in 
Table 2). These authors also found an inverted-U-shaped relationship between 
age and each of four measures of high rank (success in a physical confrontation, 
getting one’s way in the group, community-wide influence and respect).  
Henrich and Henrich (2010) found that, as predicted, prestige (being 
nominated as a yalewa vuku or ‘wise woman’) was positively associated with 
medicinal plant knowledge and age, while controlling for years of education in 
Fijian society. However, medicinal plant knowledge was assessed only indirectly 
as the number of nominations of women considered to know the most about 
medicinal plants (perceived knowledge), rather than direct assessments of actual 
knowledge. In a different study, Henrich and Broesch (2011) tested the same 
predictions in three Fijian villages, although also indirectly. The outcome variable 
there was the probability of an individual being selected as a model from whom 
to learn in each of three domains (fishing, growing yams and medicinal plants). 
Perceived success in another domain (cross-domain success) was used to 
measure prestige. The results supported the prediction of the positive association 
between prestige and knowledge/skill in different domains. Nevertheless, fishing 
and yam growing success were much better predictors of prestige (cross-domain 
success) than plant knowledge. Age was a significant predictor of being selected 
as a model from whom to learn in the domains of growing yams and medicinal 
plant knowledge in one of the villages and of fishing and medicinal plant 
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knowledge in the entire sample. Henrich & Broesch reasoned that, because age 
is an indirect indicator of success, age is a much more relevant cue in domains 
such as medicinal plant knowledge in which there does not exist clear evidence 
of success (see prediction iv in Table 2). This potential explanation constitutes an 
important nuance to the original prediction (prediction ii in Table 1) by H&GW. 
In the Hazda, hunter-gatherers in Tanzania, Stibbard-Hawkes, 
Attenborough, and Marlowe (2018) found that hunting prestige (measured using 
photo-rankings of hunters) positively predicted three measures of actual hunting 
success (aim with bow and arrow, pull strength and knowledge of animal 
vocalizations) but was uncorrelated with a fourth measure (visual acuity). These 
measures were collected by the researchers by implementing tasks such as an 
archery contest or using a digital bow pull scale. Similarly to Von Rueden et al. 
(2008), they found an inverted-U-shaped relationship between age and hunting 
prestige, and age and hunting success, which might be consequence of the 
decline of hunting skill after reaching peak skill at 40-55 years of age.  
While suggestive, most of these studies do not provide clear evidence to 
effectively determine whether prestige is positively associated with 
knowledge/skill and/or age. The most important limitation is that all of the studies 
(except Stibbard-Hawkes et al, 2018 and von Rouden et al., 2008) used 
measures of prestige that cannot be easily equated to H&GW´s original definition 
of prestige. The study by Reyes-Garcia et al. (2008) measured the number of 
nominations of people who were considered “important” within Tsimane villages, 
which led participants to nominate people with formal leadership positions. 
Therefore, it confuses power and prestige. Similarly, Henrich and Broesch’s 
(2011) measure of prestige as cross-domain success is also problematic 
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because prestige was initially considered to be domain-specific (H&GW, p. 170), 
although with some contradictions (“prestigious individuals are influential even 
beyond the domain of expertise”, H&GW, p. 184). Another limitation of some of 
these studies (Henrich & Broesch, 2011; Henrich & Henrich, 2010) is the use of 
perceived success instead of assessing success directly using objective 
measures as in the study by Stibbard-Hawkes et al, 2018. Although perceived 
success and prestige within a domain should be positively correlated given the 
fact that perceptions of success confer prestige, this does not serve to assess the 
adaptive role of prestige bias. In order to be adaptive in the first place, prestige 
should positively correlate with actual success (see prediction iii in Table 2). 
Using the most common answer as a measure of correct knowledge (Reyes-
Garcia et al., 2008) is also problematic, as the most frequent answer might be 
wrong.  
To sum up, it is difficult to convincingly say whether there exists an 
association between prestige and knowledge/skill, and prestige and age. Future 
research should use better defined, or more direct and relevant, measures of 
prestige. However, the reviewed studies are useful for refining the research 
agenda. For example, the inverted U-shaped relationship between prestige and 
age found by Von Rueden et al. (2008) and Stibbard-Hawkes et al, 2018 is more 
plausible than a linear relationship if prestige is correlated with skill and there is 
a decline in physical and cognitive abilities with older age (see H&GW p. 182 and 
Supplementary Materials in Henrich and Henrich, 2010, p.4, see prediction vi in 
Table 2). Moreover, older age might be an inefficient cue of prestige in societies 
where traditional skills/knowledge have decreased in importance and new skills 
have become more important for the community (e.g., speaking Spanish to deal 
with the outside world in Tsimane society, or computer skills in post-industrial 
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technological society). Consequently, older age is a relevant cue of prestige only 
when the environment changes at a relatively slow rate, such that the correlation 
between prestige and knowledge is stable across cultural generations (Henrich, 
2016). Rapid environmental change, however, disrupts the positive correlation 
between valuable knowledge and age as it leads to “a high rate of informational 
obsolescence” (Maxwell & Silverman, 1970, p. 388), which might even lead to 
prestige being conferred on to younger individuals (Spisak, Grabo, Arvey, & van 
Vugt, 2014; see prediction v in Table 2). 
2.4.- Prestige Cues 
 To select the best models from whom to learn, social learners can directly 
assess the competence of different models within a valued domain. For instance, 
seeing a model successfully hunting large prey or scoring several goals during a 
football match leads the social learner to infer that the model is successful within 
those domains. Of course, their success on one day might not be a reliable 
indicator of their general, sustained success within a domain, but the social 
learner can update this information when more information is provided (e.g., the 
results of the next hunting expedition or football match). Nevertheless, assessing 
competence through this procedure may be costly and noisy. Instead, social 
learners can use short-cuts either by making inferences from the appearance, 
personality, material possessions, etc. of the models, which I call first-order cues, 
or by relying on the behaviours of other social learners towards the models, which 
I call second-order cues. Both types of cues can be cheap ways to acquire 
valuable information, although they can also lead to useless or maladaptive 
behaviour.  
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2.4.1.- First-order Cues 
The basis for the usefulness of first-order cues is that these short-cuts are 
usually positively associated with competence within valuable domains and/or 
confer prestige due to their close relationship with competence. For instance, the 
age of a model can be used to infer knowledge and skill as older individuals 
generally have more experience within a valued domain and, therefore, they can 
usually provide higher quality information. This cue is especially used and useful 
for young children as it is less cognitively demanding than other cues such as 
professed knowledge (Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2012). Nevertheless, the 
usefulness of using age to socially learn depends on the social context and the 
pace of environmental change (see Section 2.3).  
Generosity has also been linked to prestige (prediction iii in Table 1) in 
experiments (e.g., Flynn, Reagans, Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006; Halevy, Chou, 
Cohen, & Livingston, 2012; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Willer, 2009) and 
ethnographic observations (e.g., Konečná & Urlacher, 2017; Price, 2003; 
Radcliffe-Brown, 1964). Because prestigious individuals tend to be both 
competent and generous (Cheng & Tracy, 2014; Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010; 
Henrich, 2016), at least towards members of their ingroup, generosity can be 
used as a proxy for competence. According to H&GW, this link is probably due to 
the fact that providing public goods is an excellent way to signal competence and, 
therefore, to receive further deference, which might be translated into fitness 
gains. Nevertheless, wealth is often inherited and, therefore, the relationship 
between being generous (e.g., providing private and public goods to other 
people) and being competent does not always hold. Moreover, generosity might 
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be valued independently to competence (Bai, 2016) due to the direct benefits 
(e.g., private and public goods) provided to the group.  
The self-assessment of one’s ability, which if positive can lead to high self-
confidence, is often used as a proxy for competence. In fact, assertive and 
confident individuals tend to be granted higher social rank within groups 
(Anderson & Kilduff, 2009b). Although confidence is likely to be associated with 
competence in many circumstances (e.g., people who do not know about a topic 
cannot usually communicate their knowledge about it effectively), copying or 
conferring high social rank to overconfident models (i.e., models who 
overestimate their knowledge) might not be the best strategy, as other models 
will outperform them in reality. Similarly, pride displays, which generally occur 
after an achievement, are often proxies for competence and social rank (Tracy, 
Shariff, Zhao, & Henrich, 2013). Nevertheless, the actual relationship with 
competence might depend on the type of pride display (i.e., authentic vs hubristic 
pride, see Cheng et al., 2010). Similarly, job titles within appreciated domains 
(e.g., doctor) and academic titles conferred by leading universities (e.g., Oxford 
or Harvard) also act as prestige cues (Burris, 2004; Dalmaso, Pavan, Castelli, & 
Galfano, 2012) in post-industrial societies. The same can be said for possessing 
wealth (Cheng & Tracy, 2013), prestige goods (Plourde, 2008) and wearing 
particular types of clothing such as suits (Bickman, 1971; DeWall & Maner, 2008; 
Maner, DeWall, & Gailliot, 2008). Nevertheless, it is necessary to emphasize that 
the identification of these cues as prestige cues has a subjective component 
because they depend on the values of the social learners and their social group. 
For instance, wearing a suit might be an inadequate cue of prestige within the 
punk rock scene, while having a multicolour Mohawk can be used as a prestige 
cue within this subculture. Likewise, a successful footballer might not be 
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considered prestigious within a group of people who do not like football, as 
football is not a valuable domain for them. Consequently, research using first-
order prestige cues should ensure that these cues are relevant for the 
participants.  
In summary, although first-order cues have the clear advantage of being 
less cognitively demanding than assessing the success of a model directly, they 
are prone to be unreliable for two reasons. First, the relationship of some of these 
cues (e.g., age, or job titles) with competence depends on the task, context and/or 
rate of ecological and social environmental change. Second, some self-
generated first-order cues (e.g., confidence) are open to cheating or deception, 
especially when prestigious individuals receive material or other benefits. 
Nevertheless, generosity is a self-generated first-order cue which is especially 
difficult to fake (Barclay, 2013). 
2.4.2.- Second-order Cues  
 According to H&GW, individuals give freely conferred deference, pay more 
attention, seek proximity to, and copy, competent individuals (predictions iv-vii in 
Table 1). Consequently, social learners can use the behaviours of other 
individuals towards the models to select models from whom to learn. These 
second-order cues have the advantage of being considerably more difficult to 
fake and of being regularly updated.  
 The voluntary payment of costs (freely-conferred deference) in exchange 
for access to prestigious models (prediction iv in Table 1) is a central aspect of 
H&GW’s theory. H&GW argue that prestigious individuals are respected, receive 
unsolicited help, and are freed from some social obligations because social 
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learners use these deference displays to try to grant themselves (not necessarily 
consciously) preferential access to prestigious individuals to gain valuable social 
learning opportunities. This preferential access to the models is important as 
many different skills contribute to the success of a model within a valued domain. 
H&GW gave the example of the potential factors involved in hunting success such 
as being good at making bows, aiming, tracking and approaching prey as well as 
more indirect factors such as sleeping well or having an appropriate diet to 
maintain good eyesight. (Note, however, that if many people show deference to 
the same individual, the probability of gaining social learning opportunities would 
be small. Therefore, the adaptive value of paying deference to a highly deferred 
demonstrator might be minimal.)  
 Although the study was not conceived to test H&GW’s prediction, van der 
Vegt, Bunderson, and Oosterhof (2006) found that students who self-perceived 
themselves as having low expertise carrying out a research project within four-
person groups were more committed (measured with items like “I am very 
committed to maintain my relationship with X”) and provide more help (measured 
with items like “I assist X with difficult assignments, even when assistance is not 
directly requested”; “I help X when s/he is running behind in his/her work 
activities”) to individuals perceived as experts within their group. Consistent with 
H&GW’s prediction, this suggests that deference (helping and commitment) was 
provided towards perceived experts to incentivise their contribution to the group 
task and receive help from those experts. Importantly, this reciprocity in the 
exchange of help and commitment between members with high and low expertise 
was associated with higher performance in the task. This highlights the adaptive 
nature of this exchange, which has also been shown theoretically by 
Panchanathan (2010). Experimental evidence has also shown that high prestige 
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individuals are paid more attention than low prestige individuals  (Cheng et al., 
2013; Dalmaso, Galfano, Coricelli, & Castelli, 2014; Dalmaso et al., 2012; DeWall 
& Maner, 2008; Foulsham, Cheng, Tracy, Henrich, & Kingstone, 2010; Gerpott, 
Lehmann-Willenbrock, Silvis, & Van Vugt; Maner et al., 2008; Ratcliff, 
Hugenberg, Shriver, & Bernstein, 2011) and that successful individuals tend to 
be copied (Atkisson, O'Brien, & Mesoudi, 2012; Burdett et al., 2016; McElreath et 
al., 2008; Mesoudi, 2008; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013), which provide support 
for H&GW’s predictions about attention (prediction v) and copying (prediction vii 
in Table 1). This makes deferential, attentional and copying cues reliable cues to 
infer the prestige of an individual in a social group.  
 To my knowledge, no research has looked directly at the proximity-
management strategies of social learners towards high prestige individuals. 
However, experimental research with WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrial, 
Rich and Democratic, see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) samples shows 
that prestige positively predicts being liked (Brand & Mesoudi, 2018; Cheng et 
al., 2013), and preferred as a holiday companion, business partner, neighbour 
(Kruger & Fitzgerald, 2011) and long-term mate (Kruger & Fitzgerald, 2011; 
Snyder, Kirkpatrick, & Barrett, 2008). This provides tentative support for H&GW’s 
prediction on proximity-management towards prestigious individuals (prediction 
vi in Table 1). However, it is possible that this proximity-management might be 
motivated by other concerns (e.g., coalitional support) than social learning, which 
is necessary for supporting H&GW’s model. Furthermore, the ethnographical 
record shows little support for the assumption (prediction viii in Table 1) that 
underpins all these predictions, that is the preferential copying of what prestigious 
individuals do (Garfield, Hubbard, et al., 2018). Nevertheless, this absence of 
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evidence might be motivated by the lack of interest of earlier anthropologists in 
social learning.  
2.5.- Prestige-biased Social Learning 
2.5.1.- Prestige and Success Biases  
H&GW predict that prestigious individuals are preferentially copied, which 
is known as prestige bias (prediction viii in Table 1). Importantly, this prediction 
should only hold when both individual learning and the direct assessment of 
knowledge/skill of a model are costly or difficult. When the acquisition of 
knowledge/skill through individual learning is relatively cheap, the use of prestige 
bias (or social learning in general) is less useful. Similarly, when information 
about the success of individuals is directly available, people should use this 
information to select models (success bias) rather than prestige (prediction ix in 
Table 1).  
 Consequently, Atkisson et al. (2012) compared prestige and success 
biases in the laboratory. Participants played a computer-based task in which they 
designed virtual arrowheads over a series of trials (see Mesoudi, 2008; Mesoudi 
& O'Brien, 2008). Participants could improve their arrowhead by either individual 
or social learning. There were three hunting seasons. Prestige information (time 
spent by each of the participants looking at the arrowheads designed by each of 
the four other participants) was provided to participants throughout the 
experiment. Success information (score of the four different individuals who used 
different arrowheads) was only provided in season 3. The results supported the 
prediction about the use of prestige bias: prestige information increased the 
likelihood of an arrowhead being copied during seasons 1 and 2 compared to the 
42 
 
other arrowheads. In contrast, the results did not support the prediction about the 
replacement of prestige bias by success bias when both success and prestige 
information are available: prestige and success cues were used similarly during 
season 3, even though prestige was not correlated with success in the 
experiment.  
This experiment provides convincing evidence for prestige bias. 
Nevertheless, it is not clear why participants used prestige and success cues in 
a similar way in Season 3. Atkisson et al. (2012) argue that participants use 
prestige cues to socially learn in their everyday life and this extends to their 
behaviour in the laboratory. It is also possible that success needs to be observed 
over longer periods of time to replace prestige bias. Alternatively, perhaps 
participants were over-trained to use prestige cues in Seasons 1-2 and carried 
this into Season 3. A replication adding a second condition, in which success 
cues are provided during Seasons 1-2, might clarify this. We might expect 
participants to learn more easily that success cues are superior to prestige cues 
in this case. Finally, it would be interesting to systematically manipulate the 
correlation between prestige and success, to see whether prestige cues are only 
used when prestige is positively correlated with success (see prediction vii in 
Table 2).  
2.5.2.- Variation in the Use of Prestige Bias with Experience and Age 
Exploratory analyses by Atkisson et al. (2012) showed that the use of 
prestige and success biases was greater when participants performed badly in 
the previous three trials. Another circumstance that might prompt greater use of 
these biases is the lack of previous experience within a domain. Consequently, 
the lower level of experience of younger people compared to older people might 
43 
 
make younger people more prone to copy prestigious/successful individuals 
(prediction x in Table 1).  
Little, Caldwell, Jones, and DeBruine (2015) tested this prediction in the 
domain of mate choice. In an initial experiment, female participants rated the 
attractiveness of young, artificially-created male faces paired with female faces 
with different degrees of prestige, which was manipulated by presenting a 
numeric score of popularity. As predicted (prediction viii in Table 1), model 
popularity positively predicted ratings of male face attractiveness. Moreover, 
older participants were less likely to be influenced by the popularity of the models 
than younger participants, consistent with the prediction that prestige bias should 
vary with experience/age. However, a limitation of this experiment is that the male 
faces being rated were all very young. Given evidence that women are less 
attracted to men who are considerably younger than themselves than men who 
are of similar age or older (Buss, 1989; Buunk, Dijkstra, Kenrick, & Warntjes, 
2001; Schwarz & Hassebrauck, 2012), this may explain the age effect rather than 
experience. This was addressed by Little et al. in a subsequent experiment, which 
used real photographs and in which three age groups were used for both 
participants (16-25, 26-32, 32-61) and stimuli (18-25, 26-32, 32-40). Again as 
predicted, model popularity positively predicted the ratings of attractiveness for 
the younger group (16-25 years old) but not for the older groups of participants 
(25-32, 32-61). Nevertheless, the problem remained: a considerable number of 
participants in the oldest group (M=41.6, SD=8.1) were still rating exclusively 
much younger male faces than themselves. Consequently, the interpretation of 
the findings requires similar caution. Moreover, the effect size was more than 
double for the interaction between age of the face and participants’ age 
(p2=0.10) than for the interaction between model popularity and participants’ age 
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(p2=0.04). This suggests that rather than experience-dependent prestige bias, 
Little et al.’s findings can be explained by the congruency between age of faces 
and age of participants. Further experiments should ensure that the stimuli are 
maximally relevant for the participants. 
Contrary to Little et al.’s prediction, the two-stage social learning model 
(Henrich & Broesch, 2011; Henrich & Henrich, 2010; Kline, Boyd, & Henrich, 
2013) predicts a greater use of prestige bias with age/experience. As there exists 
a trade-off between the access costs to different models and the fitness-
enhancing information that can be acquired from the models, social learners 
should first learn from low access cost models (e.g., relatives, neighbours, 
friends) and later further improve their knowledge/skill by copying prestigious 
and/or successful models. This updating process would be more noticeable when 
there is large variation in knowledge/skill within a given domain so that social 
learners would benefit more from copying high competence models using 
success or prestige cues. When the variation is small, most social learners would 
not copy successful/prestigious models because much of the information they 
can learn from them is shared by almost everyone in the social group and, 
therefore, they can learn fitness-enhancing knowledge/skills from low access cost 
models instead (Henrich & Henrich, 2010; see prediction ix in Table 2). 
Mathematical models that include a combination of vertical and oblique 
transmission have shown that, if some members of each generation use model-
based biases (e.g., prestige bias, success bias), fitness-enhancing 
knowledge/skills will spread in a population over generations, leading to the 
emergence of cultural adaptation (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Henrich, 2004; 
Powell, Shennan, & Thomas, 2009). This gives plausibility to the adaptive value 
of the two-stage social learning model.  
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This pattern seems to be the case in the transmission of adaptive food 
taboos related to pregnancy and breastfeeding in Fijian villages. According to 
Henrich and Henrich (2010), the pattern of transmission is mainly from older (i.e., 
mothers, grand-mothers, mothers-in-law) to younger (i.e., daughters, 
granddaughter, daughters-in-law) female relatives. Nevertheless, a substantial 
minority (almost 25%) of participants in this study reported to have learnt the 
taboos from the yalewa vuku (wise women, who were equated to prestigious 
individuals), or the elders (almost 33%). Although this gives tentative support for 
the emergence of cultural adaptation through a combination of vertical and 
oblique transmission, it is not clear whether prestige-biased transmission was 
greater at an older than a younger age. The acquisition of relevant skills for wild 
honey collecting among male Jenu Kuruba in South India also seems to follow 
the two-stage social learning model. According to Demps, Zorondo-Rodríguez, 
García, and Reyes-García (2012), most honey collecting knowledge/skill is 
acquired in this population at younger ages: most people reported to learn tree 
climbing at 6-9, making a smoky torch at 10-15, and cutting honey combs at 16-
21. Importantly, most of the knowledge/skills were learnt from relatives (fathers, 
brothers, and elder kin) but learning from successful individuals and co-workers 
became more important with age. Nevertheless, the two-stage social learning 
model is not specific to the use of prestige cues (see Lucas et al., 2016 for further 
discussion and experimental evidence). 
2.5.3.- Prestige Bias and Overimitation 
If prestige bias is especially likely to be used when success is difficult to 
directly assess (see Section 2.2), people should copy irrelevant actions carried 
out by prestigious individuals when the link between each action and success in 
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the task is not clear for them. Experiments on overimitation, the tendency to copy 
irrelevant actions to obtain a reward, have looked at whether younger children 
overimitate high social rank models. McGuigan (2013) conducted an experiment 
in which 5 year olds viewed videos with one of four models with high or low social 
rank performing irrelevant actions (e.g., removing a bolt) and relevant actions 
(e.g., extracting the sticker with the tool) to obtain a sticker from a transparent 
box. The high social rank models were the participants’ head and class teacher. 
The low social rank models were a familiar model (a researcher who had carried 
out research with the children during the previous week) and an unfamiliar model 
(a totally unacquainted individual for the children). As predicted, children copied 
irrelevant actions significantly more when they came from the high social rank 
models than from the low social rank models. Nevertheless, pairwise 
comparisons only found significant differences between the head teacher and 
both low rank models. Moreover, the copying of relevant actions was not affected 
by models’ rank. Alternative factors, rather than prestige, might account for the 
results, as the high rank models were also more familiar to the children and held 
a position of authority over them. 
In contrast, Chudek, Baron, and Birch (2016) obtained findings that cast 
doubt on importance of model-based biases in overimitation. Children aged 2-7 
years viewed videos with two female adult models trying to obtain stickers from 
a puzzle box. In one condition, the models had low or high prestige, which was 
manipulated by showing two individuals carefully looking at the actions performed 
by one model (high prestige) while ignoring the actions of the other model (low 
prestige). In another condition, the models had high or low success, which was 
manipulated by the models either saying they obtained five (high success) or zero 
(low success) stickers. While overimitation generally increased with age, there 
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was no selectivity at any age: the children were equally likely to overimitate 
successful and unsuccessful, and prestigious and non-prestigious, models. 
Importantly, these negative results were found using models who were not 
familiar to the children and who did not have a position of authority over them, 
suggesting that these factors might have driven the selective overimitation in 
McGuigan’s (2013) experiment.  
2.5.4.- Prestige Bias Beyond the Domain of Prestige  
 H&GW predict that prestigious individuals are influential beyond their 
domain of expertise (prediction xi in Table 1). This prediction is based on the 
following assumption: as it is difficult or costly to identify the factors that make 
someone successful within a valued domain, natural selection should have 
favoured a general-copying bias towards the prestigious, in the hope that at least 
one of the many characteristics that are copied are causally related to success. 
For instance, many factors might lead to being a successful hunter (tracking skill, 
ability and materials use to make bows, sleeping well, etc.) and, consequently, a 
general copying bias of all of these traits associated with the prestigious might be 
adaptive, at the occasional cost of copying neutral or maladaptive traits (e.g., 
wearing a magic charm, or being tattooed). This general social learning bias 
towards prestigious individuals might help to explain why the opinions of 
prestigious individuals within a given domain (e.g., acting or singing in Western 
society or hunting in a foraging society) are influential in other domains (e.g., 
Arnocky, Bozek, Dufort, Rybka, & Hebert, 2018; Jackson & Darrow, 2005; Lee, 
1979, p. 343; Radcliffe-Brown, 1964, p. 64; Smith & Bird, 2000). Another 
possibility not considered by H&GW is that there exist domain-general traits that 
are likely to lead to success in multiple domains, such as having an inner locus 
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of control, intrinsic motivation, general intelligence / IQ, or being perseverant and 
self-disciplined. These domain-general traits might explain in part the success of 
some celebrities such as Will Smith (acting, rapping) or Arnold Schwarzenegger 
(bodybuilding, acting, politics) across multiple domains (although being famous 
itself may also have helped them to achieve success in other domains). 
Nevertheless, a cross-domain social learning bias towards the prestigious might 
sometimes cause the acquisition of maladaptive information and, consequently, 
it should be expected that the influence of prestigious individuals is larger within 
their domain of prestige.  
 To test this, Chudek, Heller, Birch, and Henrich (2012) conducted two 
studies with 3-4 years olds. The manipulation of prestige involved varying the 
degree of attention that two different models received from other individuals. The 
models then showed a preference for one of two foods, drinks, artefacts or labels 
for novel objects. Afterwards, children’s preferences for the same item pairs were 
tested. The results for the first study supported prestige-biased social learning 
(prediction viii in Table 1), as children were more likely to share the preferences 
of the prestigious model over the non-prestigious model. The second study in 
which the models displayed preferences only in one of two domains (food or 
artefacts) also provided support for the prestige-biased social learning 
hypotheses, but confined within the domain of prestige. That is, children followed 
the preference of the prestigious model only for the specific domain in which they 
saw that model exhibit preferences. Consequently, this study did not provide 
support for H&GW’s prediction of cross-domain prestige-biased social learning. 
Future studies might benefit from studying more directly the two aforementioned 
mechanisms that favour cross-domain prestige bias, as they make specific and 
as-yet untested predictions. From the first mechanism (general copying bias) it 
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follows that cross-domain prestige bias should occur when cues are noisy within 
the tested domain (see prediction x in Table 2). From the second mechanism 
(cross-domain general ability) it follows that cross-domain prestige bias should 
occur when there are domain-general traits like IQ that make people successful 
across domains (see prediction xi in Table 2).  
2.5.5.- Comparisons between Prestige and Content Biases  
 Although theoretically prestige-biased social learning is generally 
adaptive, so are other social learning biases, and it is instructive to compare 
people’s use of prestige bias relative to other biases. Acerbi and Tehrani (2018) 
conducted two studies that compare the strength of content and prestige in 
cultural transmission. Content biases occur when certain types of material are 
preferentially transmitted, in contrast to model-based biases such as prestige 
bias where characteristics of the model are used. Acerbi and Tehrani (2018) 
chose the topic of quotations because it is a domain in which both content (the 
message of the quote) and prestige (e.g., frequent misattribution of quotes to 
famous people) are relevant. First, participants rated a series of unattributed 
quotes for their likeability, i.e., content. Then, they tested whether quotes 
associated with famous (i.e., prestigious) individuals (e.g., Vincent Van Gogh) 
were more liked than the same quotes associated with non-famous individuals 
invented by the researchers (e.g., Winston Perkins). The results showed no 
statistical difference in liking ratings between quotes associated with the high and 
low prestige individuals. Instead, liking was significantly predicted by the original 
likeability ratings of the quotes when unattributed. This suggests that the content 
of the quotations is more important than the attributed authorship of the quotation.  
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 Acerbi and Tehrani argue that the lack of evidence for prestige bias in their 
study might have been because the task did not require any kind of expertise. 
Furthermore, participants did not obtain higher or lower rewards for preferring 
some quotations over others. Consequently, the use of prestige bias was not 
useful here as participants could easily assess the likability of the quotes by 
themselves without any cost (see prediction viii in Table 2). Alternatively, people 
might have assumed that the “low prestige” names were “high prestige” too but 
that they had not heard of them before.  
 As was argued in Section 2.5.2, the usefulness of prestige bias (and social 
learning in general) should depend on people’s expertise. When people lack 
experience within a given domain, they should benefit more from using prestige 
cues to select models from whom to learn (prediction ix in Table 1). However, 
Verpooten and Dewitte (2017) predicted and found support for the opposite 
prediction for the appreciation of modern art. i.e.,Like Acerbi and Tehrani, they 
used a subjective task in which there was no objectively correct or incorrect 
answer. Laypeople and art experts were shown portraits of female faces, which 
varied in attractiveness (moderate vs high attractiveness). In one condition, 
participants were shown these pictures without any additional information. In 
another condition, participants were told that the pictures belonged to a collection 
of a prestigious museum in New York (MoMA). As predicted, laypeople’s 
appreciation was guided by the content of the pictures, showing more 
appreciation for the highly attractive faces than the moderately attractive faces 
with little influence of the prestige manipulation. As was also predicted, experts 
showed more appreciation for the pictures associated with the prestigious 
museum. This relationship was mediated by admiration towards the artists, which 
is consistent with H&GW’s theory (see Section 2.2). Surprisingly, they also found 
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that experts appreciated more the moderately attractive faces than the highly 
attractive faces. In another study, Verpooten (2018) used real artworks from 
MoMA, which depicted animate (e.g., pig) or inanimate (e.g., chair) objects. 
According to evolutionary psychologists (New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007), 
people have an evolved preference for animate over inanimate objects, which the 
authors predicted would guide the behaviour of non-experts. Consistent with this, 
there was an overall preference for animate over inanimate objects. Again, 
however, this was moderated by expertise. The greater the expertise of the 
participants, the less the participants appreciated the animate over the inanimate 
artworks, to the extent the preferences reversed in the top experts. Verpooten 
and Dewitte (2017), inspired by previous work (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Prum, 
2013), argue that the experts’ deviations in artwork preferences from evolved 
aesthetic preferences might be due to a runaway process analogous to a runway 
sexual selection  in which the trait (here, artworks) coevolves with preferences 
within a population of art experts.  
The contradiction between prediction ix in Table 1, which predicts a greater use 
of prestige bias by non-experts, and the results of the studies by Verpooten, 
which found a greater use of prestige bias by experts than non-experts, is likely 
due to a combination of two factors. First, the appreciation of art is a more relevant 
task for experts than for non-experts. Second, the assessment of quality of art is 
a difficult task, which requires to take into account many variables. Consequently, 
the greater relevance of the art domain for experts than for non-experts plus the 
difficulty of the task might make experts to rely on prestige cues to assess the 
value of different pieces of art.  Although the research covered in this section 
is interesting with respect to the general phenomenon of prestige, it is not clear 
how the likability of quotes or artworks is related to social learning. Although a 
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greater appreciation of a cultural item probably leads to the greater 
transmissibility of that item, this may not always be the case. Disgust-inducing 
information, for instance, is not particularly liked, yet several studies have shown 
that it has a transmission advantage (Eriksson & Coultas, 2014; Heath, Bell, & 
Sternberg, 2001; Miton, Claidiere, & Mercier, 2015), at least, in WEIRD samples 
(Eriksson, Coultas, & de Barra, 2016). For instance, an offensive comment on 
Twitter (e.g., one that is overtly racist) or Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain might be 
disgusting and be disliked by many people, but this in itself could contribute to 
these items’ greater transmission by commenting on them or drawing attention to 
them. Future studies should test the differential effects of the content of the 
information and the prestige associated to the source by designing experiments 
that measure transmission in a more direct way using, for instance, experimental 
paradigms such as transmission chains (Bartlett, 1932; Mesoudi, 2007) and 
choose-to-transmit (Eriksson & Coultas, 2014; Heath et al., 2001; Stubbersfield, 
Tehrani, & Flynn, 2014) and choose-to-receive (Eriksson & Coultas, 2014; 
Stubbersfield et al., 2014) methods.  
2.6.- Final Remarks and Future Directions  
 In this article, I have reviewed the evidence amassed for the adaptiveness 
and use of prestige bias in human adults and children since the publication of 
H&GW’s influential paper and suggested new predictions and research questions 
(see Table 2). Although H&GW predicted that prestige is positively correlated with 
both skill/knowledge within valued domains and age (predictions i-ii in Table 1), 
the specific tests of these claims inspired by H&GW’s theory suggest a more 
complex picture. Above all, the positive association between prestige and both 
knowledge/skill and age heavily depends on the stability of the social and 
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ecological environment. When there is rapid social change, the skills/knowledge 
that were important and valuable in the past might not be any longer. 
Nevertheless, people might still confer prestige according to old-fashioned 
values, which would disrupt the predicted positive correlation between prestige 
and knowledge/skill. Alternatively, people might confer prestige according to new 
values that confer importance to the skills that are relevant nowadays. In this 
case, if the researchers measure the correlation between prestige and a 
particular domain of knowledge/skill that has lost its importance within a society, 
the predicted positive association between prestige and knowledge/skill would be 
disrupted (see predictions i-iii in Table 2). The same can be said about the 
predicted positive correlation between prestige and age. Age is a good cue of 
knowledge/skill when the social and ecological environment is relatively stable 
and life expectancy does not go much beyond an age at which the degradation 
of cognitive and physical skills starts. When there is rapid environmental change, 
older age might be an inadequate cue to select models from whom to learn and 
sometimes even younger models might be preferred. Moreover, the degradation 
of cognitive and physical skills with age might moderate the positive association 
between age and knowledge/skill and favour a plateau or a decline at older age. 
Future research should explore how social and ecological change and the age-
dependency in skill/knowledge within different domains affects the association 
between prestige, knowledge/skill and age (see predictions v-vi in Table 2).  
The evidence reviewed in this article provides mixed support for the use 
of prestige-biased social learning in both human adults and children. However, 
few studies have examined this and further research is needed to clarify which 
factors lead to variation in the use of prestige-biased social learning. The difficulty 
of the task, the relevance of the domain for the individuals and the benefits and 
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costs associated with the task seem to be important factors influencing the use 
of prestige-biased social learning (see prediction viii in Table 2). In general, easy 
tasks, tasks that are not relevant for participants and tasks that do not provide 
incentives to perform well or avoid costs (e.g., monetary rewards or costs) seem 
not to stimulate the use of prestige-biased social learning (Acerbi & Tehrani, 
2018). Other factors taken into account in the literature, such as experience and 
age (Little et al., 2015) seem to be important when they affect task difficulty, the 
relevance of the domain for the participants and potential gains or costs of the 
task for the participants. For instance, expertise leads to a greater use of prestige-
biased social learning when the task is more relevant for the experts but the task 
is still difficult for them (Verpooten & Dewitte, 2017). Similarly, younger individuals 
use more prestige-biased social learning than older individuals when the task is 
more relevant for them (Little et al., 2015). Moreover, when there is little variation 
in knowledge/skill in a group, it is more adaptive to learn from low access cost 
models than from costly prestigious models (Henrich & Henrich, 2010; see 
prediction ix in Table 2). 
Another factor that influences the use of prestige-biased social learning is 
the availability of alternative social learning biases, e.g., success or content 
biases. When success information is provided, this information should be 
preferentially used over prestige information (prediction ix in Table 1). However, 
this was not found in the sole experiment comparing prestige with success bias 
(Atkisson et al., 2012), although this is a single study. Both direct and conceptual 
replications are needed to gain confidence in this result. Content bias was 
stronger than prestige bias in another study (Acerbi & Tehrani, 2018), but this 
might depend on the domain and the factors mentioned above (i.e., task difficulty, 
relevance for the individual, and benefits and costs associated with the task). 
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Variation in some of these factors (e.g., the relevance for the participants) might 
lead some participants (e.g., non-experts) to make use of content biases, while 
other participants (e.g., experts) to employ prestige-biased social learning 
(Verpooten & Dewitte, 2017).  
 It is also possible that prestige biased social learning has different effects 
on different measures of influence, e.g., recall, likability, behavioural influence, 
willingness to transmit and receive information. To the extent these measures of 
influence affect task difficulty, relevance for the participants or the benefits/costs 
associated with tasks, it seems plausible that the different measures would be a 
source of variation in the use of prestige and other social learning biases. For 
instance, although one recent study found that anti-vaccination messages are not 
better transmitted per se, exploratory analyses showed that when anti-
vaccination messages are provided by doctors (i.e., a prestigious source within a 
relevant domain) these types of messages are especially powerful in influencing 
people’s vaccination-related decisions (Jiménez, Stubbersfield, & Tehrani, 2018). 
Similarly, although people might be able to appreciate the content of certain 
pieces of information (e.g., quotes, news, artworks, etc.) independent of the 
prestige of the source of the information, they might be more influenced by 
prestige cues when they want to achieve influence over other people’s behaviour 
(e.g., by quoting a prestigious source of information), get personal or social 
benefits (e.g., choosing artworks to be displayed in their own town) or they have 
to decide whether to learn more about a topic or transmit the information about 
the topic to other people. Therefore, research on prestige-biased social learning 
might benefit from comparing the influence of prestige cues on different types of 
outcomes.  
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 Although H&GW predicted that prestige-biased social learning is cross-
domain such that prestige in one domain bleeds across to other domains 
(prediction xi in Table 1), the only experiment testing this hypothesis found that 
prestige-biased social learning is stronger within domains (Chudek et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence (e.g., the influence of the opinions of 
celebrities in domains in which they are not experts) suggests that cross-domain 
prestige-biased social learning occurs to some extent. In small-scale societies, it 
is likely that prestigious individuals are relatively skilful/knowledgeable across 
multiple domains and, consequently, a cross-domain prestige bias would be 
adaptive (Acerbi, 2016), albeit leading to the occasional acquisition of irrelevant 
or even maladaptive information. However, the risks of cross-domain prestige-
biased social learning seem considerably higher in the digital era in which, for 
example, young people in developing countries might be more influenced by 
American pop singers, Hollywood celebrities or leaders of terrorist groups than 
by the nearby adults who have relevant skills for their environment (Barkow, 
O'Gorman, & Rendell, 2012). Consequently, studying to what extent the digital 
media have subverted the adaptive role of prestige-biased social learning seems 
a productive new avenue for research on prestige and social learning (Acerbi, 
2016; Barkow et al., 2012). 
  H&GW predicted that information provided by prestigious individuals is 
more memorable. However, this question has not been studied yet. If H&GW are 
correct and prestige-based hierarchies evolved to select fitness-enhancing 
models from whom to learn, prestige-biased social learning should strongly affect 
human memory. However, it is possible that the effects of prestige on memory 
are just the consequence of the preferential attention that prestigious individuals 
receive (see Section 2.4.2). Therefore, studies exploring how prestige cues affect 
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memory should look at how differential attention towards prestigious and non-
prestigious individuals affects memorability (e.g., by using eye-tracking).  
 In conclusion, H&GW’s theory of the evolution of prestige has generated 
a great deal of research and this research has stimulated new research questions 
and predictions. Although the evidence reviewed here suggest that prestige-bias 
social learning is employed in at least some contexts, further research will need 
to determine the precise circumstances in which people use prestige cues to 
learn socially, and when the use of these cues is adaptive.  
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CHAPTER 3:  
Prestige Does Not Affect the Cultural Transmission of 
Novel Controversial Arguments in an Online 
Transmission Chain Experiment 
This chapter has been adapted with minor revisions from Jiménez, Á. V., & 
Mesoudi, A. (2019, July 10). Prestige does not affect the cultural transmission of 
novel controversial arguments in an online transmission chain experiment. 
Preprint at: https://psyarxiv.com/3u9wh. This chapter has been accepted for 
publication in the Journal of Cognition and Culture and it is currently in press.  
Contributions:  
This chapter was conceptualised by Alex Mesoudi and me. Experimental design, 
preparation of the materials, programming of the experiment with Qualtrics, data 
collection, data analysis and interpretation was all conducted by myself. Original 
draft was written by me. It was reviewed and edited by Alex Mesoudi and me.  
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3.0.- Abstract 
Cultural evolutionary theories define prestige as social rank that is freely 
conferred on individuals possessing superior knowledge or skill, in order to gain 
opportunities to learn from such individuals. Consequently, information provided 
by prestigious individuals should be more memorable, and hence more likely to 
be culturally transmitted, than information from non-prestigious sources, 
particularly for novel, controversial arguments about which pre-existing opinions 
are absent or weak. It has also been argued that this effect extends beyond the 
prestigious individual’s relevant domain of expertise. I tested whether the prestige 
and relevance of the sources of novel, controversial arguments affected the 
transmission of those arguments, independently of their content. In a four-
generation linear transmission chain experiment, British participants (N=192) 
recruited online read two conflicting arguments in favour of or against the 
replacement of textbooks by computer tablets in schools. Each of the two 
conflicting arguments was associated with one of three sources with different 
levels of prestige and relevance (high prestige, high relevance; high prestige, low 
relevance; low prestige, low relevance). Participants recalled the pro-tablets and 
anti-tablets arguments associated with each source and their recall was then 
passed to the next participant within their chain. Contrary to my predictions, I did 
not find a reliable effect of either the prestige or relevance of the sources of 
information on transmission fidelity. I discuss whether the lack of a reliable effect 
of prestige on recall might be a consequence of differences between how prestige 
operates in this experiment and in everyday life.  
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3.1.- Introduction 
The diffusion of knowledge, skills, attitudes, norms and other forms of 
information within societies via cultural transmission (or social learning) depends 
not only on the content of that information, but also on the characteristics of the 
source of the information. For example, when Hollywood actor Angelina Jolie 
wrote a newspaper article about her decision to undergo a preventive double 
mastectomy due to testing positive for a gene associated with breast cancer 
(Jolie, 2013), there followed an increase in online searches for information about 
breast cancer (Juthe, Zaharchuk, & Wang, 2015), increased demand for genetic 
screening of this disease (Desai & Jena, 2016), and an increase in the number 
of referrals to undergo similar preventive operations (Evans et al., 2015). While 
the content of Jolie’s article surely played some role, it seems plausible that her 
prominence and success as an actor also influenced the subsequent spread of 
knowledge regarding breast cancer screening. 
This distinction between the content and the source of culturally 
transmitted information has received much attention in the field of cultural 
evolution, which seeks to provide general explanations for cultural change that 
are rooted in both psychology and evolutionary theory (Henrich, 2015; Mesoudi, 
2011). My focus here is on the sources of culturally transmitted information:. 
Cultural evolution researchers call this model-based transmission bias (Henrich 
& McElreath, 2003; Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013), referring to the transmission 
advantage of information provided by models with specific characteristics such 
as being successful, older, genetically related, or prestigious. Such biases are 
typically evolutionarily adaptive. For example, learning from models who are 
successful (e.g., knowledgeable or skilful) within a valued domain generally leads 
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to the acquisition of fitness-enhancing knowledge/skills. Therefore, preferentially 
copying successful models (success bias) is typically an adaptive strategy when 
the knowledge or skill cannot easily be acquired on one’s own, via asocial 
learning. 
  However, assessing the knowledge or skill of potential models within a 
domain is often difficult. The learner may not have enough expertise to correctly 
infer the quality of others’ information. Even if they do, this inference may be 
costly, for example requiring lengthy observation of the model to ensure their 
success is not due to luck. To reduce these costs, Henrich and Gil-White (2001) 
suggested that social learners use short-cuts to infer the success of models from 
whom to learn. These shortcuts might involve using fixed characteristics of 
models such as job titles (first-order cues) or behaviours displayed by other 
individuals towards the model, such as the amount of attention paid by others to 
the model (second-order cues) (Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019). The use of these 
shortcuts is known as prestige bias or prestige-biased social learning (Henrich & 
Gil-White, 2001; Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019). Prestige bias is adaptive (Henrich & 
Gil-White, 2001; Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019) because prestige (e.g., amount of 
attention received by a model) is associated with high knowledge or skill within 
valued domains (Garfield, Hubbard, & Hagen, 2019; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; 
Stibbard-Hawkes, Attenborough, & Marlowe, 2018; Von Rueden, 2014), although 
see Reyes-Garcia et al. (2008). 
If there is a positive relationship between the success and prestige of a 
model, then using prestige cues to select models from whom to learn (prestige 
bias) is a cheaper way to acquire mostly valuable knowledge/skills than 
assessing directly the competence of the model (success bias). 
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My aim in this study is to experimentally test whether information attributed 
to prestigious sources is culturally transmitted with greater fidelity than 
information attributed to non-prestigious sources, as predicted by Henrich and 
Gil-White (2001). I use the transmission chain design (Bartlett, 1932; Mesoudi, 
2007) in which participants are asked to recall written information, and the 
resulting recall is passed to the next participant to read and recall and so on down 
the chain. This can reveal cumulative effects of hypothesised transmission 
biases. The information transmitted along the chains consists of opposing 
arguments about a novel and controversial issue: the replacement of textbooks 
by computer tablets at primary school. I was not interested in the issue itself (i.e., 
the content), only in the effects of prestige on its transmission (i.e., the source). I 
chose this issue because, although it engenders some debate (e.g., Kleeman, 
2014; Rowan, 2014), it is an issue that is not widely discussed and about which 
people lack polarized attitudes or detailed prior knowledge. Therefore, people’s 
attitudes towards tablets are unlikely to strongly affect the transmission of these 
arguments, minimising the influence of both content biases and individual 
judgement. 
Previous research provides some evidence that prestige affects both recall 
in a single individual, and cultural transmission from one individual to another. 
Holtgraves, Srull, and Socall (1989) had participants read conversations between 
two people. One group of participants were told that one of the speakers was 
higher status than the other. Another group were told that the two speakers had 
equal status. As predicted, statements were more likely to be recalled when they 
were thought to come from a high status speaker, compared to the same remarks 
made in the equal status condition. However, this effect only occurred when the 
status information was provided before reading the conversations; no effect was 
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found when status information was provided afterwards. There was also no effect 
of status when the conversations were acted out, rather than read. Ratcliff, 
Hugenberg, Shriver, and Bernstein (2011), meanwhile, found that participants 
were better at recognising faces associated with prestigious professions (e.g., 
CEOs or doctors) than faces associated with non-prestigious professions (e.g., 
mechanics or plumbers). However, this study did not address whether information 
provided by prestigious individuals was more memorable or how prestige affected 
the cultural transmission of information. 
Other studies have found evidence for prestige-biased cultural 
transmission. Atkisson, O'Brien, and Mesoudi (2012) found that participants 
preferentially copied virtual artifact designs that purported to come from models 
who received more attention from other participants. These prestige cues were 
even used as equally often as direct success information. Chudek, Heller, Birch, 
and Henrich (2012) similarly found that children preferentially copied the choice 
of toy or food from an adult model to whom others had attended to, compared to 
models who were ignored by others. While suggestive, these studies did not 
examine the long-term effect of prestige along chains of participants, as afforded 
by the transmission chain method, nor did they examine the transmission of 
controversial arguments, as I did here. The latter is particularly important because 
of cases such as Angelina Jolie’s endorsement of breast cancer screening, or 
(more troublingly) the endorsement of anti-vaccination arguments by celebrities 
such as Jenny McCarthy, where prestigious individuals appear to influence the 
adoption of controversial or unfamiliar arguments. 
This leads to our secondary aim, which is to explore whether the effect of 
prestige on cultural transmission extends beyond the domain of expertise of the 
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information source. This seems to occur when, for example, an actor has an 
effect in a medical domain like breast screening or vaccination. Although prestige 
bias should be more beneficial within the domain of expertise of the prestigious 
model (within-domain prestige bias), the theory (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; 
Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019) assumes that people should copy prestigious 
individuals beyond their domain of expertise (cross-domain prestige bias): (i) 
when success information in the domain of interest is unavailable and asocial 
learning in that domain is costly or difficult (general copying bias) and (ii) when 
there is a positive correlation in skill between domains due to general 
characteristics such as IQ or perseverance that lead the model to be successful 
across multiple domains (cross-domain general ability). The first of these, at least, 
would apply to controversial arguments for which people have little pre-existing 
knowledge. 
However, the evidence regarding cross-domain prestige bias is mixed. In 
the aforementioned study by Chudek et al. (2012), the effect of prestige did not 
extend beyond the domain within which the model expressed a choice. For 
example, a prestigious model’s choice of food did not affect whether their choice 
of toy was also copied. Cases such as the ‘Angelina Jolie effect’ remain anecdotal 
and ambiguous, given the difficulty of using observational data to determine 
cause-effect relationships. When Jolie wrote her article, there was already 
growing interest in genetic screening for cancer, and guidelines about detecting 
breast cancer had just been published by public health organisations (Acerbi, 
2019). Moreover, it is difficult to separate the effect of the content of the 
information she provided from the effect of her prestige. Given this ambiguous 
but limited evidence, there is a need for more experimental tests of the domain 
generality of prestige. 
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Consequently, I sought to test whether the influence of prestige on cultural 
transmission only occurs in the relevant domain of expertise of the prestigious 
model, or whether it extends beyond the relevant domain. I therefore used three 
sources that varied in prestige and relevance: a relevant high prestige source 
(Head of the Department of Education of a leading university), an irrelevant high 
prestige source (aircraft pilot), and an irrelevant low prestige source (cleaner). 
Prestige was manipulated using job titles (a first-order cue), following previous 
non-transmission chain experiments (Dalmaso, Galfano, Coricelli, & Castelli, 
2014; Dalmaso, Pavan, Castelli, & Galfano, 2012; Ratcliff et al., 2011). This 
contrasts with typical manipulations of prestige in the cultural evolution literature, 
which usually entails a second-order cue: the amount of attention displayed by 
other individuals to the model (Atkisson et al., 2012; Chudek, Baron, & Birch, 
2016; Chudek et al., 2012). Nevertheless, both types of cues should be positively 
correlated given that individuals with prestigious job titles (e.g., doctors) tend to 
be paid more attention by others (Dalmaso et al., 2014; Dalmaso et al., 2012; 
Ratcliff et al., 2011), due to both cues being used as proxies for competence. 
In light of the above theory and evidence, I preregistered 
(https://osf.io/pk2rz/, see SM1a) the following two hypotheses:  
H1: The arguments provided by high prestige sources will be better 
recalled over generations than arguments provided by low prestige 
sources. 
H2: The arguments provided by high relevance sources will be better 
recalled over generations than the arguments provided by low relevance 
sources. 
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3.2.- Methods 
3.2.1.- Ethical Statement 
The study was approved by the Biosciences Ethical Committee at the 
University of Exeter Cornwall Campus on the 6th June 2017 (Ref 2017/1963).   
3.2.2.- Participants 
Participants were recruited online through Prolific (www.prolific.ac) (Peer, 
Samat, Brandimarte, & Acquisti, 2016) following the procedure stated in the 
preregistration (https://osf.io/pk2rz/, see SM1a). I used pre-screening filters to 
select participants who had not previously participated in any of our studies on 
Prolific, had an approval rating of 90% or above, were aged 18-60 years, spoke 
English as a first language and had British nationality. The data was collected at 
four different times (one for each “cultural generation”), with 48 participants per 
generation across 48 separate, parallel chains. 48 chains were necessary to 
provide two replications of each of the 24 counterbalanced versions of the 
experimental materials (see Section 2.4). Participants were paid at a rate of 
£5.25/hour for an estimated time of completion of 20 minutes for generations 1 
and 2 and 15 minutes for generations 3 and 4.  
I excluded from the dataset participants who (i) failed the attentional check 
(“If you are carefully reading the questions, select ‘Green’”), or (ii) failed the 
manipulation check to identify the professions (i.e., manipulation of prestige) of 
the sources of the information, or (iii) read both sets of arguments (pro- and anti-
tablets) in less than 10 seconds (148 words/minute). The latter exclusion criterion 
was changed compared to the preregistered protocol, which originally specified 
a cutoff of 27 seconds (400 words/minute). After seeing the data for the first wave 
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of participants it became apparent that the original cutoff was too strict and 
unnecessarily excluded large numbers of participants who had provided valid 
data. The new cutoff was derived from inspection of the data: three participants 
who read the material in less than 10 seconds (1080 words/minute) were unable 
to recall anything, while amongst the remaining participants there was no 
relationship between time spent reading the materials and the number of 
propositions correctly recalled (Bayesian multilevel Poisson logistic model 
predicting the number of propositions correctly recalled by the time spent reading 
each of the materials associated with each source and intercepts varying by 
participant: B=0.001, SE=0.003, 89% CI [-0.003, 0.005])2, confirming that these 
participants provided valid data.  
Excluded participants were replaced by new participants. Overall, I 
collected responses from 288 participants (203 females, 85 males) aged 18-613 
(M=34.57, SD=10.12), with 192 of these participants (143 females, 49 males) 
aged 18-61 (M=35.10, SD=10.11) being included in the study.   
3.2.3.- Materials 
To select the sources of information, I asked an independent sample of 10 
Prolific participants (5 females, 5 males) aged 19-42 (M=28.8, SD=7.16) to rate 
24 professions on their prestige within society and their relevance for the debate 
over whether tablets should replace books in schools. Ratings were given on a 
                                                          
2 Throughout the thesis, I am using 89% credible intervals, instead the conventional 95% credible intervals, 
as McElrearth (2015) recommends to avoid readers thinking in terms of significance tests. There is no 
statistical reason to prefer one over the other. 89% is chosen because it is a prime number, 95% is chosen 
because is a convention.  
3 Although in the pre-screening I selected an age range of 18-60, 1 participant was 61 years old in the 
experiment. This was probably a natural consequence of the pass of time, since participants reported 
their age for the pre-screening prior the participation in the study. 
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7-point Likert scale from “not prestigious at all” or “extremely irrelevant” (-3) to 
“extremely prestigious” or “extremely relevant” (+3), respectively. I selected three 
sources who differed in their level of prestige and relevance: the Head of 
Education of a leading university (high prestige: M=1.6, SD=1.1; high relevance: 
M=2.4, SD=0.8), an aircraft pilot (high prestige: M=1.5, SD=1.2; low relevance: 
M=-2.1, SD=1.3) and a cleaner (low prestige: M=-2.6, SD=1; and low relevance: 
M=-2.2, SD=1.2). See Appendix A.2. for a full list of professions and their 
associated ratings4.  
In the experimental materials, the sources of information were associated 
with one of two sets of arguments in favour of and against the replacement of 
textbooks by computer tablets at primary school. Two different names (“William 
Healey” 5 and “Daniel Bryanson”) were used for the sources, as each participant 
read the information about two sources and their associated arguments. Their 
names and the order of presentation were fully counterbalanced. The sources 
were described as follows:  
Head of Education of a leading university (high prestige, high relevance) 
William Healey [Daniel Bryanson] is the Head of the Department of 
Education of a leading university. Outside of his job, he [also] volunteers for the 
                                                          
4 This procedure to select professions to use in the experiment on the basis of the means of ratings on a 
Likert scale is a standard practice in psychology. However, this practice contradicts what students are 
taught about ordinal variables in statistical courses. Ordinal variables are categorical variables that are 
ordered but the distances between adjacent categories might be different. Consequently, this precludes 
carrying out mathematical operations such as addition, subtraction, multiplication and divisions with 
them to obtain means and standard deviations. As I became more aware of the consequences of treating 
ordinal variables as continuous (Liddell & Kruschke, 2018) after data collection, I report descriptive 
statistics in SM1B that are more adequate for ordinal variables, such as medians.  
5 In the preregistration, I used the name “William Yellowfield”. When I was piloting the experiment, a 
colleague commented that this name was obviously made-up. Therefore, I decided to change it to William 
Healey for the experiment.  
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Australian Learning Trust. As a volunteer, Professor Healey [Bryanson] visits 
schools once a fortnight and teaches the children the importance of his job for 
society. He firmly supports the replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at 
primary schools for the following reasons: [He is firmly against the replacement 
of textbooks by computer tablets at primary school for the following reasons:] 
Aircraft pilot (high prestige, low relevance) 
William Healey [Daniel Bryanson] is a commercial Aircraft pilot who 
regularly flies between Auckland and Madrid, Paris, Amsterdam and other 
European destinations. Outside of his job, he [also] volunteers for the Australian 
Learning Trust. As a volunteer, Mr Healey [Bryanson] visits schools once a 
fortnight and teaches the children the importance of his job for society. He firmly 
supports the replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at primary schools for 
the following reasons: [He is firmly against the replacement of textbooks by 
computer tablets at primary school for the following reasons:] 
Cleaner (low prestige, low relevance) 
William Healey [Daniel Bryanson] works as a cleaner in a telemarketing 
company. Outside of his job, he volunteers for the Australian Learning Trust. As 
a volunteer, Mr. Healey [Mr Bryanson] visits schools once a fortnight and teaches 
the children about the importance of his job for society. He firmly supports the 
replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at primary school for the following 
reasons: [He is firmly against the replacement of textbooks by computer tablets 
at primary school for the following reasons:]  
Table 3 shows the full list of arguments in favour of (‘pro-tablets’) and 
against (‘anti-tablets’) the replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at 
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primary school. ‘Pro-tablets’ arguments pointed out both the advantages of 
tablets (e.g., “Computer tablets permit the storage of hundreds of books and the 
instant access to those books from everywhere”) and the disadvantages of books 
(e.g., “The continuous carrying of textbooks from home to school gives long-term 
back pain to our children”). ‘Anti-tablets’ arguments pointed out both the 
advantages of books (e.g., “Textbooks can last hundreds of years and they don’t 
require electricity or batteries to work”) and the disadvantages of tablets (e.g., 
“The continuous use of devices with screens such as computer tablets gives long-
term vision problems to our children”). Both sets of arguments were created with 
the explicit intention of being balanced and covering similar topics. Both sets 
included arguments about the impact of computer tablets and textbooks on 
health, the environment, children’s learning, student distraction, control by the 
teacher, parental support and technical aspects such as storage, accessibility, 
durability and battery life. Both sets of arguments were inspired by the pros and 
cons arguments compiled by ProCon.org (https://tablets-textbooks.procon.org/).  
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‘Pro-tablets’ arguments ‘Anti-tablets’ arguments 
The continuous carrying of textbooks 
from home to school gives long-term 
back pain to our children. 
The continuous use of devices with screens 
such as computer tablets gives long-term 
vision problems to our children. 
Children using computer tablets learn 
much better as they are more engaged 
and understand the material better. 
Children using textbooks learn much better 
as they are more engaged and understand 
the material better. 
Teachers have less control over 
children’s learning when using textbooks 
because they cannot effectively manage 
what children are doing during the class. 
Children are more easily distracted when 
using computer tablets because they can play 
games instead of attending to the lesson. 
The production of textbooks for our 
schools requires the consumption of 
tons of paper each year, which 
contributes to the problem of 
deforestation. 
The production of computer tablets requires 
the emission of a considerable amount of 
pollutants to the air, which contributes to the 
problem of the greenhouse effect. 
Children need less support from their 
parents when they use computer tablets 
than when they use textbooks because 
tablets offer personalized lessons. 
Children receive more support from their 
parents when they use textbooks than when 
they use computer tablets because parents 
offer personalized help.  
Computer tablets permit the storage of 
hundreds of books and the instant 
access to those books from everywhere. 
Textbooks can last hundreds of years and 
they don’t require electricity or batteries to 
work. 
Table 3. Arguments in favour (‘pro-tablets’) and against (‘anti-tablets’) the replacement of 
textbooks by computer tablets at primary schools used as materials to transmit along the 
transmission chains 
3.2.4.- Design 
 A 3 (pair of sources: Cleaner vs Head of the Department of Education, 
Cleaner vs Aircraft Pilot, Head of the Department of Education vs Aircraft Pilot) X 
2 (opinions associated with sources: ‘pro-tablets’ vs ‘antitablets’, ‘antitablets vs 
protablets’) factorial design was used for this experiment. The order of 
presentation and the names associated with the sources (‘William Healey’ and 
‘Daniel Bryanson’) were fully counterbalanced, which resulted in 24 different 
versions of the experimental materials. As I was only interested in the influence 
of the sources of the information on transmission, I analyse three experimental 
conditions: Condition 1 (Head of the Department of Education vs Cleaner), 
Condition 2 (Aircraft Pilot vs Cleaner) and Condition 3 (Head of the Department 
of Education vs Aircraft Pilot).  
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I used the transmission chain method (Bartlett, 1932; Mesoudi, 2007) to 
experimentally simulate this controversy. This method is similar to the children’s 
game “Chinese Whispers” or “Broken Telephone”. A first “generation” of 
participants read the original materials given above in Section 3.2.3. They then 
recalled this material from memory. Their recall is then transmitted to the next 
participant in their chain (second generation). This procedure is repeated for four 
generations in total, and across 48 separate, parallel chains to provide 
independent replications of transmission effects. This method has typically been 
used to study content transmission biases, which entail a transmission advantage 
to certain types of information due to their intrinsic characteristics (Henrich & 
McElreath, 2003) such as having a more emotional (Eriksson & Coultas, 2014; 
Stubbersfield, Tehrani, & Flynn, 2017), social (Mesoudi, Whiten, & Dunbar, 2006; 
Stubbersfield, Tehrani, & Flynn, 2014), negative (Bebbington, MacLeod, Ellison, 
& Fay, 2017) or stereotypical (Bangerter, 2000; Kashima, 2000) content. The 
novelty of the present study is to use this method to study a model-based 
transmission bias: prestige bias. Transmission chain experiments permit the 
study of the consequences of experimental conditions over multiple transmission 
events. Single-generation experiments sometimes cannot detect certain 
transmission biases, as the effects of the experimental conditions are only 
revealed after multiple transmission events (e.g., Jiménez, Stubbersfield, & 
Tehrani, 2018), or they are detected in the first generation and then reversed in 
latter generations (e.g., Kashima, 2000).  
In my experiment, I kept the description of the sources of information (i.e., 
names and job titles) constant along the chains, i.e., these were not subject to 
participant recall. This ensured that my manipulation was applied across all 
generations and all chains, and simulated the fact that prestigious individuals tend 
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to be acknowledged and recognised by most members of a society or social 
group. The content of the information (the arguments in favour of and against the 
replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at primary school) was allowed to 
vary as the information provided to participants in generations 2-4 was the 
information recalled by the participant in the previous generation within their 
chain.   
3.2.5.- Procedure 
Prior to the presentation of the experimental materials, participants were 
asked their opinion about the replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at 
primary school (‘pre-test’ opinion) by rating their agreement with the statement “If 
the decision were in my hands, I would replace all the textbooks with computer 
tablets in primary schools" on a 7-point Likert scale from “totally disagree” (-3) to 
“totally agree” (+3). They were also asked about their familiarity with computer 
tablets using a 7-point Likert scale from “very unfamiliar” (-3) to “very familiar” 
(+3).  
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of 48 transmission 
chains and provided the following instructions: “In many schools across the world, 
computer tablets have started to replace traditional textbooks. This recent change 
has given rise to a heated debate about the benefits and risks of computer tablets 
and textbooks for children’s education. We have asked a number of volunteers 
at schools in Australia about their views on this issue. In the following, you will 
learn about two of these volunteers and about their opinions about the use of 
textbooks and computer tablets at primary school. It is very important that you 
read the information at a pace that allows you full comprehension as you will be 
asked some questions about this information later”. Participants then read 
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information about one of the sources (e.g., cleaner) and one set of arguments 
(e.g., ‘pro-tablets’) and, immediately afterwards, information about another 
source (e.g., Head of the Department of Education) and the other set of 
arguments (e.g., ‘anti-tablets’). Participants in generation 1 read the original 
arguments created by us. Participants in generations 2-4 read the arguments as 
they were recalled by the participant in the previous generation within their chain. 
Spelling and grammar mistakes were corrected before transmitting the 
information from one participant to the next.  
Participants were then asked to identify the source professions they had 
read from a list of six professions (Head of the Department of Infectious Diseases 
of a leading university, cleaner, Head of the Department of Education of a leading 
university, writer, warehouseman, aircraft pilot and taxi driver) and to rate the 
prestige within society of the two sources they had read about on a 5-point Likert 
scale from “not prestigious at all” (1) to “incredibly prestigious” (5) and their 
relevance for the debate about the benefits and risks of tablets and books at 
schools on a 7-point Likert scale from “very irrelevant” (-3) to “very relevant” (+3).  
There was then a surprise free recall test in which participants had to recall 
the arguments provided by each source. I originally intended to force participants 
to do this for each source for at least 2.5 minutes and no more than 5 minutes. 
However, a technical problem disabled the feature that forced participants to stay 
on the task at least 2.5 minutes. Therefore, participants submitted their responses 
when they considered they had finished, which is the standard procedure for 
transmission chain experiments. The feature that prevented participants to 
complete the recall task beyond 5 minutes worked correctly.  
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Finally, participants provided demographic details (age, gender, 
nationality, first language, nearest city and profession) and were asked again 
about their opinion about whether computer tablets should replace books at 
primary schools by rating their agreement with the statement “If I were an 
education policy maker I would replace textbooks by computer tablets all over the 
country” on a 7-point Likert scale from “totally disagree” (-3) to “totally agree” (+3). 
They were also asked to provide reasons to support one or the other side by 
writing their own opinion within a textbox. At the end, participants were informed 
about the goal of the experiment and my hypotheses.  
3.2.6.- Coding and Data Analyses 
Participants’ recall accuracy was assessed by comparing their correct 
recall with a preregistered table (https://osf.io/6d5ga/, see Appendix A.4) 
containing twelve central propositions, i.e., verbs, adjectives or other relational 
terms followed by complementary nouns, which capture the core meaning of the 
sentence (Kintsch, 1974). For instance, the core meaning of “the continuous 
carrying of textbooks from home to school gives long-term back pain to our 
children” is “textbooks give back pain (to children)”. This table specified which 
elements were important (central propositions) to recall within each sentence. 
The recall was coded by me. A second coder, who was blind to the hypothesis, 
coded 12.5% of the chains (6 chains. We found a high inter-coder reliability 
between both coders (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.84).  
All statistical analyses were conducted with Bayesian package brms 
(Bürkner, 2017) in R 3.5.3 (R Core Team, 2019). This was a change from the 
preregistered script (https://osf.io/dt2uq/, see SM1c.), in which I did the analyses 
with dummy data with the package lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 
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2015). The change was due to the advantage of brms in handling ordinal 
predictors (Bürkner & Charpentier, 2018). This change did not affect the 
qualitative conclusions derived from the results (see SM2a and SM2b).  
3.3.- Results 
3.3.1.- Manipulation Checks: Prestige and Relevance of the Sources 
As the ratings of prestige and relevance were measured in an ordinal 
scale, I used the median, range and frequency of each rating to describe the 
central tendency and the distribution of the ratings for each source (Figures 1 and 
2 and SM2c). For the same reason, I conducted Bayesian multilevel ordinal 
logistic models with source as a predictor. Because each participant rated the 
prestige and relevance of two sources of information, the intercepts were allowed 
to vary by participant. For these analyses, I used the default priors in brms 
(Bürkner, 2017). 
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Figure 1. The distribution of ratings of prestige for the three sources of information: Head of the 
Department of Education (“educator”), pilot and cleaner.  Prestige was measured on a 5-point 
scale from "Not prestigious at all" (1) to "incredibly prestigious" (5). Thick lines represent the 
median, the box the middle 50% of ratings or inter-quantile range, the lower whisker ranges from 
the 25th percentile to the smallest value no smaller than 1.5 times the inter-quantile range and 
outliers are ratings outside 1.5 times the inter-quantile range. 
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Figure 2. The distribution of ratings of relevance for the three sources of information: Head of the 
Department of Education (“educator”), pilot and cleaner.  Relevance was measured on a 7-point 
Likert scale from “very irrelevant” (-3) to “very relevant” (+3). The thick line represents the median, 
the box the middle 50% of ratings or inter-quantile range, the lower whisker ranges from the 25th 
percentile to the smallest value no smaller than 1.5 times the inter-quantile range and outliers are 
ratings outside 1.5 times the inter-quantile range. 
 
I expected that the Head of the Department of Education (henceforth 
‘educator’) and the pilot would be rated similarly prestigious, and both rated more 
prestigious than the cleaner. Prestige were rated on a 5-point Likert scale from 
“not prestigious at all” (1) to “incredibly prestigious” (5). The educator was 
considered the most prestigious (Median=4), being mostly rated as “(4) very 
prestigious” (50%), followed by “(3) somewhat prestigious” (37%). The pilot was 
seen as less prestigious than the educator (Median=3), being mostly rated as “(3) 
somewhat prestigious” (58%) followed by “(4) very prestigious” (32%). The 
cleaner was seen as the least prestigious (Median=2), being rated mostly as “(2) 
hardly prestigious” (40%), followed by “(3) somewhat prestigious” (30%) and “(1) 
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not prestigious at all” (27%). As expected, the regression model confirmed that 
the educator (B=5.26, SE=0.51, 89% CI: [4.46, 6.11]) and the pilot (B=3.95, 
SE=0.42, 89% CI:[3.29, 4.62]) were rated as more prestigious than the cleaner. 
Contrary to expectations, however, the educator was rated as more prestigious 
than the pilot (B=1.31, SE=0.32, 89% CI: [0.81, 1.82]), although the magnitude of 
this difference was much smaller than that between the educator and cleaner, 
and between pilot and cleaner.  
I also expected that the educator would be rated more relevant to the issue 
of tablets in schools than both the pilot and cleaner, who would be rated similarly 
(non) relevant. Relevance was rated on a 7-point Likert scale from “very 
irrelevant” (-3) to “very relevant” (+3). The educator was considered most relevant 
(Median=2), being mainly rated as +3 (46%). The pilot was considered the next 
most relevant (Median=1), being mostly rated as +1 (33%). The cleaner was 
considered least relevant (Median=0), being mainly rated as +1 (30%). As 
expected, the regression model confirmed that the pilot (B=-3.08, SE=0.36, 89% 
CI: [-3.65, -2.51]) and the cleaner (B=-3.40, SE=0.35, -89% CI: [-3.96, - 2.85]) 
were considered less relevant sources of information than the educator, while 
there was little difference between the pilot and the cleaner (B=0.31, SE=0.25, 
89% CI:[-0.08, 0.71]).  
3.3.2.- Cumulative Recall 
Figure 3 shows the recall of correct central propositions across cultural 
generations by opinion (‘pro-tablets’ vs ‘anti-tablets’, Figure 3A) and source of the 
information (educator, pilot and cleaner, Figure 3B).  As in similar transmission 
chain experiments, Figure 3 shows that recall decreased over cultural 
generations, with a larger decrease from generation 1 to generation 2 than for 
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subsequent generations. Unexpectedly, the ‘anti-tablets’ opinion seems to have 
been better transmitted than the ‘pro-tablets’ opinion (Figure 3A). Contrary to my 
hypotheses, Figure 3B suggests little difference in cumulative recall between the 
three sources of information.  
 
 
Figure 3. Raw means for the recall of information with 1.60 standard error bars (corresponding to 
89% CI as given in the text) plotted against generation. A: the ‘anti-tablets’ arguments were better 
transmitted than the ‘pro-tablets’ arguments. B: contrary to H1 and H2, the information provided 
by the three sources (Head of the Department of Education, Pilot and Cleaner) was transmitted 
with similar fidelity.  
To statistically analyse these trends, we produced several Bayesian 
multilevel Poisson regression models with intercepts varying by chain and 
compared their model fit (Table 4).  Model fit was compared using leave-one-out 
cross validation information criterion (LOOIC; Vehtari, Gelman, & Gabry, 2017), 
which can be interpreted similarly to Akaike information criterion (AIC) or 
Watanabe-Akaike information criterion (WAIC): a lower LOOIC indicates better fit 
to the data.  
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I first ran a generation model with generation (one to four) as the sole 
predictor of recall (number of correctly recalled propositions). Generation was 
treated as a monotonic variable (Bürkner & Charpentier, 2018) as recall tends to 
decrease across generations but the amount of the decrease varies between 
adjacent generations. This model was compared with an opinion model, which 
included opinion (‘pro-tablets’ vs ‘anti-tablets’) and generation as predictors. As 
the opinion model (LOOIC=1301.2, SE=14.4) had a better fit to the data than the 
generation model (LOOIC=1311.1=, SE=14.3), the opinion model was selected 
as the control model to compare against subsequent models. (Allowing an 
interaction between generation and opinion did not improve the model fit by 
much, LOOIC=1298.5, SE=14.3. Including participants’ degree of agreement with 
the statement “I would replace all the textbooks with computer tablets in primary 
schools” prior to being exposed to the experimental materials also did not improve 
the model fit. See SM2b for details).  
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Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Main Regression Models 
Generation 
B (SE) 
Opinion 
B (SE) 
Source 
B (SE) 
Prestige 
B (SE) 
Relevance 
B (SE) 
Prestige-
Relevance 
B (SE) 
Intercept 
1.56 (0.06) 
1.65 
(0.06) 
1.60 
(0.08) 
1.62 
(0.09) 1.63 (0.12) 1.61 (0.12) 
mo(Generation) -0.95 (0.09) 
-0.95 
(0.09) 
-0.95 
(0.09) 
-0.95 
(0.09) 
-0.95 
(0.09) 
-0.95 
(0.09) 
Opinion 
[Pro-tablets]  
-0.19 
(0.06) 
-0.19 
(0.06) 
-0.19 
(0.06) 
-0.19 
(0.06) 
-0.19 
(0.06) 
Source 
[Educator]   
0.06 
(0.08)    
Source [Pilot]   
0.06 
(0.08)    
mo(Prestige)    
0.05 
(0.14)  0.05 (0.15) 
mo(Relevance)     0.03 (0.13) 0.01 (0.13) 
LOOIC 1311.1 1301.2 1302.5 1302.2 1302.6 1303.8 
model weights 0.002 0.329 0.208 0.205 0.167 0.089 
Table 4. Unstandardized Coefficients (B) and their standard errors (in brackets) for each of the 
main regression models. Square brackets indicate the reference categories for categorical 
predictors. Ordinal predictors were modelled as monotonic effects and they are labelled 
mo(variable). More regression models and further details can be found in SM2b. LOOIC = leave-
one-out cross validation information criterion (lower values indicate better fit to the data; see text 
for details). Model weights were calculated using pseudo-Bayesian model average weights with 
Bayesian bootstrap (Vehtari & Gabry, 2019; Yao, Vehtari, Simpson, & Gelman, 2018) with the loo 
package (Vehtari, Gabry, & Gelman, 2019). 
 
To test H1, which stated that the information provided by high prestige 
sources of information (educator and pilot) would be better recalled than the 
information provided by the low prestige source (cleaner), I ran a model (‘source 
model’) which included source of information as a predictor of recall (with cleaner 
as reference category) in addition to generation and opinion. Consistent with 
hypothesis H1, the information provided by the prestigious sources, the educator 
(M=3.09, SD=1.70, B=0.06, SE=0.08, 89% CI [-0.07, 0.18]) and the pilot (M=3.09, 
SD=1.77, B=0.06, SE=0.08, 89% CI[-0.06, 0.19]), were better recalled than the 
less prestigious cleaner (M=2.93, SD=1.75). However, the credible intervals for 
both comparisons include 0, indicating an unreliable effect of source of 
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information on recall. Furthermore, the fit of the source model (LOOIC=1302.5, 
SE=14.5) was worse than the fit of the control model (LOOIC=1301.2, SE=14.4). 
Allowing an interaction between source and generation did not improve model fit 
(LOOIC=1305.5, SE=14.5). Consequently, the results did not support H1.  
To test H2, which stated that the information provided by the high 
relevance source (educator) would be better recalled than the information 
provided by the low relevance sources (pilot and cleaner), I refitted the source 
model with educator as the reference category. Contrary to H2, the information 
provided by the educator was not better recalled than the information provided 
by the pilot (B=0.01, SE=0.07, 89% CI [-0.11, 0.12]) and the cleaner (B=-0.06, 
SE=0.08, 89% CI [-0.18, 0.07]). Consequently, the results did not support H2.  
An alternative way to test H1 and H2 is to use the participants’ own ratings 
of prestige and relevance as predictors of recall, instead of assuming based on 
the independent raters’ judgements (see Section 3.2.3) that both the pilot and the 
educator are high prestige sources (with the educator also being a relevant high 
prestige source) and the cleaner a low prestige source. As prestige and relevance 
were ordinal measures, we modelled them as monotonic variables (Bürkner & 
Charpentier, 2018): the effects of prestige and relevance on recall should 
increase or decrease with higher ratings but the effect might vary between 
adjacent ratings. In addition to generation and opinion, these models included 
ratings of prestige (prestige model: LOOIC=1302.2, SE=14.5), ratings of 
relevance (relevance model: LOOIC=1302.6, SE=14.5) or ratings of both prestige 
and relevance (prestige-relevance model: LOOIC=1303.8, SE=14.5). Marginal 
effects of the latter prestige-relevance model are shown in Figure 4. In these 
models, the effects of prestige and relevance were in the expected direction: 
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prestige (prestige model: B=0.05, SE=0.14, 89% CI [-0.17, 0.27]) and relevance 
(relevance model: B=0.03, SE=0.13, 89% CI [-0.17, 0.24]) both positively 
predicted recall in the prestige model and relevance model respectively, while for 
the prestige-relevance model, the effect of relevance B=0.01, SE=0.13, 89% CI 
[-0.19, 0.23]) diminished after accounting for prestige (B=0.05, SE=0.15, 89% CI 
[-0.17, 0.28]). However, the credible intervals for both variables in all models 
include 0 indicating unreliable effects of prestige and relevance ratings on recall. 
Furthermore, none of these models had better fit than the control model 
(LOOIC=1301.2). Consequently, these alternative analyses did not provide 
support for either H1 or H2.  
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Figure 4. Marginal effects plots of the prestige-relevance model. A: The number of correctly 
recalled propositions decreased monotonically with generation (B=-0.95, SE=0.09, 89% CI [-1.09, 
-0.81]), the greatest decrease being between generation 1 to generation 2. B: The pro-tablets 
propostions were transmitted worse than the anti-tablets propositions (B=-0.19, SE=0.06, 89% CI 
[-0.29, -0.10]). C: Prestige is positively related to the number of correctly recalled propositions but 
this effect is very weak and the wide standard error shows that it is unreliable (B=0.05, SE=0.15, 
89% CI [-0.19, 0.28]. D: Relevance is positively related to the number of correctly recalled 
propositions but this effect is very weak and the wide standard error shows that is unreliable 
(B=0.01, SE=0.13, 89% CI [-0.19, 0.23]. 
3.4.- Discussion 
In this experiment, I studied whether the prestige and the relevance of 
sources of information affect the transmission of arguments in favour (“pro-
tables”) and against (“anti-tablets”) the replacement of textbooks with computer 
tablets in schools. Contrary to my predictions, I failed to find a reliable advantage 
of the prestige (H1) or relevance (H2) of the sources of information on the 
transmission of their arguments using two different analytical procedures: (i) 
assuming that the sources differ in prestige and relevance in a similar way for all 
participants in our sample (Head of the Department of Education: high prestige, 
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high relevance; airline pilot: high prestige, low relevance; cleaner: low prestige, 
low relevance) and (ii) using the participants’ own ratings of prestige and 
relevance of the sources as predictors of recall. 
Although the effect of prestige on recall was statistically unreliable, it was 
in the expected direction. This suggests that either prestige has a weak effect on 
the recall of information or the results in the expected direction were due to 
chance. If the effects of prestige on recall are too small to have multi-generational 
effects in my experiment, this might indicate that the prestige of the source is not 
important in reality, where information is transmitted repeatedly from person to 
person. This would mean that, contrary to Henrich and Gil-White’s (2001) 
hypothesis, there is no intrinsic memory bias to recall better what prestigious 
individuals say or argue. It would also mean that purported cases of prestige bias 
in real life (e.g., the ‘Angelina Jolie effect’, see Introduction) are exaggerated or 
spurious.  
Alternatively, people might recall better what prestigious individuals say 
due to repeated or redundant transmission (Morin, 2016). That is, outside the 
experimental setting, people are exposed to the opinions of prestigious 
individuals multiple times (e.g., on TV, radio and conversations) and this multiple 
exposure is what makes them more memorable. Future transmission chain 
studies could manipulate both the prestige of the sources and the number of 
exposures or number of sources per argument within each generation (e.g., 
Eriksson & Coultas, 2012; Kempe & Mesoudi, 2014), rather just one source per 
argument, to test this alternative. 
Another possibility is that my manipulation of prestige (i.e., ascribing 
opinions to fictitious sources of information with different levels of prestige) does 
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not adequately capture the way prestige works in everyday life. In large scale 
societies, especially in the digital era, people encounter individuals who are 
prestigious at different societal levels. Prestigious individuals at the group level 
are people who are admired and respected within a face-to-face group united by 
a common task or activity (e.g., a basketball team or a student class). Here, 
prestigious individuals and the people who admire them know each other and 
interact. Prestigious individuals at the society level (e.g., Hollywood 
actors/actresses, pop singers and professional footballers) do not normally know 
personally their admirers. Rather, their admirers have the illusion of familiarity 
and personally knowing the prestigious individuals,  giving rise to a type of 
relationship known as para-social interaction (Horton & Wohl, 1956). At both 
levels, social learners already know and admire the prestigious individual, while 
participants in my study were for the first time exposed to the (fictional) sources. 
It is possible that, if participants already knew and admired the sources of 
information, the effects of prestige on recall might have been stronger. For 
example, if fans of a famous singer such as Beyoncé listens to her arguing in 
favour or against the replacement of computer tablets at school, these fans might 
recall better these arguments than similar arguments provided by other sources 
that they know but they do not admire. Nevertheless, similar manipulations to the 
one used in our study have been effective in demonstrating a positive effect of 
prestige on attention (Dalmaso et al., 2014; Dalmaso et al., 2012; Ratcliff et al., 
2011). This suggests that prestige-biased social learning might have different 
effects on different measures of influence such as recall of information, attention 
towards the sources, opinion formation, etc. (Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019). Future 
research will need to determine whether prestige-biased social learning only 
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occurs at certain levels (e.g., decision-making under uncertainty, attention 
towards sources) but not others (e.g., memory).   
The recall advantage of the “anti-tablets” arguments over the “pro-tablets” 
arguments was unexpected. It is possible that the anti-tablets advantage was 
caused by a confirmation bias effect, i.e., better recall of information that is 
congruent with pre-existing attitudes (Frost et al., 2015). Supporting this, the full 
sample of participants was initially slightly against the replacement of textbooks 
by computer tablets at schools (Median=-1). However, participants’ attitudes 
towards tablets did not predict recall, which contradicts the confirmation bias 
explanation (see also Jiménez, Mesoudi, & Tehrani, 2018).  
In conclusion, this experiment does not provide evidence in support of a 
prestige bias in the recall of information. To my knowledge, this is the first 
experiment studying this question. Therefore, it is difficult to know whether the 
prestige of the source of information genuinely does not affect recall, or whether 
my study suffers from methodological limitations (e.g., my manipulations of 
prestige). Given the potentially important consequences of prestige-driven 
information diffusion, such as the spread of attitudes towards breast screening or 
vaccination, I encourage further tests of whether information attributed to 
prestigious sources is preferentially recalled and transmitted through society.  
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CHAPTER 4:  
An Experimental Simulation of the Cultural 
Transmission of Dominance and Prestige Social Rank 
Cues 
This chapter has been adapted with minor revisions from Jiménez, Á. V., & 
Mesoudi, A. (2019, December 28). An experimental simulation of the cultural 
transmission of prestige and dominance social rank cues.  Preprint at: 
https://psyarxiv.com/tc6w4/  
Contributions:  
This chapter was conceptualised by Alex Mesoudi and me. Experimental design, 
preparation of the materials, programming of the experiment with Qualtrics, data 
collection, data analysis and interpretation was all conducted by myself. Original 
draft was written by me. It was reviewed and edited by Alex Mesoudi and me.  
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4.0.- Abstract 
Informal social hierarchies within small human groups are argued to be based on 
prestige, dominance, or a combination of these two (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). 
Prestige-based hierarchies entail the ordering of individuals by the level of admiration 
and respect they receive from others due to their competence within valued domains. 
This type of hierarchy provides benefits for subordinates such as high-quality social 
learning opportunities and both private and public goods. In contrast, dominance-based 
hierarchies entail the ordering of individuals by their capacity to win fights, coerce and 
intimidate others. This type of hierarchy produces costs in subordinates due to its 
aggressive and intimidating nature. Given the benefits and costs associated with these 
types of social hierarchies for subordinates, I hypothesized that prestige and dominance 
cues are better recalled and transmitted than  social rank cues that do not elicit high 
prestige or dominance associations (here medium social rank cues). Assuming that for 
the majority of the population who are not already at the top of the social hierarchy it is 
more important to avoid the costs of dominance-based hierarchies than to obtain the 
benefits of prestige-based hierarchies, I hypothesized that dominance cues are better 
transmitted than prestige cues. I conducted a recall-based transmission chain 
experiment with 30 chains of four generations each (N=120). Participants read and 
recalled three descriptions of prestigious, dominant and medium social rank footballers, 
and their recall was then passed to the next participant within their chain. As predicted, 
I found that both prestige cues and dominance cues were better transmitted than medium 
social rank cues. However, I did not find support for my prediction of the better 
transmission of dominance cues over prestige cues. I discuss whether the results might 
be explain by a specific social-rank content transmission bias or by a more general 
emotional content transmission bias.  
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4.1.- Introduction 
Social hierarchies are a universal phenomenon in our species (Von 
Rueden, 2014),  emerging rapidly and spontaneously during social interactions 
(Anderson & Kilduff, 2009; Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013; 
Smith & Foti, 1998). Being at the top of the hierarchy in a human social group is 
associated with positive fitness outcomes such as greater access to resources, 
mating opportunities and greater number of surviving offspring (Betzig, 1988; 
Chagnon, 1988; Hill, 1984; Mealey, 1985; Savin-Williams, 1979; Snyder, 
Kirkpatrick, & Barrett, 2008; Von Rueden, 2014; von Rueden, Gurven, & Kaplan, 
2010; von Rueden & Jaeggi, 2016). People at the top usually act as leaders of 
groups, which helps to solve group problems such as collective decision-making 
and within-group coordination (Anderson & Willer, 2014). Consequently, social 
hierarchy is not only beneficial for the individuals at the top but also, potentially, 
for groups and their members. Nevertheless, hierarchies also produce costs for 
groups and their members as they can lead to abuse of lower social rank 
individuals, which diminishes group morale and lowers group performance 
(Anderson & Willer, 2014).  
The dual evolutionary model of social hierarchy (Cheng, 2019; Cheng & 
Tracy, 2014; Cheng et al., 2013; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Jiménez & Mesoudi, 
2019, December 27; Redhead, Cheng, & O’Gorman, 2018a) might help to explain 
this contrast between the benefits and costs of social hierarchy. According to this 
model, informal social hierarchies within small human groups can be based on 
prestige, dominance, or a combination of the two. Prestige-based hierarchies 
entail the ordering of members of a social group by their prestige (sometimes 
referred to as ‘status’), which is defined as the respect, esteem and admiration 
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that they receive by other members of the group (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 
2015). Prestige is given by others (Blader & Chen, 2014; de Waal-Andrews, 
Gregg, & Lammers, 2015), usually due to being competent in domains that are 
appreciated by a group (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). For example, frequently 
scoring goals is an indicator of competence in football, which is highly regarded 
by people who play/like football. As such, top goal scorers tend to attain prestige 
within football teams. However, competence in itself might often not be enough 
to be granted prestige. Competence needs to be acknowledged by others (e.g., 
by having many social connections) and these others have to expect to benefit 
from that competence somehow. In my example of football players, it would be 
difficult for an excellent football player to be conferred prestige if he/she is never 
seen playing or if he/she plays well but he/she plays in a rival team or does not 
share tips about his/her football skills. Therefore, prestige-biased hierarchies are 
not only meritocratic, but also beneficial for less knowledgeable/skilful individuals 
as being close to prestigious individuals gives opportunities to social learners to 
acquire valuable knowledge/skills (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) and being 
provided with private (Pinker, 1998, p. 499) and public (Price & Van Vugt, 2014) 
goods.  
In contrast, dominance-based hierarchies entail the ordering of individuals 
in the capacity to win fights, coerce and intimidate others (Redhead, Cheng, & 
O’Gorman, 2018b). Dominance is a form of informal social rank that is imposed 
upon others (de Waal-Andrews et al., 2015; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), 
sometimes with the help of coalitional alliances. Consequently, the top of 
dominance-based hierarchies are usually occupied by individuals who possess 
physical and material characteristics that are useful to win fights and intimidate 
others, such as having greater strength, higher fighting skills, greater coalitional 
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support, and the possession of more and/or better weapons or other resources 
that could be used to inflict costs. Therefore, dominance-based hierarchies are 
mainly beneficial for the dominant individuals and their allies. Therefore, people 
who do not have a dominant position tend to dislike this type of hierarchy (Brand 
& Mesoudi, 2019; Ridgeway & Diekema, 1989) and, if possible, try to escape the 
influence of dominant individuals and rebel against them (Boehm et al., 1993; 
Cheng, 2019; Ridgeway & Diekema, 1989).   
4.1.1.- Social Rank Cues 
Because prestige-based and dominance-based hierarchies are associated with 
beneficial and detrimental fitness consequences respectively in subordinates, it 
is important for subordinates to identify who is prestigious and who is dominant 
within a social group. To this end, people use social rank cues or signals that 
convey information on the level of prestige and dominance of an individual. I 
classify social rank cues into first-order and second-order cues (Jiménez & 
Mesoudi, 2019). First-order cues are cues related to the behaviour, appearance, 
personality, material possessions, etc. of an individual. These can be assessed 
directly by the observer. Second-order cues are cues related to the behaviour of 
other people towards an individual and imply, therefore, a more indirect 
assessment of the individual by the observer.  
Prestige cues are cues that people use to infer the competence of an individual 
within a value domain and the willingness of an individual to provide benefits for 
the group. Examples of first-order prestige cues are being knowledgeable/skilful 
(Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), humble (Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010) and 
showing altruistic behaviour towards the in-group (Halevy, Chou, Cohen, & 
Livingston, 2012). Examples of second-order prestige cues are being paid 
117 
 
sustained attention with prolonged eye contact, being copied, being popular, and 
receiving generalised voluntary deference (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001).  
Dominance cues are cues that people use to infer the fighting skill of an individual 
and their willingness to use force and intimidation to attain their goals. Examples 
of first-order dominant cues are being aggressive/intimidating (Henrich & Gil-
White, 2001), arrogant/narcissist and self-centred (Cheng et al., 2010). Examples 
of second-order dominance cues are being paid attention but without receiving 
prolonged eye contact, being obeyed, being disliked/unpopular and receiving 
generalised coerced deference (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001).  
Medium social rank cues are cues that people use to infer that an individual is 
not particularly prestigious or dominant but is not at the bottom of either hierarchy. 
Examples of first-order medium social rank cues are having average 
knowledge/skill, being modest and regarding highly the contribution of others. 
Examples of second-order medium social rank cues are not being paid a lot of 
attention, not being very influential within a group and receiving deference by only 
a small group of close friends and relatives. 
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4.1.2.- Hypotheses 
According to Henrich and Gil-White (2001), prestige-based hierarchies evolved 
as a way to identify individuals with better-than-average fitness-enhancing 
knowledge/skills from whom to learn. Based on their theory, they predicted that 
high prestige individuals are more likely to be copied by others than low prestige 
individuals. This prediction has found some support (Atkisson, O’Brien & 
Mesoudi, 2011; Brand, Heap, Morgan & Mesoudi, 2019; Chudek, Heller, Birch & 
Henrich, 2012), although with limitations (see Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019). 
However, a key piece in the puzzle of how people learn from prestigious 
individuals is missing in the literature. That is, there is a lack of studies 
investigating the cultural transmission of prestige cues themselves. This is an 
important question because it is necessary to identify prestigious individuals to 
be able to preferentially copy them.  
If people select individuals with better-than-average knowledge/skills from whom 
to learn through the identification of indirect cues that convey high prestige, as 
Henrich and Gil-White’s state, then it is likely than natural selection (or potentially 
cultural selection, Heyes, 2018) has shaped human cognition to be more attentive 
to, and process and recall better high prestige social rank cues than social rank 
cues conveying lower prestige. If so, descriptions of individuals displaying high 
prestige social rank cues would be transmitted with greater fidelity during social 
interactions than descriptions of individuals displaying lower prestige social rank 
cues.  
The identification of individuals who are more likely to impose costs upon others 
through physical aggression or other types of intimidation might also have been 
important in human evolution. Natural selection (or cultural selection) might 
therefore have shaped human cognition to be more attentive, and process and 
119 
 
recall better high dominance social rank cues than social rank cues conveying 
lower dominance. If this is true, then descriptions of individuals displaying high 
dominance social rank cues would be transmitted with greater fidelity during 
social interactions than descriptions of individuals displaying lower dominance. 
Consequently, I predict that both high prestige and high dominance social rank 
cues are better transmitted than medium social rank cues.  
Another important question is whether high dominance cues are better 
transmitted than high prestige social rank cues, high prestige cues better 
transmitted than high dominance cues, or both types of high social rank cues are 
similarly well transmitted. Previous research suggested that people tend to be 
more attentive, recall better and choose to transmit more information conveying 
negative and threat-related information than neutral or positive information  
(Bebbington et al., 2017; Blaine and Pascal, 2018) and that people are loss 
aversive, i.e., they prefer not to lose certain amount of money than to gain the 
same amount of money with the same probability (Kahneman & Amos, 1979; but 
see Mukherjee et al., 2017). These pieces of evidence suggest that avoiding 
costs might have been more important in human evolution than attaining benefits. 
If so, it is likely that people are more attentive, process and recall better high 
dominant social rank cues, which signal the capacity and disposition of an 
individual to impose costs over others, than high prestige social rank cues, which 
displays the capacity to provide benefits to others, being injured is likely to have 
important negative fitness consequences such as impeding physical mobility and 
difficulties attaining resources. Therefore, high dominance cues, which convey 
the capacity and willingness to inflict costs upon others should be easily identified 
and remembered. In contrast, lacking access to the knowledge/skill of a 
prestigious individual might be less detrimental given the fact that others 
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individuals of the group (e.g., kin) are likely to possess and be willing to share 
knowledge/skills, which, although less valuable than the knowledge/skills of the 
prestigious individual, are still likely to be fitness-enhancing. Consequently, I 
predict that high dominance cues are better transmitted than high prestige cues.  
In this experiment, I created fictional descriptions of three footballers 
playing in three different local football teams, who were described as prestigious, 
dominant or medium social rank. I use a transmission chain experimental design 
(Bartlett, 1932; Mesoudi, 2007) in which participants were organised in linear 
chains of four participants (‘cultural generations’) in order to test the accumulated 
effect of memory biases beyond a single individual’s recall. Participants in the 
initial group receive and recall the original descriptions, while the remaining 
participants receive the information recalled by participants in the previous 
generation of their chain. I preregistered my hypotheses on the Open Science 
Framework (OSF) website (https://osf.io/68vcs, see SM3a.), which were that:  
H1: Both high prestige and high dominance cues are more accurately 
transmitted over experimental cultural generations than medium social 
rank cues.  
H2: High dominance cues are more accurately transmitted over 
experimental cultural generations than prestige cues.  
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4.2.- Methods 
4.2.1.- Ethical Statement 
The study was approved by the Biosciences Ethical Committee at the 
University of Exeter Cornwall Campus on the 4th November 2019 (Ref 
eCORN002174 v3.3).   
4.2.2.- Participants 
Following the procedure stated in the preregistration (https://osf.io/68vcs, 
see SM3a), I recruited online participants through Prolific (www.prolific.ac) (Peer, 
Samat, Brandimarte, & Acquisti, 2016). Using pre-screening filters, I selected 
participants who were aged 18-60 years, were English native speakers, had 
British Nationality, had an approval rating on previous Prolific studies of 90% or 
above, and had not participated in any of our previous studies through this 
website.  
The data was collected at four different times (one for each “cultural 
generation”), between the 12th and 19th November 2019. Each time I recruited 30 
participants to complete one generation. 30 chains were necessary to provide 
five replications of each of the six counterbalanced versions of the experimental 
materials (see Section 4.2.4). Participants were paid at a rate of £6/hour for an 
estimated time of completion of 15 minutes for Generations 1 and 2 (£1.5) and 
10 minutes for Generations 3 and 4 (£1).  
Following the exclusion criteria stated in the preregistration, I excluded 
from the dataset the data of two participants who read at least one of the 
footballers’ descriptions at a rate greater than 1080 words/minute. I derived this 
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cut-off point from a previous transmission chain experiment (Jiménez & Mesoudi, 
2019, July 10), in which participants who read the materials faster than this pace 
were unable to recall anything from the materials. These two excluded 
participants were replaced by new participants. We also excluded two other 
participants who occupied the same generation in a chain for which we had 
already collected a response. As stated in the preregistration, the responses for 
participants who completed the study first were retained.  
Overall, I recruited 124 participants (84 females, 40 males) aged 18-60 
(M=37.25, SD=10.27), with 120 of these participants (82 females, 38 males) aged 
18-60 (M=37.44, SD=10.25) included in the analysis.   
4.2.3.- Materials 
 Fictional descriptions of three different local footballers (John, Bill and 
James) who play in different local teams (also fictional) were created as materials 
to transmit along the chains. These descriptions were created with the intention 
of describing a prestigious (John), a dominant (Bill) and a medium social rank 
(James) footballer respectively. The materials were based on the dominance-
prestige distinction put forward by Henrich and Gil-White (2001) and Cheng et al. 
(2010). Following this account, John, the prestigious footballer, was described as 
a competent footballer who was admired by his teammates. In contrast, Bill, the 
dominant footballer, was described as a violent footballer who was feared by his 
teammates. James, the medium social rank footballer, was described as having 
average football skill without evoking strong emotions. I decided to use medium 
social rank rather than low social rank because low social ranked individuals were 
likely to elicit strong emotions of pity and sympathy. Medium social rank is both 
lacking in such emotions, and in prestige and dominance cues. 
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The exact descriptions of the three footballers are as follows:  
Prestigious footballer (John) 
Everybody in the football team admires John. He is so skilful as a football 
player that last year he scored the most goals in the local league. Consequently, 
this year members of the team unanimously voted to make him captain of the 
team. They also tend to copy whatever he does. At team meetings, the other 
members always pay careful attention to what he is saying with their eyes fixed 
on him. Nevertheless, he is modest about his football skills and he always takes 
other team members’ wishes into consideration. Outside of the football team, he 
is also very popular. People often invite him to parties because they want to 
spend time with him. 
Dominant footballer (Bill) 
Everybody in the football team is afraid of Bill. He is so violent as a football 
player that last month he injured two teammates during training. This year he self-
appointed himself captain without the support of any team member. Other 
teammates tend to obey him. At team meetings, the other members always pay 
careful attention to what he is saying, though usually without making eye contact 
with him. He thinks he is the best player and he never takes other team members’ 
wishes into consideration. Outside of the football team, people also dislike him, 
but people invite him to parties because they don't want to make him angry. 
Medium social rank footballer (James) 
People in the football team don’t have strong emotions towards James. He 
is an average football player in the team, scoring only a few goals last year. This 
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year he wanted to be the captain of the team, but he only received two votes. He 
isn’t very influential among his teammates. At team meetings, the other members 
of the team often don’t listen to him very carefully and don’t tend to fix their eyes 
on him for long. He is modest about his football skills, and consequently takes 
other teammates’ perspectives in high regards. Outside the team, he is not 
particularly popular but he does get invited to parties held by his closest friends 
because they like to hang out with him. 
4.2.4.- Design 
A within-chain transmission chain design with four generations per chain 
was used. Participants in the first generation were asked to read and then recall 
the original descriptions of all three footballers (prestigious, dominant and 
medium social rank) given above in Section 4.2.3, although without the labels 
denoting prestige, dominance or medium social rank. The product of their recall 
was then transmitted to the next participant in their chain (second generation), 
who also recalled the material. This procedure was repeated until reaching the 
fourth generation and across 30 separate, parallel transmission chains to provide 
independent replications of transmission effects. The order of presentation of the 
three descriptions was fully counterbalanced, which resulted in six different 
versions of the experimental materials (5 replications for each version).  
4.2.5.- Procedure 
Participants were first randomly assigned to one of the 30 transmission 
chains and provided with the following instructions: “In the following you will read 
three descriptions of three football players who play in different local football 
teams in the UK. We would like you to read these descriptions very carefully as 
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you will be asked some questions about each of the football players later. It is 
very important that you read the information at a pace that allows you full 
comprehension as you will be asked some questions about this information later.” 
Second, they read the three descriptions of the prestigious, dominant and 
medium social rank footballer. Third, they were asked to provide their basic 
demographic information (i.e., gender, age, first language, nationality, profession 
and nearest city from where they live). This served as a distractor task. Fourth, 
they were asked to recall the descriptions of the three footballers one by one. 
They were given between a minimum of 1 minute and a maximum of 3 minutes 
to recall the description of each footballer. Lastly, participants were thanked for 
their participation and informed about the goal of the experiment and our 
hypotheses.  
4.2.5.- Coding and Data Analyses 
Participants’ recall accuracy was assessed by comparing their correct 
recall with a preregistered table (https://osf.io/b4nqu/, see Appendix B.3)6 
containing twelve social rank cues for each description. Examples of prestige 
cues are to be skilful, admired and copied. Examples of dominance cues are to 
be violent, feared and obeyed. Examples of medium social rank cues are to have 
average skill, not to evoke strong emotions and not to be very influential. After 
data collection, I realised that two cues contained two cues each. For instance, 
“being chosen as captain”, which in the original table was considered a unique 
prestige cue could be divided into having the position of captain (being captain) 
                                                          
6 The registration form was submitted on 11th November 2019. The data was collected between the 12th 
and 19th November. During data collection, I realised that the supplementary materials for the 
preregistration (i.e., experimental materials, table for coding recall and R script) were not attached to the 
preregistration form and uploaded again on 15th November 2019. 
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and the process of attainment of the captainship (being chosen/voted). The same 
was applicable for the equivalent dominance cue (“being self-appointed captain” 
= being captain + attaining the captainship through self-appointment) and 
medium social rank cue (“not enough votes for being captain” = not being captain 
+ receiving few votes). The other proposition (“being invited to parties” for both 
the prestigious and dominant individuals, and “being invited to parties of closest 
friends” for the medium social rank individual), were considered  unfair for the 
medium social rank individual as it contained more information to remember. 
Consequently, I changed the recall coding system to accept “being invited to 
parties” as one cue for the three individuals. An additional proposition specified 
the people who invited them (i.e., only their friends for the medium social rank 
individual and the team or people in general for both the prestigious and dominant 
individual). See Table 6. Both coding systems (the preregistered and the new) 
yielded qualitatively similar results and, consequently, I only report here the 
results derived from the new, improved coding system. A second coder, who was 
blind to the hypothesis, coded 10% of the chains (3 chains) using this improved 
coding system. A high inter-coding reliability between both coders (Cohen’s 
Kappa = 0.86) was found.  
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PROPOSITIONS PRESTIGIOUS (John) DOMINANT (Bill) MEDIUM SOCIAL RANK (James) 
P1 Is admired Is feared Doesn't arouse strong emotions 
P2 Skilful Violent Average skill 
P3 Highest goal score Injured teammates Few goals 
P4A + P4B A: Being captain 
B: Being chosen/voted 
A: Being captain 
B: Being self-appointed 
A: Not being captain 
B: Not having many votes 
P5 Is copied Is obeyed Isn’t very influential 
P6 Is paid attention to / Is 
listened to 
Is paid attention to / is 
listened to 
Is not paid (a lot of) attention to / Is 
not listened to (very carefully) 
P7 Received eye contact People avoid eye contact Rarely prolonged eye contact 
P8 Is modest He thinks he is the best 
(arrogant/narcissist) 
Is modest 
P9 Takes others into 
consideration 
Doesn't take others into 
consideration 
Take others' perspectives in high 
regard (Takes others into 
consideration) 
P10 Is popular / liked Is unpopular/disliked isn’t particularly popular 
P11A + P11B A: is invited to parties 
B: by the team/people 
A: is invited to parties 
B: by the team/people 
A: is invited to parties  
B: by closest friends 
P12 People want to spend 
more time with him 
People don't want to 
make him angry 
Closest friends like to hang out with 
him 
Table 5. Recall coding template. Propositions 4 and 11 were splitted into propositions 4A and4B, 
and 11A and 11B respectively after data collection. See main text for details. 
 
All statistical analyses were conducted with Bayesian package brms 
(Bürkner, 2017) in R 3.5.3 (R Core Team, 2019) following the preregistered R 
script (see SM3c). As in my previous transmission chain experiments (Jiménez 
& Mesoudi, 2019, July 2010; Jiménez, Stubbersfield, & Tehrani, 2018), all the 
regression models were multilevel with intercepts varying by chain. I treated 
generation as a monotonic variable (Bürkner & Charpentier, 2018) as recall 
decreases over generations but the amount of the decrease varies between 
adjacent generations (Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019, July 10). I adopted a model 
comparison approach, comparing a control model that included generation as the 
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sole predictor of recall to a model that, in addition to generation, included the type 
of social rank cue (prestige, dominance, medium social rank) as a predictor. I use 
leave-one-out cross validation information criterion (LOOIC) (Vehtari, Gabry, & 
Gelman, 2019), as a measure of relative model fit. LOOIC can be interpreted 
similarly to Akaike information criterion (AIC) or Watanabe-Akaike information 
criterion (WAIC), such that a lower LOOIC indicates better fit to the data. 
4.3.- Results 
4.3.1.- Cumulative Recall 
Figure 5 shows the number of correctly recalled social rank cues across 
cultural generations for the description of each footballer (prestigious, dominant 
and medium rank). As in similar transmission chain experiments, the number of 
correctly recalled social rank cues decreases over cultural generations. As 
predicted by H1, the figure clearly shows that the prestige and dominance cues 
were better transmitted than the medium social rank cues. This effect is present 
from the first generation, and in each subsequent generation. Contrary to H2, the 
figure does not show any clear differences in the transmission of prestige and 
dominance cues over generations.  
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Figure 5. Raw means for the recall of information with 1.60 standard error bars (corresponding to 
89% CI as given in the text) plotted against generation. As predicted by H1, both prestige cues 
and dominance cues were better transmitted than medium social rank cues. Contrary to H2, there 
were no clear differences in the transmission of prestige cues and dominance cues over 
generations. 
To statistically analyse these trends, I produced several Bayesian 
multilevel Poisson regression models (See Table 7). I first ran a generation-only 
model that included generation as the sole predictor of recall, which was used as 
our control model (LOOIC=1431.3, SE=17.4). I compared this model with my two 
a priori models. The first was a social rank model, which included the three types 
of social rank cues (prestige, dominance and medium social rank cues) together 
with generation as predictors of recall (LOOIC=1400.4, SE=17.5). The second 
was an interaction model, which included the main effects of the social rank cues 
and generation together with their interaction (LOOIC=1400.9, SE=17.5). Both a 
priori models had a better fit than the control generation model, with the social 
rank model being slightly better than the interaction model. As predicted by H1, 
both dominance cues (M=5.15, SD=2.75, B=0.30, SE=0.06, 89% CI [0.20, 0.40]) 
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and prestige cues (M=5.12, SD=2.76, B=0.31, SE=0.06, 89% CI [0.21, 0.41]) 
were better recalled than medium social rank cues (M=3.79, SD=2.58). Contrary 
to H2, the dominance cues were not better recalled than the prestige cues (B=-
0.01, SE=0.06, 89% CI [-0.10, 0.09]).  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Main Regression Models 
Generation Cues 
Cues * 
Generation 
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
Intercept 1.92 (0.08) 
1.70 
(0.09) 
1.76 (0.10) 
mo(Generation) -0.97 (0.07) 
-0.97 
(0.07) 
-1.12 (0.13) 
Cue [Dominance]   
0.30 
(0.06) 
0.21 (0.09) 
Cue [Prestige]   
0.31 
(0.06) 
0.25 (0.08) 
Cue[Dominance]:Generation     0.24 (0.17) 
Cue[Prestige]:Generation     0.16 (0.17) 
LOOIC 1431.3 1400.4 1400.9 
model weights 0.000 0.562 0.438 
Table 6. Unstandardized Coefficients (B) and their standard errors (in brackets) for each of the 
main regression models. Square brackets indicate the reference categories for the categorical 
predictors. Ordinal predictors were modelled as monotonic effects and are labelled mo(variable). 
More regression models and further details can be found in the Supplementary Materials. LOOIC 
= leave-one-out cross validation information criterion (lower values indicate better fit to the data; 
see text for details). Model weights were calculated using pseudo-Bayesian model average 
weights with Bayesian bootstrap (Vehtari & Gabry, 2019; Yao, Vehtari, Simpson, & Gelman, 2018) 
with the loo package (Vehtari, Gabry, & Gelman, 2019). 
 
Exploratory analyses were conducted to study the possible effects of 
gender, age and interest in football on the transmission of social rank cues. The 
addition of these three variables together or separately to the social rank model 
did not improve its model fit (see SM4a).  
4.3.2.- Narrative Evolution 
To study the narrative evolution, I analysed which social rank cues were 
well conserved in generation 4 for the description of the prestigious, dominant 
and medium social rank individuals. I also identified participants’ inferences at 
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any generation within the chains and assessed their congruency with the 
dominance-prestige-medium social rank distinction. These analyses were not 
included in the preregistration and areexploratory.  
For the prestigious individual, the cue that was best conserved in 
Generation 4 was being popular (67%), which was followed by being invited to 
parties (47%), being the team captain (40%), being skilful playing football (30%) 
and being voted for the captain position (33%). Participants’ inferences mainly 
referred to his good social skills (e.g., “nice”, “friendly”, “kind”, “open”), 
confidence, competence (e.g., “all round”, “golden boy”) and the wish of people 
to be like him. These inferences are all congruent with the notion of a prestigious 
individual as it was described in the introduction, i.e., as a competent, generous 
and respected individual.  
For the dominant individual, the cue that was best conserved was being 
feared (60%), which was followed by being team captain (43%), being invited to 
parties (37%), being aggressive (33%), having self-appointed himself the captain 
position (30%), being obeyed (30%) and being unpopular (30%). Participants’ 
inferences refer to him as an “angry”, “mean”, “nasty”, “unpleasant”, “direct”, 
“forceful”, “hostile”, “loud” “bully” who “shouts a lot”, “is not a good listener” and 
“people don’t’ enjoy his company”. These inferences are congruent with the 
notion of a dominant individual as described in the introduction, i.e., an 
aggressive individual who is feared by people.  
For the medium social rank individual, the cue that was best conserved 
was having average football skill (57%), followed by being invited to parties 
(43%). Participants’ inferences refer to him as a “good person” (also “nice”, 
“pleasant”, who “could be trusted in times of need”) with an introverted personality 
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(e.g., “quiet”, “shy”, “reserved” person who “may lack confidence in larger 
groups”). These characteristics are compatible with the notion of medium social 
rank. However, opposite characteristics, i.e., being a bad person with an 
extroverted personality, would also be compatible with the notion of medium 
social rank.  
 4.4.- Discussion 
In this study, I have tested (H1) whether high social rank cues (both 
prestige and dominance cues) are better transmitted than medium social rank 
cues and (H2) whether dominance cues are better transmitted than prestige cues. 
To test these two hypotheses, I conducted a transmission chain experiment with 
four cultural generations. Supporting H1, I found that both prestige and 
dominance cues were better transmitted than medium social rank cues. The 
recall advantage of both high social rank cues was evident in the first generation, 
which suggests that this effect might be strong enough to be detected in single-
generation experiments, although also carried through to all subsequent 
generations, indicating its long-term stability over repeated transmission 
episodes. This result is consistent with the evolutionary importance of both 
prestige-based and dominance-based social hierarchies in human social groups 
(Henrich & Gil-White, 2001).  
Contrary to H2, dominance cues were no better transmitted than prestige 
cues. I predicted a transmission advantage of dominance cues over prestige cues 
because I assumed that avoiding the potential costs produced by dominant 
individuals (e.g., physical injuries) were more important than the potential benefits 
provided by prestigious individuals (e.g., high quality information to socially 
learn). My experiment does not test directly this assumption, but the lack of 
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statistical differences between the cumulative recall of prestige and dominance 
cues suggest that identifying both prestigious and dominant individuals might 
have been equally important in our evolutionary history.  
Recall-based transmission chain experiments are generally used to study 
content transmission biases, i.e., a transmission advantage of information with 
particular intrinsic characteristics. These studies have identified different content 
biases such as social (Mesoudi, Whiten, & Dunbar, 2006; Stubbersfield, Tehrani, 
& Flynn, 2014), emotional (Eriksson & Coultas, 2014; Stubbersfield, Tehrani, & 
Flynn, 2017), negative (Bebbington, MacLeod, Ellison, & Fay, 2017), and 
stereotypical (Kashima, 2000; Lyons & Kashima, 2006) content transmission 
biases. My results suggest another content transmission bias to add to this list: a 
social rank content transmission bias. However, the results might also be 
explained, not by a specific content bias referring to social rank, but by a 
previously identified content bias: the emotional content bias. Stubbersfield et al. 
(2017) showed that narratives with high emotional content are better transmitted 
than narratives with low emotional content. This effect occurred independent of 
the valence of the emotion (positive as in amusement vs negative as in disgust). 
It is plausible that our descriptions of both the prestigious individual and the 
dominant individual have elicited a higher level of emotionality than our 
description of our medium social rank individual. The description of a prestigious 
football player might have elicited positive emotions like admiration, while the 
description of the dominant football player might have elicited negative emotions 
like fear. This possibility would be congruent with Henrich and Gil-White’s dual 
evolutionary model of social hierarchy, which states that the emotions of 
admiration and fear elicited in others are the mechanisms by which prestigious 
and dominant individuals respectively acquired high social rank and influence. As 
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emotions are a proximate mechanism, emotional and social rank content biases 
are not necessarily alternative explanations. Emotions such as admiration and 
fear could be the proximate mechanism by which the ultimate-level social rank 
bias operates. Future studies should use procedures to balance the emotional 
content across experimental conditions to test whether the elicitation of emotions 
is the mechanism by which social rank bias operates at a proximate level.  
Another possibility is that the experimental materials for both prestige and 
dominance cues were easier to remember (i.e., less cognitively demanding) than 
the medium social rank cues due to their higher level of concreteness (Heath & 
Heath, 2008). Being at the top of a social hierarchy, being feared or admired, 
being popular or disliked is more concrete and, consequently, easier to 
remember, than being in the medium of a social hierarchy, not eliciting strong 
emotions, or not being particularly popular. Future studies might use a description 
of an individual at the bottom of both dominance and prestige hierarchies to avoid 
the problem of different levels of concreteness between high social rank and 
lower social rank. A description of an individual at the bottom of a social hierarchy 
could also elicit higher level of emotions (e.g., compassion, pity) than the medium 
social rank description, which might help to alleviate the problem of different 
levels of emotional content.  
In conclusion, I have found evidence to support the higher fidelity 
transmission of high social rank cues, referring to both prestige and dominance, 
than medium social rank cues. I found no evidence that supports a transmission 
advantage of either type of high social rank cue. However, the mechanism that 
explains these results are not clear. It could be the consequence of a specific 
content transmission bias referring to high social rank (social rank content 
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transmission bias) or it could be a more general feature of the information such 
as a higher level of emotional content or concreteness of the experimental 
materials for both the prestigious and dominant individual than for the medium 
social rank individual. Given that this is the first experiment studying the cultural 
transmission of social rank cues, I encourage both direct and conceptual 
replications of this study to further explore the transmission advantage of social 
rank cues.  
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CHAPTER 5:  
The Integrated Dual Evolutionary Model of Social 
Hierarchy 
This chapter has been adapted with minor revisions from Jiménez, Á. V., & 
Mesoudi, A. (2019, December 27). The Integrated Dual Evolutionary Model of 
Social Hierarchy.  Preprint at: https://psyarxiv.com/sh7mg/  
Contributions:  
This chapter was conceptualised by Alex Mesoudi and me. Original draft was 
written by me. It was reviewed and edited by Alex Mesoudi and me.  
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5.0- Abstract 
 Almost 20 years ago, Henrich and Gil-White (2001) developed the dual 
evolutionary model of social hierarchy, which distinguishes between dominance 
and prestige as two different strategies to attain, maintain and increase social 
rank and social influence. This model has stimulated research in a variety of fields 
such as psychology, anthropology and management science; has proved to be 
useful to explain contradictory findings in the literature and has prompted new 
avenues for research. However, the current application of this model faces two 
main problems: (i) it is not clear whether a two-strategy model is the best way to 
conceptualise the strategies that people use to attain social rank, and (ii) it is 
challenging to apply this model, which was initially developed to explain the 
attainment of high social rank within small groups without formal hierarchies, to 
large-scale societies with formal hierarchies. In this article, I address these two 
problems. To this end, I first outline Henrich and Gil-White’s dual evolutionary 
model of social hierarchy. Second, I describe the evidence for and against the 
different aspects of this model and discuss the ways that it could be integrated 
with research conducted in adjacent fields. Lastly, I outline an integrated model 
that addresses the two problems pointed out above and encourage the study of 
how contextual factors affect the strategies that people use to acquire, maintain 
and increase social rank and social influence.  
5.1.- Introduction 
In a scene of the popular TV series Game of Thrones, Lord Petyr 
‘Littlefinger’ Baelish threatens the Queen-Regent Cersei Lannister with 
compromising information that, if publicly revealed, could negatively affect her. In 
his view, threatening Cersei in this way would make him more socially influential. 
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“Knowledge is power” he bluntly states. As a way to teach ‘Littlefinger’ a lesson, 
Cersei orders her guards to seize him and cut his throat, but then she orders the 
guards to stop. She says: “power is power”. This scene illustrates well how people 
use coercion as a way to compete for social rank and social influence. Yet, people 
also compete for social rank and social influence through the display of valued 
knowledge/skills. This is the way scientists, artists and athletes compete for social 
rank and social influence within their area of specialism. 
Henrich and Gil-White (2001) labelled these two different strategies for 
competing for social rank ‘dominance’ and ‘prestige’, respectively. This distinction 
between dominance and prestige has stimulated research in cultural evolution 
(e.g., Brand & Mesoudi, 2019; Offord, Gill, & Kendal, 2019), social psychology 
(e.g., Halevy, Chou, Cohen, & Livingston, 2012; Maner & Case, 2016), 
evolutionary psychology (e.g., Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 
2013; Conlon, 2019; Snyder, Kirkpatrick, & Barrett, 2008), anthropology (e.g., 
Henrich & Broesch, 2011; Reyes-Garcia et al., 2008; Von Rueden, Gurven, & 
Kaplan, 2010), and management science (McClanahan, 2019; Ronay, Maddux, 
& von Hippel, 2018); has proved to be extraordinarily useful to explain 
contradictory findings in the literature (e.g., Cheng & Tracy, 2014; Kakkar, 
Sivanathan, & Gobel, 2017); and has prompted new avenues for research (e.g., 
Cheng, Tracy, & Henrich, 2010).  
However, the current application of the dominance-prestige distinction 
faces two main problems. First, it is not clear whether a two-strategy model is the 
best way to conceptualise the pathways to high social rank in humans. For some 
authors, competence is the only way to the top (e.g., Chapais, 2015). For others, 
morality is an independent third way to the top (Bai, 2016). Moreover, there have 
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been proposals to distinguish between different strategies to obtain coerced 
social influence (Lewis, 2002), as well as to distinguish between different 
strategies for attaining voluntary social influence (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009a).  
Second, dominance and prestige were initially just two different strategies 
to acquire high social rank and influence within small groups without formal 
hierarchies. However, the distinction is now being applied to large-scale societies 
and groups with formal hierarchies (e.g., Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017) without 
explicitly acknowledging the different dynamics of social rank allocation in groups 
of different size and in hierarchies with different levels of formality. The distinction 
between power and status (e.g., Magee & Galinsky, 2008) in social psychology 
is potentially more suitable for large-scale societies with formal hierarchies than 
the dominance-prestige distinction.  
In this article, I address these two problems. To this end, I first outline 
Henrich and Gil-White’s Dual Evolutionary Model of Social Hierarchy (henceforth 
Standard Dual Model or SDM). Second, I describe the evidence for and against 
the different aspects of the SDM and discuss the ways that it could be integrated 
with research conducted in adjacent fields. Lastly, I outline an integrated model 
that addresses the two problems pointed out in this introduction and I encourage 
the study how contextual factors affect the strategies that people use to acquire, 
maintain and increase social rank and social influence.  
5.2.- The Standard Dual Evolutionary Model of Social Hierarchy (SDM) 
Figure 6 depicts the SDM (Cheng & Tracy, 2014; Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, 
et al., 2013; Henrich, 2016; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Redhead, Cheng, Driver, 
Foulsham, & O'Gorman, 2018). I distinguish three levels of analysis: strategies to 
148 
 
acquire high social rank (dominance strategy vs prestige strategy), dimensions 
of social rank (dominance dimension vs prestige dimension) and consequences 
of social rank (being influential, receiving attention, receiving deference, and 
having higher fitness for both the dominance dimension and the prestige 
dimension, and being copied only for the prestige dimension).  
 
 
Figure 6. The Standard Dual Evolutionary Model of Social Hierarchy (SDM). Based on Henrich 
and Gil-White (2001) 
 
According to the SDM, dominance and prestige are two strategies that 
people use (consciously or unconsciously) to acquire, maintain and/or increase 
their social rank and social influence within a social group. The dominance 
strategy entails the display of aggressive and coercive behaviours to induce fear 
in other individuals. In contrast, the prestige strategy entails the display of 
knowledge/skill within valued domains to induce admiration in other individuals.  
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 Although this is not always explicit (e.g., Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, et al., 
2013), there are not only two ways (strategies) to the top (high social rank) in the 
SDM. There are also two different tops (dimensions on Figure 6), with each one 
only being reachable by one strategy, which receives the same name as the 
dimension (see arrows connecting the dominance strategy to dominance 
dimension and the prestige strategy to prestige dimension in Figure 6). The key 
difference between both dimensions is whether the social rank is coercively 
imposed (dominance dimension) or voluntarily conferred (prestige dimension) 
(Cheng, 2019; Redhead, Cheng, & O’Gorman, 2018a). Consequently, the 
boundaries between the dominance strategy and the dominance dimension and 
between the prestige strategy and the prestige dimension are not clearly marked 
in the SDM. 
In the SDM, having a position of high dominance or high prestige within a 
social group confers social and biological benefits. Both dominant and prestigious 
individuals are socially influential, receive preferential attention and deference 
and tend to have higher biological fitness (see arrows connecting both dominance 
and prestige dimensions with social influence, receiving attention, receiving 
deference and higher fitness in Figure 6). Nevertheless, these similar 
consequences of dominance and prestige are the result of the distinct emotions 
they elicit in subordinates: fear vs admiration respectively. Whereas dominant 
individuals received deference due to fear of the potential costs of failing to do so 
(coerced deference), prestigious individuals receive deference due to the desire 
of other people to have access to their knowledge/skills (voluntary deference). 
Similarly, dominant individuals are paid attention as a way to monitor their 
potentially threatening behaviour, while prestigious individuals are paid attention 
due to the admiration towards their knowledge/skills. The same mechanism 
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indicates that dominant individuals are socially influential through obedience, 
while prestigious individuals are influential through persuasion.  
A clear difference between the consequences of dominance and prestige 
is that prestige leads to being copied by other individuals, while this is not the 
case for dominance (see arrow connecting the prestige dimension with being 
copied but the lack of arrow connecting the dominance dimension with being 
copied in Figure 6). According to Henrich and Gil-White (2001), prestige evolved 
in our lineage as a way to select knowledgeable/skilful models from whom to learn 
within valuable domains (e.g., hunting skill for a hunter-gatherer society). This 
would have led to gaining superior knowledge/skills to increase fitness. Some of 
these cues are first-order cues, i.e., characteristics of the target individual such 
as their age  and level of confidence, which can be assessed directly by the 
observer to infer competence (Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019). However, these cues 
could be unreliable. This would have favoured the use of second-order cues such 
as the amount of sustained attention, voluntary deference and copying that 
individuals receive as a way to infer who has superior knowledge/skills by 
observing the behaviour of other individuals displayed towards the target 
individual (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019). In this sense, 
the relationship between prestige and being copied, being paid attention and 
receiving deference is bidirectional (see bidirectional arrows prestige to being 
copied, receiving attention and receiving deference in Figure 6) because prestige 
leads to being copied and receiving attention and deference occurs at the same 
time as being copied, and this attention and deference serves to reinforce an 
individual’s prestige. First-order (e.g., physical formidability) and second-order 
cues (e.g., fear displayed towards the target individual) are also used for 
identifying who is dominant. The use of these cues is adaptive as it helps to 
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prevent potential costs by individually and socially learning who is more likely to 
cause those costs without having to directly suffer themselves the dominant 
behaviour (Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019, December 28).  
5.3.- Key Predictions, Empirical Evidence and Limitations of the SDM 
In this section, I discuss the key predictions derived from the SDM (Table 
1), their associated empirical evidence and its limitations. I also propose to 
integrate the SDM with research about social hierarchy in adjacent fields, mainly 
social psychology.  
Predictions about dominance and prestige strategies 
(i) Dominance and prestige strategies are independent from each other 1 2 
(ii) Both dominance and prestige strategies lead to acquiring high social rank and social 
influence 1 2 
(iii) Dominance and prestige strategies use different means (fear vs admiration) 1 2 
Predictions about the dynamics of dominance and prestige dimensions 
(iv) The strength of the social influence attained by people high in dominance diminishes 
over time 3 
(v) The strength of the social influence attained by people high in prestige strengthens 
over time 3 
Predictions about the consequences of dominance and prestige dimensions 
(vi) Both dominant and prestigious individuals received more attention than low social 
rank individuals 1 2 
(vii) Prestigious individuals receive more sustained attention than dominant individuals 1 
(viii) Dominant individuals receive more furtive glances than prestigious individuals1 
(ix) Both dominant and prestigious individuals received more deference than low social 
rank individuals 1 
(x) The deference prestigious individuals receive is voluntarily conferred, while the 
deference received by dominant individuals is coercively attained 1 
(xi) Both dominant and prestigious individuals have higher fitness than low social rank 
individuals 1  
(xii) Prestigious individuals are preferentially selected as models from whom to socially 
learn valued knowledge/skills 1 
Table 7. Key predictions of the Standard Dual Evolutionary Model of Social Hierarchy.  
1 (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001), 2 (Cheng et al., 2013), 3 (Redhead et al, 2018)   
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5.3.1.- Strategies to Social Rank and Influence 
5.3.1.1.- Two Ways to the Top? 
The SDM predicts that dominance and prestige are two strategies, which 
are independent from each other (prediction (i) in Table 8), and that lead to 
acquiring high social rank and influence (prediction (ii) in Table 8) through the use 
of different means (fear and admiration respectively, prediction (iii) in Table 8). 
The standard procedure to test whether dominance and prestige are two 
independent strategies (prediction (i) in Table 8) has been to ask subjects to rate 
the perceived prestige and the perceived dominance of themselves or other 
individuals using the validated Dominance-Prestige scales (Cheng, Tracy, & 
Henrich, 2010) to see to what extent prestige and dominance ratings are 
correlated. Low correlations are taken as evidence of the independence of the 
two strategies. The scales include items for dominance like “I (he/she) enjoy(s) 
having control over others” and “Some people are afraid of me (him/her)”. The 
scales also include items for prestige like “Members of my (your) group respect 
and admire me (him/her)” and “Members of my (your) group do not want to be 
like me (him/her)” (reverse coded). The results of multiple studies using this scale 
or another similar scale (Buttermore, 2006), have supported the idea that prestige 
and dominance strategies are independent, as the correlations have tended to 
be low (between r=-0.06 and r=0.18). These results have been found in studies 
that asked participants to rate themselves (Cheng et al., 2010; Conlon, 2019; 
Monge-López & Álvarez-Solas, 2017); unacquainted peers in a group task 
conducted in the laboratory (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, et al., 2013); peer 
members of an athletic team (Cheng et al., 2010) or of other naturally occurring 
groups such as music bands and small businesses (Brand & Mesoudi, 2019); 
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and the famous footballer Lionel Messi (Kakkar et al., 2017). Furthermore, low 
correlations between prestige and dominance are maintained over time among 
undergraduate classmates (Redhead, Cheng, Driver, et al., 2018).  
The prediction that both dominance and prestige strategies lead to high 
social rank and social influence (prediction (ii) in Table 8) has been 
experimentally tested by Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, et al. (2013). Students were 
asked to rank, first individually and later in groups, fifteen pieces of equipment 
(e.g., box of matches, signal flares, food concentrates) according to their 
relevance for survival on the Moon (Bottger, 1984; Branch, 1971). Next, 
participants rated each other by their perceived social influence, dominance, 
prestige and likability. Two external judges also rated each of the participants for 
these traits. Behavioural social influence was measured by comparing the 
individual decisions with the collective decisions in the task. The results showed 
that both prestige and dominance positively predicted social influence in the three 
measures (peer ratings, external judges’ ratings and the behavioural measure). 
Similarly, Brand and Mesoudi (2019) showed that both dominance and prestige 
ratings of other members of naturally occurring small groups were positively 
associated with influence ratings within those groups.  
These two studies also provide tentative evidence that dominance and 
prestige strategies resulted in social influence through the use of different means: 
fear vs admiration respectively (prediction (iii) in Table 8). In Cheng et al.’s study, 
prestige was more strongly associated with liking than was dominance, and in 
Brand and Mesoudi’s study liking was positively related to prestige and negatively 
related to dominance. These results are congruent with the idea that the prestige 
strategy elicits admiration and the dominant strategy fear. However, it is possible 
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for an individual to be liked without being admired (e.g., a friend who is not 
particularly skilful/knowledgeable in any valued domain) or to be disliked without 
being feared (e.g., a boring acquaintance). More conclusive evidence was found 
in an unpublished study by Cheng, Tracy, and Henrich (2013; reviewed in Cheng 
& Tracy, 2014), which showed that the relationship between dominance and 
social influence were mediated by fear, while the relationship between prestige 
and social influence were mediated by contribution to the group.   
All in all, the reviewed evidence supports the idea that dominance and 
prestige are two independent strategies that lead to the acquisition of high social 
rank and social influence through different means. These studies are high in 
external validity: they were conducted with naturally occurring groups or they 
studied the emergence of dominance-based and prestige-based hierarchies in 
interactions between unacquainted individuals. However, the dominance-related 
and prestige-related behaviours were measured through self and peer reports 
instead of being manipulated. Consequently, the nature of the supporting 
evidence is correlational. As a next step, I encourage experiments in which 
dominance and prestige are manipulated by the researchers, for instance, by the 
use of confederates trained to use dominance and prestige cues.  
5.3.1.2.- Debate 
5.3.1.2.1.- One Way to the Top? 
 My recommendation of manipulating dominance and prestige with 
confederates has already been done in a series of studies conducted in the 
1980s-90s. Contrary to prediction (ii) in Table 8, these studies only found that 
prestige-related cues led to the attainment of social influence, while dominance-
related cues failed to attain social influence (Carli, LaFleur, & Loeber, 1995; 
155 
 
Copeland, Driskell, & Salas, 1995; Driskell, Olmstead, & Salas, 1993; Ridgeway, 
1987; Ridgeway & Diekema, 1989). In the first of these experiments (Ridgeway, 
1987), the confederate displayed either dominance (e.g., loud voice, tense 
posture, staring eye contact), submissiveness (e.g., soft voice, cowering posture, 
averted eye contact with sneaking glances), high competence (e.g., medium 
voice, relaxed posture, high eye contact with normal break-offs), or low 
competence (e.g., soft, slumped voice, slumped posture, low eye contact) non-
verbal cues while arguing with a second confederate about the amount of a 
financial reward in an insurance settlement. The target confederate argued for a 
low reward, while the other confederate argued for an average reward. 
Participants had to decide the amount of the financial reward before and after 
being exposed to the interaction. The difference between these amounts was 
used as the measure of influence. The results show that the use of high 
competence cues led to the highest level of influence, while there were no 
significant differences between the uses of dominance, submissive and low 
competence cues in predicting influence.  
According to Cheng and Tracy (2014), the failure of the dominance 
strategy to attain influence in these studies was probably due to two reasons. 
First, the dominant behaviour was not directed towards participants and, 
consequently, they could not experience fear, which is necessary for the 
successful use of the dominance strategy. Second, the measure of influence was 
persuasion, which is contrary to the way dominant individuals achieve social 
influence, i.e., submission to their wishes via fear and intimidation. Consequently, 
these studies only show that the dominance strategy is not useful to attain 
persuasion but they do not provide evidence about whether the use of the 
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dominance strategy is useful to attain other forms of social influence (e.g., 
compliance with a request from a dominant individual).  
A “one-way to the top” approach has also been put forward by Chapais 
(2015) who argues that both dominance and prestige require competence and, 
consequently, competence is the only way to the top. For Chapais, the attainment 
of high social rank via dominance requires competence in controlling one’s own 
fear, using weapons, formulating tactics to attack rivals, etc. Moreover, this 
competence in imposing their will, for Chapais, not only triggers fear but also 
admiration and, consequently, the dominance-prestige distinction is not so clear-
cut.  
 Although it is true that dominance goes together with competence within 
domains as the ones mentioned by Chapais, this is not incompatible with the 
SDM, which focuses on the causes of acquiring high social rank and social 
influence through the elicitation of different emotions in others. A dominant 
behaviour might elicit both fear and admiration but these will rarely be triggered 
together at the same time in the same individual. People suffering the dominant 
behaviour would defer to the dominant individual due to fear. Other individuals 
might admire the dominant individual for their dominance-related skills when they 
are used against other individuals (especially members of rival out-groups), not 
against themselves. Halevy et al. (2012) have shown that behaviours damaging 
an out-group and benefitting the in-group elicit perceptions of greater prestige 
and lower dominance in in-group members when there is no other way of 
benefitting the in-group without damaging the out-group. However, if the 
dominant behaviour is directed towards the in-group, it seems implausible that 
this behaviour would elicit the admiration of in-group members or that, if 
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admiration is elicited somehow, the elicitation of admiration instead of fear would 
be the pathway to the top. For example, terrorists might acquire social influence 
among people with similar ideology through the prestige route due to their 
commitment to their cause or their violence against those who they see as their 
enemy. However, the only way they are going to acquire social influence among 
the people they are fighting against is by imposing their will through violence and 
intimidation. In this light, Chapais’ (2015) criticism does not entail a real challenge 
to the SDM (for further discussion about the in-group vs out-group distinction 
applied to the SDM, see Jiménez, Flitton, & Mesoudi, 2020, January 7).  
5.3.1.2.2.- Three Ways to the Top? 
Numerous studies in social psychology (Flynn, 2003; Flynn, Reagans, 
Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006; Willer, 2009) have shown 
that altruism/generosity is associated with the attainment of high social rank and 
greater influence within a social group. For instance, Hardy and Van Vugt (2006) 
conducted a study in which participants had to decide how much they contributed 
to a public fund vs the amount to keep for themselves. They received a bonus for 
the amount of money in the public fund that was divided equally among 
participants. The results showed that participants who contributed more to the 
public fund did economically worse but they were rated as higher in prestige.  
However, researchers do not agree whether altruism (or morality in 
general, which is a broader concept) is an independent way to the top (Bai, 2016) 
or is part or a modifier of the prestige route (Cheng & Tracy, 2014; Henrich, 2016). 
Henrich and Gil White (2001, p. 180) argue that individuals who provide public 
goods at a cost for themselves often acquire prestige but the advantage of 
defecting (i.e., using the goods without deferring towards the provider) makes it 
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difficult for prestige to evolve through altruism. Nevertheless, they point out that 
for skilful/knowledgeable individuals, the provision of public goods might be an 
excellent way to advertise their competence and, consequently, obtain a greater 
number of followers who defer to them, which might be translated into fitness 
gains. Similarly, Cheng and Tracy (2014) see altruism as a form of signalling 
competence to acquire more followers. They argue that the tendency to copy the 
prestigious is an incentive for prestigious individuals to behave altruistically, as if 
they are followed, they would acquire more benefits through the contribution of 
other individuals to the public good. This close link between being altruistic and 
being copied has been proposed to explain the evolution of human cooperation 
(Henrich, 2016, pp. 128-131; Henrich, Chudek, & Boyd, 2015). 
 In contrast to this subsuming of altruism within competence, Bai (2016) 
argues that altruism and other forms of moral behaviour are an independent way 
to acquire high social rank. By morality Bai means “a prescriptive system (…) that 
focuses on approach motives to do something good” (pp.208-209), which is 
usually costly for the individual behaving morally.  To effectively acquire high 
social rank, the display of moral behaviour should be tuned to the morality 
system/s accepted within a specific culture, as the display of competence should 
be tuned to the domains that the observers regard as important.  
According to Bai, competence is not a requirement for the moral route to 
high social rank as many heroes and heroines often fail to achieve their goals 
and might be punished for their virtues. Bai gives the example of Malala 
Yousafzai, a Pakistani school girl who defended the right of girls to attend school 
against the Taliban and was shot for this. Although she did not succeed in 
restoring the access to education for girls in Pakistan, she was awarded a Nobel 
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Prize for her heroism, which led her to becoming a very influential person 
worldwide.  
According to Bai (2016), the psychological mechanism to acquire high 
social rank through the morality route is the elicitation of admiration for virtue, 
which leads to positive feelings and expectations of the morally praiseworthy 
individuals bearing costs to benefit the group or a moral view. Consequently, 
people accept the influence of virtuous individuals and defer to them because 
they believe this would benefit themselves.  This is very similar to the mechanism 
of the competence route, which is admiration for competence, which leads to 
people deferring to the competent individual to attain benefits (e.g., social 
learning or private/public goods) for themselves (Leary, Jongman-Sereno, & 
Diebels, 2014). This suggests that displaying competence and/or displaying 
altruism (or other forms of morality) are ways in which people can acquire prestige 
and voluntary deference, not to acquire a third different dimension of social rank.  
Nevertheless, Bai argues that admiration is an “umbrella term” (p. 211), 
which refers to similar but different emotions (Schindler, Zink, Windrich, & 
Menninghaus, 2013). For instance, admiration for morality leads to more intense 
physical sensations (e.g., warmth in the chest) and higher desire of imitating the 
model than admiration for skill (Algoe & Haidt, 2009). Similarly, admiration for 
morality and admiration for skill activate different cortical areas in the brain 
(Immordino-Yang, McColl, Damasio, & Damasio, 2009). However, this does not 
change the fact that people admired for their competence or for their virtue are 
conferred voluntary deference because people expect to benefit from them, 
which contrast with the coerced deference attained by dominant individuals. 
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Bai seems to have found cases in which competence is not necessary to 
acquire prestige. Another case is the possibility of behaving altruistically without 
being competent by having acquired wealth through inheritance. However, 
competence and altruism seems to be tightly linked together in many empirical 
contexts. For example, altruism is positively correlated with prestige (Cheng et 
al., 2010) and morality with competence-respect in some of Bai’s own studies 
(Bai, Ho, & Yan, 2019). Similarly, competence (e.g., hunting skill and gardening 
knowledge) and altruistic behaviours (e.g., sharing meat and helping others with 
work) clustered together in a study in a foraging society using data reduction 
techniques (Konečná & Urlacher, 2017).  Furthermore, competence within a 
particular domain (e.g., hunting) is normally necessary in order to gain the surplus 
wealth to be able to act altruistically. For example, sharing turtle meat among the 
Meriam of Torres Strait (Australia) requires being a skilful hunter, which demands 
hard work (Smith & Bird, 2000). Moreover, if an individual is very competent in a 
given domain, they are likely to elicit resentment and jealousy in less competent 
individuals. However, if this very competent individual acts generously by 
contributing to a group task or providing advice, he/she can overcome this threat 
to his/her attainment of voluntarily conferred high social rank (Grant, 2013). 
All in all, the reviewed evidence suggests that displaying 
altruism/generosity (or moral behaviour in general) is a way in which individuals 
could attain high prestige. However, further research is necessary to understand 
how altruism/generosity interacts with competence in the attainment of prestige.  
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5.3.1.2.3.- Multiple Ways to Dominance and Multiple Ways to Prestige? 
 The concept of dominance in the animal literature has been found 
problematic. It tends to refer to the use of force or the threat of the use of force, 
sometimes with the help of coalitional support (Lewis, 2002). This is also the way 
that dominance is frequently understood in the human literature, which is 
associated with physical and non-verbal cues that signal the capacity of an 
individual to inflict costs via physical aggression such as physical formidability, 
masculine facial characteristics, deeper voice, etc. as well as behavioural 
displays such as risk-taking behaviour (Hill, Bailey, & Puts, 2017; Redhead, 
Cheng, & O’Gorman, 2018b). However, this is not the only way humans and other 
animals can impose costs in other individuals. Lewis (2002) has restricted the 
concept of dominance to physical dominance and has used the term  ‘leverage’ 
to refer to the way individuals can attain social influence through the possession 
of resources that cannot be taken by force. For example, female chimpanzees 
have an advantageous social position when they are in estrus, although the ability 
to win fights does not change. In humans, expert knowledge/skills and wealth can 
be used to inflict costs or threaten to inflict costs in others to attain social 
influence. For example, a shaman can attain influence in others by threatening to 
withhold his services when they are needed (Chapais, 2015).  
 Apart from the display of competence and altruism/generosity, other 
individual behaviours and characteristics such as demographic characteristics 
(Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972), assertiveness (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009b), 
confidence (Anderson, Brion, Moore, & Kennedy, 2012) and social 
connectedness (Anderson & Shirako, 2008) have been associated with the 
attainment of prestige. I posit that demographic characteristics, assertiveness 
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and confidence are first-order cues that people use to infer competence (Jiménez 
& Mesoudi, 2019). In contrast, social connectedness is a way to broadcast 
competence and/or generosity (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009a).  
 Anderson and Shirako (2008) demonstrated the importance of social 
connectedness to acquire prestige through generosity in a study with MBA 
students enrolled in a negotiation class. The researchers measured through peer 
reports the level of connectedness of each student prior to the start of the class 
and the students’ reputations after engaging in all the dyadic negotiation 
exercises. The results clearly show that the reputation for cooperativeness or 
selfishness for the more connected individuals was more linked to their history of 
behaviour during negotiations than the reputation of less connected individuals. 
The same is applicable to the attainment of prestige through competence. For 
example, scientific publications and scientific prestige culturally evolved to 
encourage scientists to share their knowledge, so that others could build on it 
(Hull, 1988/2010). If Darwin had kept his ideas to himself, he would not be 
celebrated and natural selection would have taken longer to discover.  
5.3.1.3.- Needed Integration 
Taking all these pieces of evidence together, I proposed to talk about 
dominance strategies and prestige strategies in the plural, instead of a unique 
dominance strategy and a unique prestige strategy. In dominance strategies, I 
include physical dominance and leverage (Lewis, 2002). In prestige strategies, I 
include displays of (apparent) competence, displays of (apparent) generosity and 
the development of social connections (Anderson & Kilduff, 2009a).  
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Future research will need to determine to what extent the different 
strategies for attaining dominance and prestige are independent from each other. 
I predict that the two strategies to rank high in the dominance dimension (i.e., 
physical dominance and leverage) are independent because their induction of 
fear rest on different mechanisms: the capacity to win fights vs the possession of 
valued knowledge/skills/resources (prediction (i) in Table 9). In contrast, I predict 
that the three strategies to rank high in the prestige dimension (i.e., displaying 
competence, displaying generosity and developing more social connections) are 
more dependent on each other (prediction (ii) in Table 9).  
 
(i) Physical dominance and leverage are two independent strategies to 
induce fear in others and attain/maintain/increase social influence and 
power 
(ii) Displaying competence, displaying generosity and developing more 
social connections are not independent strategies to induce admiration 
and attain/maintain/increase status and power 
(iii) Power can be attained either through dominance strategies, prestige 
strategies or a mixed of both types of strategies.  
(iv) Status can only be obtained through the use of prestige strategies, 
never through the use of dominance strategies.  
Table 8. Predictions derived from the present review. 
5.3.2.- Dimensions of Social Rank 
5.3.2.1.- Dominance and Prestige 
The literature abounds with examples of dominant and prestigious 
individuals in large-scale societies who occupy/occupied formal power positions 
such as Joseph Stalin (Stuppy & Mead, 2016; Suessenbach, Loughnan, 
Schonbrodt, & Moore, 2018), Kim Jong-un, Baschar al-Assad (Suessenbach, 
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Loughnan, Schönbrodt, & Moore, 2018), Vladimir Putin (Bai, 2016), Henry Ford 
II (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, et al., 2013), Donald Trump, Narendra Modi and 
Nigel Farage (Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017) for dominance and Stephen Hawking 
(Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Suessenbach, Loughnan, Schonbrodt, et al., 2018), 
Warren Buffet (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, et al., 2013), Hillary Clinton (Kakkar & 
Sivanathan, 2017), Abraham Lincoln (Stuppy & Mead, 2016) and Marry Barra 
(Bai, 2016) for prestige. However, the SDM was initially developed to explain rank 
differentiation within small groups with informal hierarchies such as a hunter-
gatherer band or a group of school peers (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). In this type 
of group, in which members know each other and interact face-to-face, the use 
of either dominance strategies or prestige strategies is effective to attain 
coercively-imposed social rank (the dominance dimension) or freely-conferred 
social rank (the prestige dimension, see Section 5.3.1). However, dominance and 
prestige are likely to have different dynamics over time.  
In a longitudinal study with naturally occurring small groups without formal 
hierarchies, Redhead, Cheng, Driver, et al. (2018) predicted that the social 
influence attained by people initially rated as high in dominance diminishes over 
time (prediction (iv) in Table 8), while the social influence attained by people 
initially rated as high in prestige strengthen over time (prediction (v) in Table 8). 
Dominance, prestige and social influence were measured though peer ratings 
using the previously validated scales (Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, et al., 2013; 
Cheng et al., 2010) described in Section 5.3.1.1. The authors found support for 
this prediction. Dominance strategies are likely less effective over time than 
prestige strategies because people dislike attacks on their autonomy and being 
coerced (Boehm et al., 1993; Price & Van Vugt, 2014). Consequently, less 
dominant individuals might fight back against dominant individuals by forming 
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coalitions (e.g., Ridgeway & Diekema, 1989) and, in doing so, resist or diminish 
their influence. In contrast, some of the consequences of prestige such as being 
copied and receiving deference make the prestige of an individual and, with it, 
their social influence, increase over time due to their bidirectional relationship 
(see Section 5.2, Figure 6, and Cheng, 2019 for a review).  
5.3.2.2-. Power and Status 
 In parallel to the dominance-prestige distinction of the SDM, social 
psychologists have distinguished between power and status as two different 
dimensions of social rank (Fragale, Overbeck, & Neale, 2011; Hays, 2013; Hays 
& Bendersky, 2015; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). In this area of research, power is 
defined as the “asymmetrical control over valued resources in social relations” 
(Magee & Galinsky, 2008), while status is defined as the respect, esteem and 
admiration received by individuals from others (Magee & Galinsky, 2008).  
The key distinction between both dimensions of social rank is that status 
is more subjective than power (Blader & Chen, 2014). That is, status entirely 
depends on the admiration professed by observers to some of the target’s 
attributes. Power or the control over resources is more an objective property of 
the individual (Blader & Chen, 2014): he/she controls or does not control the 
resources. Furthermore, power does not necessarily reflect the consensus over 
the value of the attributes of one individual because power can be taken by the 
use of dominance strategies, be inherited (e.g., the crown) or be awarded by one 
or a few individuals (e.g., being hired as a policeperson).  In many cases, 
nevertheless, there is a certain level of consensus in a group about who deserves 
to have power (e.g., electing a Prime Minister through elections).  
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Another distinction between power and status within social psychology is 
that power is more formal in nature (e.g., having the role of Prime Minister, Head 
Teacher, policeperson or CEO), while status is more informal. Nevertheless, 
power and status often interact. Having a position of high power (e.g., being the 
line manager within a company) is frequently associated with having high status 
(e.g., being admired and respected) for two reasons. First, a position of high 
power leads to having perceived instrumental value because powerful people 
have control of resources that other individuals want to benefit from. Second, 
individuals who have high status are frequently chosen for positions of power as 
individuals expect that high status individuals are good leaders.  
However, power and status does not necessarily go together. An individual 
with a powerful position (e.g., a line manager) might have influence and be 
deferred to by subordinates within a group, not because they admire him/her but 
because they fear the consequences of not doing so (e.g., being fired). Similarly, 
an individual without power within a group (e.g., an assembly-line worker) might 
have status among his/her peers due to some of his/her attributes (e.g., 
knowledge about football) and consequently attain influence in the group.  
5.3.2.3.- Needed Integration 
The social psychologists distinction between power and status has certain 
similarities with the SDM’s distinction between dominance and prestige. 
However, while I consider the terms prestige and status synonymous and 
interchangeably, the term dominance cannot be equated to power. The concept 
of power (i.e., the asymmetrical control over valued resources) is agnostic about 
the way it is exercised (e.g., in a gentle or coercive manner) or obtained (e.g., 
through a democratic process, coercion or inheritance). In contrast, the concept 
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of dominance always goes together with the coercion of others. Moreover, power 
tends to have a formal nature, but dominance, as well as status/prestige, always 
has an informal nature. Consequently, I consider the term dominance a valid 
concept for referring to a dimension of social rank within small groups in which 
social influence is exercised informally through coercion. However, the concept 
of dominance as a dimension of social rank is not applicable to large groups 
and/or groups with formal hierarchies. In these contexts, dominance refers 
exclusively to strategies to acquire, maintain or increase power and social 
influence through coercion. Power can also be obtained through the use of 
prestige strategies, when people voluntarily confer a powerful position to some 
individual (prediction (iii) in Table 9). However, status can only be attained 
through the use of prestige strategies, never through the use of dominance 
strategies as status entirely depends on the subjective appreciation of the value 
of an individual (prediction (iv) in Table 9).  
The distinction between power and status has the advantage that it is 
applicable at both the group level (i.e., small groups without formal hierarchies in 
which all the members know each other and interact directly) and the society level 
(i.e., large groups in which members know and directly interact with a tiny 
proportion of members who have formal hierarchies). It can also help to 
understand how the prestige route to social rank might confer opportunities to 
display behaviours that are associated with the other strategy (e.g., threats to 
maintain high social rank). Henrich and Gil-White (2001) give the example of 
Stephen Hawking. Although he attained prestige within the scientific community 
and society in general through his scientific contributions to the field of 
astrophysics, his prestige led him to attain institutional power. This gave him the 
opportunity to potentially inflict costs on students (e.g., giving them low grades) 
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without being physically dominant. This could have not been possible in a social 
group without formal hierarchies.  
5.3.3.- Consequences of Social Rank 
According to the SDM, attaining a dominant or prestigious social rank 
leads to being socially influential (prediction (ii) in Table 8), receiving attention 
(prediction (vi) in Table 8) and deference (prediction (ix) in Table 8) and having 
higher fitness (prediction (xi) in Table 8). Nevertheless, these similar 
consequences of dominance and prestige are achieved through different means, 
i.e., the induction of fear (dominance) vs admiration (prestige) in subordinates.  
5.3.3.1.- Attention 
 Although the SDM predicts that both dominant and prestigious individuals 
receive preferential attention from subordinates (prediction (vi) in Table 8), it also 
predicts that the type of attention they receive is different. That is, prestigious 
individuals are expected to receive sustained attention, which is assumed to 
facilitate acquiring high quality knowledge/skills through social learning from 
competent individuals (prediction (vii) in Table 8) (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001); 
while dominant individuals are expected to receive furtive glances, which is the 
consequence of the need to monitor the behaviour of the dominant individual to 
prevent potential costs (prediction (viii) in Table 8) (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001).  
While the evidence showing that high social rank individuals are paid more 
attention is robust, (Dalmaso, Pavan, Castelli, & Galfano, 2012; DeWall & Maner, 
2008; Foulsham, Cheng, Tracy, Henrich, & Kingstone, 2010; Gerpott, Lehmann-
Willenbrock, Silvis, & Van Vugt, 2017; Jones et al., 2010), few studies have 
distinguished between dominant and prestigious individuals. One exception is a 
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recent study conducted by Roberts, Palermo, and Visser (2019). These 
researchers manipulated dominance and prestige through the use of first-order 
cues (Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019; Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019, December 28): faces 
rated as high or low in dominance and CVs considered to be high (e.g., 
succeeding in a career in medicine) or low (e.g., having dropped from university) 
in prestige. The attentional blink (AB) task was used in this study, which entails 
the rapid visualisation of a series of stimuli including two targets and a number of 
distractors (scrambled human faces and dog faces). This task is used to study 
biases affecting the allocation of attentional resources to competing stimuli. In 
this study, the way participants identified the faces was by answering positively 
to the question “did you see an unscrambled face”? Contrary to prediction (vi) in 
Table 8, there were no significant differences between the high and low prestige 
stimuli, and the accuracy was higher for low dominance stimuli than for high 
dominance stimuli. It is not clear why the low dominance faces were more 
accurately identified but a possibility suggested by the authors is that the low 
dominance faces did not meet the stereotypical expectations of how male faces 
look like. Nevertheless, the procedure used involved 10 milliseconds to process 
each stimuli with an interval of 80 milliseconds between stimuli. These is very 
different from the way people interact with dominant and prestigious individuals 
and it is difficult to compare with other attention experiments using more realistic 
experimental materials.  
Another exception is the study by Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, et al. (2013) 
reviewed in Section 5.2.1. After collecting the data for the emergence of 
dominance and prestige-based hierarchies in groups of unacquainted individuals 
completing together the Moon Task, external participants who wore fixed eye-
trackers viewed clips of these interactions. These external participants rated the 
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individuals in the clips for dominance and prestige. In support of prediction (vi) in 
Table 8, the dominance and prestige ratings received by the individuals in the 
clips were positively related to the amount of attention they received by these 
external participants to the group interactions.  
Cheng et al. did not directly test whether the type of attention that dominant 
and prestigious individuals received was different. However, they took two 
different measures of attention: total fixation duration and proportion of fixations. 
These measures can be used as proxies for sustained attention and furtive 
glances respectively. According to the standardized coefficients, dominance 
ratings (=0.56) positively predict sustained attention to a greater extent than 
prestigious ratings (=0.23), which contradicts the prediction of a greater 
sustained attention towards prestigious individuals over dominant individuals 
(prediction (vii) in Table 8). Similarly, dominance ratings ( = 0.56) also positively 
predict furtive glances to a greater extent than prestigious ratings ( = 0.24) do, 
which supports the prediction of a greater number of furtive glances towards 
dominant individuals than towards prestigious individuals (prediction (viii) in Table 
8).  
Although there was no comparison between dominance and prestige, 
another relevant study was conducted by Holland, Wolf, Looser, and Cuddy 
(2017). The authors used static images of one man and one woman displaying 
either dominant poses (e.g., greater occupation of the space and open limbs) or 
submissive poses (e.g., smaller occupation of the space and closed limbs), while 
participants’ attention was recorded with eye-tracking devices. As the authors 
predicted, people fixated less and spent less time looking at dominant posers 
than at submissive posers, fixated less and spent less time looking at the faces 
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and upper bodies and more at the lower bodies of dominant posers than 
submissive posers. This is congruent with the assumption that dominant 
individuals are feared and monitored. The authors conclude their article 
emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between prestige and dominance 
to assess attention in line with Henrich and Gil-White’s predictions. They point 
out that, while experiments using prestige through manipulations of targets’ 
clothing (DeWall & Maner, 2008; Maner, DeWall, & Gailliot, 2008) or CV 
(Dalmaso et al., 2014; Dalmaso et al., 2012) indicate that people payed sustained 
attention to high prestige individuals, their manipulations of the target’s 
dominance through non-verbal displays indicate that people avert their gaze from 
high dominance individuals.  
In the light of the examined evidence, it is not clear whether both 
prestigious and dominant individuals received similar or different types of 
attention. The study by Cheng et al. (2013) indicates that both prestigious and 
dominant individuals received similar types of attention and that dominance has 
a stronger effect than prestige in predicting attention. However, Holland et al. 
(2017) showed that people avert their gaze from people displaying dominance 
poses, which suggest that people do show different types of attention towards 
dominant individuals. Unfortunately, this study did not compare dominance with 
prestige. Moreover, these eye-tracking experiments have the serious limitation in 
that they measure the attention paid to individuals differing in social rank by 
external observers to the group interactions. In line with the theory, dominant 
individuals should only encourage furtive glances when they can react to the 
observer. Similarly, prestigious individuals should only encourage sustained 
attention when it is possible to learn something valuable (e.g., knowledge, skill) 
from them. Neither of these were possible in these experiments. The introduction 
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of expectations about encountering these high social rank individuals or being 
watched by them later (e.g., Gobel, Kim, & Richardson, 2015) might help to clarify 
this question. Moreover, the development of eye-tracking devices that allow the 
measurement of attentional biases of participants interacting together is 
promising. Future studies using mobile eye-trackers in group interactions might 
help to tell apart the effects of prestige and dominance on social attention.  
5.3.3.2.- Deference 
 The SDM predicts that both dominant and prestigious individuals receive 
more deference than low social rank individuals (prediction (ix) in Table 8). It also 
predicts that the deference received by dominant individuals is coercively 
attained due to the fear of potential costs (e.g., psychical aggression) of failing to 
do so in subordinates; while the deference received by prestigious individuals is 
voluntarily conferred due to the wish of subordinates to benefit from the 
prestigious individual’s knowledge/skill (prediction (x) in Table 8). Unfortunately, 
to my knowledge, there are no studies comparing the deference received by 
dominant and prestigious individuals.  
 The deference towards dominant men has been shown in an experiment 
about mate competition (Gambacorta & Ketelaar, 2013). In the experiment, 
participants were made to believe that they were competing with another male 
for a date with an attractive female. The manipulation of dominance was a photo 
of a shirtless man who was either physically strong (high dominance) or weak 
(low dominance). Participants were prompted to tell stories and jokes to the 
attractive female. Gambacorta and Ketelaar assumed that dominant men have 
used violence to prevent other men mate through human evolutionary history. 
Consequently, they hypothesized that men competing for mates with a dominant 
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man would inhibit creative displays to avoid the potential costs inflicted by 
dominant individuals. In the experiment, men competing with the high dominance 
man told fewer stories and jokes than the men competing with the low dominance 
man. Moreover, the quality of the stories and jokes of the men who told them was 
lower when competing with the high dominance man than when competing with 
the low dominance man.  
Deference towards prestigious individuals has been shown by van der 
Vegt, Bunderson, and Oosterhof (2006), who found that participants with low 
expertise in a group task show more deference (i.e., were more committed and 
help more) towards experts than towards less competent individuals. This could 
be interpreted as a way to incentive experts’ contribution and receiving advice 
and help from those experts (Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019).  
5.3.3.3.- Fitness 
 The SDM predicts that both dominant and prestigious individuals have 
higher fitness than lower social rank individuals (prediction (ix) in Table 8). Von 
Rueden et al. (2010) studied whether this prediction holds for Tsimane men. The 
ability to win a dyadic physical confrontation was used as a proxy for dominance, 
while community-wide influence was used as a proxy for prestige. In this study, 
both dominance and prestige were positively related to number of in-pair 
surviving offspring and extra-marital affairs. Both correlations were stronger for 
prestige. Dominance was positively related to marrying younger women and 
prestige to having wives with earlier age of birth. The relationship between 
determinants of social rank (physical formidability, political influence and hunting 
ability) and positive fertility outcomes is robust in the literature about small-scale 
foraging societies (Von Rueden, 2014). Nevertheless, it is less clear how 
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dominant and prestigious individuals attain higher fertility. Von Rueden (2014) 
suggests that it could be through having more access to mates and/or higher 
quality mates, as well as receiving more support from allies and deference from 
others. It is also possible that the characteristics that lead to attaining high social 
rank within these societies (e.g., hunting ability) are the important factors in 
determining offspring survivorship (Von Rueden, 2014). Moreover, it could also 
be the case that having more offspring is what leads to attaining higher social 
rank and not the other way round (Von Rueden, 2014).  
 Sexual preferences for dominant and prestigious men have also been 
found in studies with WEIRD (acronym for Western, Educated, Industrialized, 
Rich and Democratic; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) samples. Snyder et 
al. (2008) argue that high dominance men could cause costs to their partners if 
they behave aggressively towards them. Consequently, they hypothesized that 
women generally prefer prestigious men over dominant men. They independently 
manipulated dominance (high vs low) and prestige (high vs low) in a 2 x 2 
between-subjects design using descriptions of individuals competing for 
leadership within a student fraternity. They found support for their hypothesis: 
high prestige individuals were rated as more attractive and desirable as short-
term and long-term partners than low prestige individuals. Low dominance 
individuals were also more desirable as long-term partners than high dominance 
individuals. In a subsequent study using the context of an athletic competition, 
high dominance men were considered more attractive and desirable as both 
short-term and long-term partners than low dominance men. A potential 
explanation for this finding is that using the dominance strategy in athletic male 
to male competition is socially sanctioned (Snyder et al., 2008) and, therefore, it 
could be difficult to disentangle from the prestige strategy of displaying high 
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competence. Unfortunately, there was no comparison between prestige and 
dominance in the athletic context in this study.  
5.3.3.4.- Social learning 
A clear difference between the consequences of dominance and prestige 
is that prestige leads to being preferentially selected as a model from whom to 
socially acquire valuable knowledge/skills (prediction (xii)). This is not the case 
for dominance except when the knowledge/skill that the social learning involves 
acquiring the dominance strategy itself. This prediction is derived from Henrich 
and Gil-White’s (2001) theory of the evolution of prestige, which was reviewed in 
Section 5.2.  
This preferential selection of prestigious individuals as models from whom 
to socially learn has been demonstrated by laboratory and online experiments 
(Atkisson, O'Brien, & Mesoudi, 2012; Brand, Heap, Morgan, & Mesoudi, 2019, 
December 12; Chudek, Heller, Birch, & Henrich, 2012) and by ethnographic 
studies of small-scale societies (Henrich & Broesch, 2011; Henrich & Henrich, 
2010). Although the empirical evidence is in general supportive of the use of 
prestige-biased social learning, there is little supporting evidence in the 
ethnographic record (Garfield, Garfield, & Hewlett, 2016; Garfield, Hubbard, & 
Hagen, 2019). Similarly,  Chudek, Baron, and Birch (2016) did not find that 
children aged 2-7 preferentially copied the high prestige individuals over low 
prestige individuals. See Jiménez and Mesoudi (2019) for longer review of 
prestige-biased social learning.  
To my knowledge, Chambers and Hammonds (2014) has conducted the 
sole study comparing social learning from prestigious vs dominant individuals. 
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They manipulated dominance by showing a demonstrator displaying either high 
(e.g., speaking loudly and doing authoritative gestures) or low (e.g., speaking 
timidly and having a very reserved body posture) first-order dominance cues. 
Instead of manipulating prestige, they manipulated success information: whether 
the demonstrator was able to solve five anagrams or only one out of five. The 
study adopted a 2 (dominance: high vs low) x 2 (success: high vs low) between-
subjects experimental design. The measure of social learning was the number of 
anagrams solved by participants after viewing the demonstrators. This is more a 
motivational type of influence (i.e., vicarious effectiveness or vicarious 
helplessness) than direct copying. The results yielded a significant main effect of 
success and an interaction between dominance and success, but the main effect 
of dominance was not significant. For the dominant demonstrators, when they 
were successful solving the anagram, participants solved more anagrams than 
when the dominant demonstrator was unsuccessful. For the non-dominant 
demonstrators, there were no significant differences between successful and 
unsuccessful. These results, however, are difficult to interpret because the 
manipulation checks show that the dominant demonstrators received higher 
ratings of prestige than dominance and that their prestige was higher than the 
prestige of the non-dominant successful demonstrator. 
5.4.- The Integrated Dual Evolutionary Model of Social Hierarchy (IDM) 
Taking all the pieces of evidence reviewed in Section 5.3 together, I 
proposed an integrated model, which I label the Integrated Dual Evolutionary 
Model of Social Hierarchy (henceforth IDM). Figure 8 depicts my proposed model, 
which, like the SDM, distinguishes between two types of social hierarchies 
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(‘dimensions’ on the figure). I use the terms ‘power’ and ‘prestige’7 to refer to 
these dimensions. The dimension of power entails the ordering of individuals by 
their degree of control of resources and group decisions, while the dimension of 
prestige entails the ordering of individuals by the degree of respect, esteem and 
admiration that they receive from others. Power can be formal or informal, while 
prestige is always informal.  
 
 
Figure 7. The Integrated Dual Evolutionary Model of Social Hierarchy (IDM) 
 
Power and social influence can be acquired through the use of either 
dominance or prestige strategies (see arrows connecting dominance strategies 
to social influence, both directly and indirectly through power, and the arrows 
connecting prestige strategies to power, prestige, and indirectly to social 
                                                          
7 ‘Prestige’ is used here as synonym of ‘status’ in the social psychology literature (see Section 5.3.2.2.).  
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influence through status in Figure 8). I call dominance strategies all the actions 
that individuals consciously or unconsciously do to induce fear in other individuals 
through the imposition of costs and/or the threat of those costs. In dominance 
strategies I include both physical dominance and leverage (Lewis, 2002). The 
successful use of dominance strategies sometimes leads to the acquisition of 
formal power. For example, the military general Augusto Pinochet acquired 
formal power and became the maximum authority of Chile (1973-1990) through 
the use of violence and coercion against the political authorities and their 
supporters. In some cases, the use of dominance strategies does not lead to 
attaining power but only social influence (e.g., terrorist attacks influence social 
behaviours without terrorists having taken power).  
In contrast, prestige cannot be acquired through the use of dominance 
strategies, as people who fear the dominant individuals do not admire nor 
voluntarily confer prestige to them. I call prestige strategies all the actions that 
individuals consciously or unconsciously do to induce admiration in other 
individuals and, therefore, be granted with power and/or status. I include the 
display of (apparent) competence, (apparent) in-group commitment and the 
developing of more social connections within a group (Anderson & Kilduff, 
2009a). From my perspective, these three strategies can also be used to acquire 
formal and informal power. For example, the prestige strategy is the path to 
formal power of democratic elected leaders, who are voluntarily conferred this 
position by the electorate due to their displays of (apparent) competence (e.g., 
knowledge of international relations) and/or compromise with particular causes 
(e.g., reforms to tackle climate change).  
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The consequences of prestige in the IDM are similar to the consequences 
of prestige in the SDM. Prestige leads to being socially influential (persuasion), 
receiving sustained attention, receiving voluntary deference, having higher 
fitness and being copied. The consequences of power depend on whether the 
powerful person has high prestige or not. The consequences of power without 
prestige are similar to the consequences of dominance in the SDM: being socially 
influential (obedience), receiving coerced attention and deference, and having 
higher fitness. If the powerful person has prestige the consequences would be 
similar to the consequences of prestige without power but the occupation of a 
powerful position would in many cases increase his/her prestige and amplify the 
degree in which the positive consequences of status are attained.  
The IDM focuses on three level of analysis: strategies to acquire high 
social rank and social influence, dimensions of social rank and consequences of 
social rank. However, I consider the social and environmental context is another 
very important level of analysis to add to this model and I encourage research on 
how context affects the strategies that people use to attain social rank and the 
consequences of power and status. For instance, it has been predicted that the 
lack of exit options for followers (Price & Van Vugt, 2014) and higher levels of 
wealth inequality (Ronay et al., 2018) favour the adoption of a dominant approach 
to the attainment, maintenance and increase of power, but tests of these 
predictions are lacking. Furthermore, the usefulness of the prestige strategies 
altruism/morality and competence to attain prestige have been shown to depend 
on the cultural contexts. In a series of studies, Torelli, Leslie, Stoner, and Puente 
(2014) have shown that (i) individualism is positively related to perceptions of high 
prestige individuals as competent and to the conferral of high prestige to 
competent individuals, while collectivism is positively related to perceptions of 
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high prestige  individuals as warm and to the conferral of high prestige to warm 
individuals and (ii) that people from an individualistic culture (US Americans) are 
more likely to display competence as a way to attain higher prestige, while people 
from a collectivistic culture (Latin Americans) are more likely to display warm 
behaviours such as helping others to attain higher prestige.  
In conclusion, the SDM has generated a great deal of research in different 
disciplines and a number of debates and conflicting evidence. In this chapter, I 
have reviewed the empirical literature on the dominance-prestige distinction and 
adjacent fields and have proposed a model that builds on the SDM. I expect this 
model to be useful for integrating research from different fields.  
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CHAPTER 6:  
When Do People Prefer Dominant over Prestigious 
Political Leaders?  
This chapter has been adapted with minor revisions from Jiménez, Á. V., Flitton, 
A., & Mesoudi, A. (2020, January 7). When do people prefer dominant over 
prestigious political leaders? Preprint at: https://osf.io/68zca/  
Contributions:  
This chapter was conceptualised by Adam Flitton, Alex Mesoudi and me. Data 
analysis and interpretation was conducted by me with the help of Adam Flitton 
for running the models in Stata for Table 13. Original draft was written by me. It 
was reviewed and edited by Adam Flitton, Alex Mesoudi and me.  
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6.0.- Abstract 
 Previous research has sought to explain the rise of right-wing populist 
leaders in terms of the evolutionary framework of dominance and prestige. In this 
framework, dominance is defined as high social rank acquired via coercion and 
fear, and prestige is defined as high social rank acquired via competence and 
admiration. Previous studies have shown that right-wing populist leaders are 
rated as more dominant than non-populist leaders, and right-wing populist / 
dominant leaders are favoured in times of economic uncertainty and intergroup 
conflict. In this paper I explore and critique this application of dominance-prestige 
to politics. First, I argue that the dominance-prestige framework, originally 
developed to explain inter-personal relationships within small-scale societies 
characterised by face-to-face interaction, does not straightforwardly extend to 
large-scale democratic societies which have frequent anonymous interaction and 
complex ingroup-outgroup dynamics. Second, I show that economic uncertainty 
and intergroup conflict predict not only preference for dominant leaders, but also 
prestigious leaders. Third, I show that perceptions of leaders as dominant or 
prestigious are not fixed, and depend on the political ideology of the perceiver: 
people view leaders who share their ideology as prestigious, and who oppose 
their ideology as dominant, whether that ideology is liberal or conservative. 
Fourth, I show that political ideology is a stronger predictor than economic 
uncertainty of preference for Donald Trump vs Hillary Clinton in the 2016 US 
Presidential Election, contradicting previous findings that link Trump’s success to 
economic uncertainty. I conclude by suggesting that, if economic uncertainty 
does not directly affect preferences for right-wing populist leaders, other features 
of their discourse such as higher emotionality might explain their success.  
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6.1.- Introduction 
 The last two decades has seen the rise of several right-wing populist 
leaders in democratic countries (Tartar, 2017, December 11) such as Donald 
Trump, Marine Le Pen, Viktor Órban, Matteo Salvini, Nigel Farage, Narendra 
Modi, Jair Bolsonaro and Geert Wilders.  According to Mudde and Kaltwasser 
(2017), populists share a political discourse that divides society into two 
antagonistic groups: “pure” people vs the “corrupt” political, economic, cultural 
and media elite or establishment. They often criticise representative liberal 
democracy and argue that politics should be a direct expression of the will of the 
people (e.g., via referenda). Populism is not a complete ideology in itself, unlike 
socialism or fascism, but it attaches to other ideologies on the right or the left 
(Muddle and Kaltwasser, 2017).  
The dual evolutionary model of social hierarchy (Cheng & Tracy, 2014; 
Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone, & Henrich, 2013; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; 
Jiménez, Á.& Mesoudi, 2019, December 27; Redhead, Cheng, & O’Gorman, 
2018a) has recently been used to understand the rise of such right-wing populist 
leaders (Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017; McAdams, 2017). This model distinguishes 
between dominance and prestige as two independent strategies that people use 
to acquire high social rank and influence (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). The 
dominance strategy entails the use of force and coercion against others. Its 
success depends on the capacity to defeat and/or induce fear in other individuals 
(Redhead, Cheng, & O’Gorman, 2018b). Consequently, people tend to dislike 
dominant individuals (Brand & Mesoudi, 2019; Cheng et al., 2013) and avoid 
proximity to them (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). In contrast, the prestige strategy 
entails the display of competence within valued domains and/or pro-ingroup 
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behaviours. Its success depends on the capacity to induce admiration and 
voluntary deference in others because prestigious individuals are perceived as 
having instrumental value to accomplish one’s own goals (Leary, Jongman-
Sereno, & Diebels, 2014), such as socially learning valuable knowledge/skills 
(Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Jiménez & Mesoudi, 2019) or being provided with 
tangible private (Pinker, 1998, p. 499) and public goods (Price & Van Vugt, 2014). 
This explains why people generally like and prefer prestigious individuals as both 
leaders and social companions (Cheng et al., 2013; Kruger & Fitzgerald, 2011; 
Laustsen & Bor, 2017; Petersen & Laustsen, 2019).  
Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017) equated right-wing populist leaders with 
dominant political leaders. They argue that certain environmental contexts, in 
particular economic uncertainty, might reverse the preference for prestigious 
individuals over dominant individuals, at least when choosing between different 
political leaders. According to these authors, economic uncertainty induces in 
people a sense of lack of personal control, prompting them to find ways to 
compensate for that deficit. One of these compensatory strategies is to support 
dominant political leaders (Hogg & Adelman, 2013), who are perceived as able 
to defend the interests of the ingroup even at the expense of the well-being of 
out-groups (Halevy, Chou, Cohen, & Livingston, 2012).  
Consequently, Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017) attribute the rise of right-
wing populist leaders to the rise in economic uncertainty after the 2008 global 
financial crisis (see also Funke, Schularick, & Trebesch, 2016; Funke & 
Trebesch, 2018). First, Kakkar and Sivanathan found that, during the 2016 US 
Presidential campaign, participants rated the right-wing populist leader Donald 
Trump significantly higher in dominance and lower in prestige than the opposing 
197 
 
candidate, Hillary Clinton. Supporting the link to economic uncertainty, Kakkar 
and Sivanathan further showed that (i) individual voters’ preference for Donald 
Trump before the election was significantly predicted by an aggregate zip-code-
based measure of economic uncertainty composed of housing vacancy rate, 
poverty rate and unemployment rate, and (ii) at a country level, using data from 
the World Values Survey from 2004-2016 (Inglehart et al. 2018) with 138,323 
respondents from 69 countries, preference for dominant leaders in general (a 
preference for “a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and 
elections”) was significantly predicted by the change of unemployment from one 
year to the next within that country according to the World Bank.  
Theories and findings such as those of Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017) are 
valuable in integrating across disciplines (psychology, economics, politics and 
anthropology) and providing novel explanations for socially and politically 
important trends. However, precisely because of this importance, such claims 
and evidence should be carefully evaluated and scrutinised. In this article, I 
critically evaluate the above theory and evidence linking right wing populist 
leaders to dominance via economic uncertainty. I first discuss the limitations of 
the current applications of the dual evolutionary model of social hierarchy to 
modern politics and the rise of right-wing populism, arguing for a greater role of 
political ideology. Second, I formulate a number of hypotheses derived from the 
limitations I identify. Third, I test these hypotheses using data from the WVS as 
well as the data collected by Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017) to analyse the 
perceptions of and preferences for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. Finally, I 
discuss my results in the context of the broader literature on prestige-dominance, 
political psychology and populism. 
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6.1.1.- The dual evolutionary model of social hierarchy as applied to politics 
 Although originally conceived as an explanation for social rank hierarchies 
within small, face-to-face groups, the prestige-dominance distinction has also 
been applied to the political arena in large-scale societies, as described above 
for the 2016 US Presidential Election (Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017; McAdams, 
2017; Witkower, 2017). In these applications, Donald Trump is depicted as 
dominant because of his more aggressive vocabulary, threats against political 
rivals (e.g., “lock her up”), non-verbal displays of dominance (e.g., occupying 
more space and extending his arms) (Witkower, 2017) and the display of 
emotional and personality traits associated with dominance (Cheng, Tracy, & 
Henrich, 2010) such as high neuroticism, low agreeableness and hubristic pride 
(McAdams, 2017; Nai, Martínez I Coma, & Maier, 2019). Conversely, Hillary 
Clinton is depicted as prestigious because of her greater political experience and 
expertise (e.g., having previously been Secretary of State) as well as her more 
frequent demonstrations of knowledge and non-verbal displays associated with 
the prestige strategy (e.g.,  smiling) during the Presidential debates (Witkower, 
2017).  
 However, the application of the dual evolutionary model of social hierarchy 
to modern politics and the rise of right-wing populist leaders is not without 
difficulties. The model was initially developed to explain the acquisition of high 
social rank and social influence within small groups (e.g., hunter-gatherer bands 
or sports teams) in which members interact face-to-face and personally know 
each other. In contrast, the acquisition of political power in modern society occurs 
within large societies (e.g., the population of the USA exceeds 325 million people) 
in which members only interact with and know a small proportion of other 
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members. Consequently, the acquisition and maintenance of political power and 
political influence within the modern political sphere are more complex than within 
the small groups to which the model was originally applied.  
 First, the key distinction between the dominance and prestige strategies in 
the dual evolutionary model is that the social influence attained through 
dominance is imposed upon others, while the social influence attained through 
prestige is voluntarily given by others (de Waal-Andrews, Gregg, & Lammers, 
2015; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001).  However, democratic procedures like the 
presidential elections that led to the victory of Donald Trump are especially tuned 
to the prestige strategy given that political power is voluntarily given to the party 
or coalition of parties that have the greatest freely-conferred support within a 
society8. Given the fact that Donald Trump attained the US Presidency through 
democratic elections, not through a coup d’état, labelling his strategy to power 
“dominance” is questionable.  
Second, the dominance and prestige strategies in the original model were 
assumed to be displayed towards other members of the ingroup, such as other 
members of a small-scale society like the !Kung or the Yanomamo (Henrich & 
Gil-White, 2001), sport teams (Cheng et al., 2010) and other community groups 
(Brand & Mesoudi, 2019). In modern politics, however, the use of both strategies 
are often directed towards outgroups, such as when political leaders of one 
country pursue a military attack or trade war against another country (potentially 
a dominance strategy) or when leaders make reforms in their own country to gain 
                                                          
8 In modern democracies, the winners of elections are not always the ones that have the greatest support 
in absolute terms. For instance, Hillary Clinton had more votes (48.5%) than Donald Trump (46.4%) in the 
US Presidential elections of 2016. Nevertheless, Donald Trump became the President of the US. This is 
due to the specific system within a country to turn votes into seats. 
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admiration and be emulated by the international political community (potentially 
a prestige strategy). However, it is not clear that the concepts of prestige and 
dominance straightforwardly translate to this intergroup context. For example, a 
dominant action by a political leader directed towards an outgroup (e.g., bombing 
another country) might lead to the acquisition of prestige among ingroup 
members (e.g., by the demonstration of commitment to protect the in-group from 
external threats). When facing intergroup conflict, research has found that people 
increase their preferences for male leaders who have traits associated with the 
use of the dominance strategy such as facial masculinity, muscle strength and 
height (Laustsen & Petersen, 2017; Little, Burriss, Jones, & Roberts, 2007; 
Petersen & Laustsen, 2019), features that people presumably perceive as 
facilitating the use of aggression against outgroups during intergroup conflict 
(Laustsen & Petersen, 2017). For instance, Little et al. (2007) found that people 
prefer hypothetical election candidates with more physically dominant faces 
during war time and less physically dominant faces during peace time. However, 
this and other studies have not tested whether intergroup conflict simultaneously 
increases people’s preferences for prestigious political leaders. It is plausible that 
prestigious leaders are desirable in intergroup conflict because they are more 
knowledgeable about international relations, or more skilled negotiators and, 
therefore, achieve the best deals possible for their ingroup preventing much of 
the damage of a long-lasting intergroup conflict. 
Furthermore, although members of one’s country might often be perceived 
as the ‘in-group’, the existence of different ideologies within a country often leads 
to conflicts, and groups with opposing ideologies within the same country become 
perceived as outgroups. This has consequences for the perceptions of 
dominance and prestige of political leaders and political decisions, as the same 
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decisions might be seen differently by people within the same country but 
belonging to different ideological groups. For instance, the Catalonian 
Independence Referendum (1st October 2017) carried out by the pro-
independence Catalonia regional government despite being declared illegal by 
the Constitutional Court of Spain was considered a coup d’état (i.e., an act of 
dominance) by people who defend the territorial integrity of Spain (e.g., Wintour, 
2017), but a democratic process capturing the will of the people (i.e., a prestigious 
act) by defenders of the independence of Catalonia (e.g., Asamblea Nacional 
Catalana, 2018). Conversely, the application of article 155 of the Spanish 
Constitution by the Spanish Government, which resulted in the control of the 
Catalonian regional power by the Spanish government, was considered a coup 
d’état (i.e., an act of dominance) by people in favour of the independence of 
Catalonia, but a reestablishment of democracy (i.e., a prestigious act) by 
defenders of the territorial integrity of Spain (e.g., Burgen, 2017). 
 The same is applicable to the perceptions of liberal (e.g., Hillary Clinton) 
and conservative (e.g., Donald Trump)9 political leaders as either dominant or 
prestigious. Conservatives might feel that liberal politicians are imposing their 
views on society by pushing the direction of cultural change towards liberal 
values. Similarly, liberals might feel that conservative politicians are imposing 
their views on society by pushing the direction of cultural change towards 
conservative values. As both conservatives and liberals see political leaders of 
the opposing ideology as a threat to their personal values, or seeking to coerce 
them into following alternative values, they might perceive them as dominant. In 
contrast, political leaders of their own ideology are seen as defending and trying 
                                                          
9 I use the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ as they are used in the US: ‘liberal’ as synonymous of left-
wing and Democrat and ‘conservative’ as synonymous of right-wing and Republican.  
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to implement the values that those people view as correct and, therefore, people 
might perceive these politicians as competent and confer prestige on them. 
These perceptions of political leaders of their own ideology as prestigious and 
political leaders of the opposing ideology as dominant might be exacerbated due 
to the increasing political polarization experienced in the last two decades, at 
least in the US (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2018, pp. 128-132).  
Third, it is not clear why economic uncertainty would reverse the general 
tendency of preferring prestigious leaders over dominant leaders as Kakkar and 
Sivanathan (2017) propose. Although dominant leaders might benefit their 
ingroup by competing more aggressively over limited resources against out-
groups, prestigious individuals, who are assumed to be more competent, might 
take the right decisions to bring the country out of an economic recession. 
Therefore, supporting a prestigious leader might also be a way to compensate 
the lack of control while facing economic uncertainty.  
Furthermore, it is unclear why economic uncertainty would be a better 
predictor of preference for dominant / right-wing populist leaders than political 
ideology, as has been claimed (Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017). Ideology is an 
alternative explanation for the rise of right-wing populist leaders. This ideological 
explanation posits that the political discourse and proposed policies of right-wing 
populist leaders are more attractive for a part of the electorate than the political 
discourse and policies of well-establish political leaders. This explanation is often 
described as a cultural or political backlash against post-materialist political 
movements such as feminism and environmentalism (Inglehart & Norris, 2016, 
2017) and/or political correctness (Campbell & Manning, 2018, pp. 151-161). 
Inglehart and Norris (2017) found support for the ideological explanation in a 
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study in which they tested whether ideology or economic uncertainty better 
accounts for the recent rise of right-wing populism. They used data from the 
European Social Survey (2002-2014) to predict voting preferences for a right-
wing populist party from several control (e.g., age, gender, education), economic 
(e.g., unemployment, subjective economic uncertainty, living on social benefits) 
and ideological (e.g., anti-immigration, right-wing self-identification, mistrust in 
global governance) variables. They found mixed support for the economic 
uncertainty explanation. For example, right-wing populists were supported more 
by unemployed people but less by people receiving social welfare. In contrast, all 
the ideological predictors (anti-immigration attitudes, mistrust in global and 
national governance, authoritarian values and right-wing ideology) positively 
predicted support for populist leaders, giving clear support for the ideological 
explanation. These results highlight the importance of political values in 
predicting support for right-wing populist leaders. Consequently, I suggest that 
political ideology actually plays a greater role than economic uncertainty in 
explaining the rise in popularity of right-wing populist leaders. Nevertheless, 
political ideology and economic uncertainty might interact. Ideology might predict 
who decides to vote for a right-wing populist leader, but economic uncertainty 
might have created a window of opportunity for right-wing populists, with their 
discourse becoming attractive to a greater number of people after the financial 
crisis. 
In conclusion, there exist certain parallels between right-wing populist 
leaders such as Donald Trump and the dominance strategy (e.g., use of 
aggressive vocabulary against political rivals). However, there are limitations to 
this parallel. Donald Trump and other right-wing populist leaders often use this 
strategy against outgroups or political rivals. This differs from the dual 
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evolutionary model of social hierarchy in which the dominance strategy is directed 
towards ingroup members. The use of dominance against outgroups might serve 
to gain prestige within the ingroup, blurring the original dominance-prestige 
distinction. Consequently, failing to take the ingroup/outgroup distinction into 
account might lead to incorrect inferences such as concluding that people prefer 
dominant political leaders under certain contexts (e.g., economic uncertainty) 
without considering how political ideologies influence perceptions of dominance 
and prestige of political leaders (e.g., Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017) or how 
dominance strategies against out-groups might confer prestige within in-groups 
(Halevy et al., 2012).  
6.1.2.- Hypotheses  
Based on the discussion above, I formulated a number of hypotheses 
(Table 10) that specify the conditions under which dominant and prestigious 
leaders should be preferred. Hypotheses H1-H3 predict preferences for dominant 
(H1a, H2a and H3a) and prestigious (H1a, H2b and H3a) political leaders as a 
result of experiencing economic uncertainty (H1), perceived lack of control (H2) 
and inter-group conflict (H3). These hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. 
Dominance and prestige have been shown to be two independent strategies to 
acquire high social rank and social influence through different means (Cheng & 
Tracy, 2014; Cheng et al., 2013). Consequently, economic uncertainty, perceived 
lack of control and intergroup conflict might predict preference for both dominant 
and prestigious political leaders. Hypotheses H4-H6 derive from our argument 
that political ideologies influence perceptions of political leaders as either 
dominant or prestigious and the greater importance that I ascribe to political 
ideology over economic uncertainty in predicting voting preferences. These 
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hypotheses are tested in Studies 1 and 2 described below, which extend and 
improve on the methods and analyses of previous studies (e.g., Kakkar and 
Sivanathan 2017) that partially address only some of the hypotheses. 
 
Economic 
Uncertainty 
H1a: Economic uncertainty positively predicts preferences 
for a dominant leader. 
H1b:  Economic uncertainty positively predicts preferences 
for a prestigious leader. 
Perceived lack 
of control 
H2a: Perceived lack of control positively predicts 
preferences for a dominant leader. 
H2b: Perceived lack of control positively predicts 
preferences for a prestigious leader. 
Inter-group 
conflict 
H3a: Inter-group conflict positively predicts preferences for a 
dominant leader. 
H3b: Inter-group conflict positively predicts preferences for a 
prestigious leader. 
Perceptions of 
conservative 
political 
leaders 
H4:  Liberal ideology is positively related to perceptions of 
conservative political leaders as dominant and negatively 
related to perceptions of liberal leaders as dominant 10. 
Perceptions of 
liberal political 
leaders 
H5: Liberal ideology is positively related to perceptions of 
liberal political leaders as prestigious and negatively related 
to perceptions of conservative leaders as prestigious 11. 
Voting 
decisions 
H6: People’s political ideology is a stronger predictor of 
people’s voting decisions than economic uncertainty. 
Table 9. Hypotheses. Hypotheses H1-H3 refer to the relationship between economic uncertainty, 
perceived lack of control and inter-group conflict, and preferences for both dominant and 
prestigious political leaders (Study 1). Hypotheses H4-H5 refer to how people’s political ideology 
are related to the perceptions of political leaders as dominant or prestigious (Study 2). Hypothesis 
H6 related to whether political ideology is a better predictor of voting decisions than economic 
uncertainty or not.  
                                                          
10 Because the scale used to measure political ideology ranges from conservative (1) to liberal (7), this 
hypothesis could also be framed as “conservative ideology is negatively related to perceptions of 
conservative political leaders as dominant and positively related to perceptions of liberal leaders as 
dominant. 
11 Because the scale used to measure political ideology ranges from conservative (1) to liberal (7), this 
hypothesis could also be framed as “conservative ideology is negatively related to perceptions of liberal 
political leaders as prestigious and positively related to perceptions of conservative leaders as prestigious. 
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6.2.- Study 1 
6.2.1.- Introduction 
The aim of this study is to test whether economic uncertainty (H1a & H1b), 
perceived lack of control (H2a & H2b) and intergroup conflict (H3a & H3b) 
positively predict preferences for dominant and prestigious leaders respectively. 
I use data from the longitudinal World Values Survey (henceforth WVS; Inglehart 
et al., 2018) for the period 2010-2016. H1a and H2a have been previously tested 
with this dataset but with a longer timeframe (2004-2016) by Kakkar and 
Sivanathan (2017), I am using the data from 2010 to 2016 because only the data 
from this period contain all the variables of interest. Hypotheses H1b, H2b, H3a 
and H3b (related to prestige, and intergroup conflict) have not previously been 
addressed.  
Kakkar and Sivanathan used a 4-point Likert item that asked respondents 
their opinion of “having a strong leader who does not bother with parliament or 
elections” (1=very good, 4=very bad, reverse coded) as a measure of preference 
for a dominant leader. For perceived general lack of control, they used a 10-point 
Likert item, which asked respondents to indicate how much freedom of choice 
and control they have over the way their lives turn out (1=no choice at all, 10 = a 
great deal of choice, reverse coded). They also used five control variables from 
the WVS (subjective social class, gender, age, political ideology and income 
category). However, they did not use any of the economic uncertainty variables 
included in the WVS. Instead, as their measure of economic uncertainty, they 
used the change in unemployment in a country from one year to the next, which 
was extracted from the Word Development Indicators (WDI) database from the 
World Bank. They found support for hypotheses H1a and H2a (Table 10): both 
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economic uncertainty and perceived general lack of control positively predicted 
preference for a dominant leader. However, the adjusted R2 is very low (Adj 
R2=0.002) and there is no difference in the adjusted R2 between the model 
including only the control variables and the models that also included economic 
uncertainty alone or together with perceived lack of control. This might be the 
consequence of using the same value of economic uncertainty (i.e., change in 
unemployment) for all the respondents from the same country within a year, 
which totally eliminates the variation in economic uncertainty between individuals 
in the same country. To improve on their analysis, I use individual-level variables 
extracted from the WVS to measure economic uncertainty. Moreover, I adopt a 
model comparison approach to compare the strength of economic uncertainty, 
perceived lack of control and intergroup conflict in predicting preferences for both 
dominant and prestigious leaders.  
6.2.2.- Methods 
 I used the same item as Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017) to measure the 
outcome variable preference for a dominant leader. The second outcome 
variable, preference for a prestigious leader, was measured with a 4-point Likert 
item (1=very good, 4=very bad) in which respondents gave their opinion about 
the way of governing:“having experts, not government, make decisions according 
to what they think is best for the country” (1=very good, 4 very bad, reverse 
coded). I chose this item because it is consistent with Henrich and Gil-White’s 
prestige definition, which centres on knowledge and skill as key aspects of 
leadership.  
For the predictor variable economic uncertainty I used five items. Two of 
those items asked respondents to indicate how worried they were about the 
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possibility of losing or not finding a job (EcUnJOB) and about not being able to 
give their children a good education (EcUnEDUCATION) (1=very much, 4= not 
at all, reverse coded). The remaining three items asked respondents to indicate 
how often in the last 12 months they or their family have gone without enough 
food to eat (EcUnFOOD), without medicine or medical treatments they needed 
(EcUnMEDICINE), and without a cash income (EcUnCASH) (1=often, 4=never, 
reverse coded). Intergroup conflict was measured with three 4-point Likert items 
indicating how often respondents are worried about a war involving their country 
(InConINTWAR), a civil war (InConCIVILWAR) or a terrorist attack 
(InConTERRORISM) (1=very much, 4=not at all, reverse coded). Each item for 
both the economic uncertainty variable and the intergroup conflict variable were 
used as separate predictors to preserve their meaning. This also entailed to treat 
each Likert item as ordinal rather than averaging it and treating it as continuous. 
Perceived lack of control was measured with the same item as Kakkar and 
Sivanathan (2017) used (see Section 6.2.1.). As control variables we used the 
same variables as Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017): age, gender, income category 
(10-point Likert scale from lowest group to highest group within respondents’ 
country), subjective social class (5-point Likert scale, 1=upper class, 5=lower 
class, reverse coded) and political ideology (10-point Likert item from left to right).  
After excluding respondents who did not provide information from one or 
more of these variables, the dataset contained 52325 respondents (26209 
females, 26116 males) aged 16-99 (M=41.27, SD=15.95) from 54 different 
countries.  
Because both outcome variables (preference for a dominant leader and 
preference for a prestigious leader) are ordered categorical variables and 
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respondents lived in different countries, I used ordinal mixed effects logistic 
regression models to analyse the data (Bürkner & Vuorre, 2019) with intercepts 
varying by country of respondents. As the predictor variables of interest (i.e., the 
items used as proxies for economic uncertainty, lack of control and intergroup 
conflict) were ordered categorical variables, I modelled their relationship with the 
outcome variable as monotonic effects (Bürkner & Charpentier, 2018) with the 
package brms (Bürkner, 2017). As most variables were ordered, instead of 
continuous, I did not centre or standardize the variables.  
6.2.3.- Results 
6.2.3.1.- Which variables predict preference for a dominant leader? 
 To analyse the relationship between the predictors of interest and the 
preference for a dominant political leader I ran several Bayesian regression 
models with default flat priors in brms and compared their model fit using leave-
one-out cross validation information criterion (LOOIC; Vehtari, Gelman, & Gabry, 
2017). See Table 11 for regression coefficients and LOOIC values. Similarly to 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Watanabe-Akaike Information Criterion 
(WAIC), a lower LOOIC indicates better model fit. First, I ran a null model 
(LOOIC=132040.6, SE=212.0), with only the intercepts as predictors. The 
Variance Ratio (a Bayesian equivalent to the Intraclass Correlation) in this null 
model was 0.06, meaning that the 6% of the variance in preferences for dominant 
leaders is explained by the clustering of respondents within countries. This is a 
relatively small value but important enough to justify the use of multilevel 
modelling to attain accurate estimates. This model was compared to a control 
model (LOOIC=131955.3, SE=212.6), which included all the control variables. As 
the model fit of the control model was better than the fit of the null model, I used 
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the control model as a base for constructing and comparing the model fit of 
subsequent models.  
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
NULL 
B (SE) 
CONTROL 
B (SE) 
ECONOMIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
B (SE) 
LACK OF 
CONTROL 
B (SE) 
INTERGROUP 
CONFLICT 
B (SE) 
FULL 
B (SE) 
Intercept [1] 
-1.11 
(0.12) 
-1.00 
(0.12) -0.53 (0.13) -0.94(0.13) -0.68 (0.13) 
-0.40 
(0.13) 
Intercept [2] 
0.23 
(0.12) 0.35 (0.12) 0.83 (0.13) 0.40 (0.13) 0.68 (0.13) 
0.96 
(0.13) 
Intercept [3] 
1.86 
(0.12) 1.98 (0.12) 2.46 (0.13) 2.03 (0.13) 2.31 (0.13) 
2.59 
(0.13) 
Gender [Male]   
-0.03 
(0.02) -0.04 (0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
Age   
-0.00 
(0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
mo (Subjective Social 
Class)   0.12 (0.02) 0.13 (0.02) 0.12 (0.02) 0.12 (0.02) 
0.13 
(0.02) 
mo (Income Category)   
-0.00 
(0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.01) -0.00 (0.01) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
mo (Political Ideology)   0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.01) 
0.02 
(0.00) 
mo(EcUnJOB)     0.05 (0.01)     
0.05 
(0.01) 
mo(EcUnEDUCATION)     0.04 (0.01)     
-0.02 
(0.01) 
mo(EcUnFOOD)     0.15(0.02)     
0.15 
(0.02) 
mo(EcUnMEDICINE)     0.06(0.01)     
0.06 
(0.01) 
mo(EcUnCASH)     -0.04 (0.01)     
-0.04 
(0.01) 
mo (Perceived Lack of 
Control)       0.01 (0.00)   
0.00 
(0.00) 
mo (InConINTWAR)         0.07 (0.01) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
mo(InConCIVILWAR)         0.12 (0.01) 
0.11 
(0.01) 
mo(InConTERRORISM)         -0.06 (0.01) 
-0.05 
(0.01) 
LOOIC 132040.6 131955.3 131509.0 131940.8 131669.3 131335.1 
Variance Ratio 0.12 
Table 10. Unstandardized Coefficients (B) and their standard errors (in brackets) for each of the 
main ordinal regression models with preference for a dominant leader as the outcome. Square 
brackets indicate reference categories for the categorical predictors..Ordinal predictors were 
modelled as monotonic effects and are labelled mo(variable). More regression models and further 
details can be found in SM5a. LOOIC = leave-one-out cross validation information criterion (lower 
values indicate better fit to the data; see text for details). Variance Ratio represents the proportion 
of variance explained by the clustering of indiiduals within States.  
 To test H1a, which predicted that economic uncertainty is positively related 
to preferences for a dominant leader, I ran a model that included the 5 items for 
economic uncertainty and the control variables (LOOIC= 131509.0, SE=215.5). 
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Supporting H1a, the economic uncertainty model had a better fit than the control 
model (LOOIC=131955.3, SE=212.6). Four items (EcUnJOB: B=0.05, SE=0.01, 
89% CI [0.04, 0.06]; EcUnEDUCATION: B=0.04, SE=0.01, 89% CI[0.02, 0.06]; 
EcUnFOOD: B=0.15, SE=0.02, 89% CI [0.12, 0.18; EcUnMEDICINE: B=0.06, 
SE=0.01, 89% CI[0.04,0.07]) were, as expected, positively related to preference 
for a dominant leader, while one item (EcUnCASH, B=-0.05, SE=0.01, 89% CI [-
0.07, -0.04]) was, contrary to expectations, negatively related to preference for a 
dominant leader.  
 To test H2a, which predicted that perceived lack of control is positively 
related to preferences for a dominant leader, I ran a model that included 
perceived lack of control and the control variables (LOOIC=131940.8, SE=212.8). 
This model had a better fit than the control model (LOOIC=131955.3, SE=212.6). 
However, the fit of this model was worse than the fit of the economic uncertainty 
model (LOOIC= 131509.0, SE=215.5), which indicates that perceived lack of 
control was less important in predicting preference for a dominant leader than 
economic uncertainty. The addition of perceived lack of control to the economic 
uncertainty model did not improve the latter’s model fit (LOOIC=131509.8, 
SE=215.5) and the credible interval for perceived general lack of control crossed 
zero (B=0.01, SE=0.01, 89% CI[-0.01, 0.01] indicating an unreliable effect of 
perceived lack of control on preferences for a dominant leader. 
 To test H3a, which predicted a positive relationship between intergroup 
conflict and preference for a dominant leader, I ran a model that included the 
three intergroup conflict items and the control variables (LOOIC=131669.3, 
SE=215.1). Supporting H3a, the intergroup conflict model had a better fit than the 
control model (LOOIC=131955.3, SE=212.6). Two of the intergroup conflict items 
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(InConINTWAR, B=0.07, SE-0.01, CI 89% [0.05, 0.09]; InConCIVILWAR: 
B=0.12, SE=0.01, 89% CI [0.10, 0.14]) were, as expected, positively related to 
preference for a dominance leader, while one item (InConTERRORISM, B=-0.06, 
SE=0.01, 89% CI [-0.08, -0.04]) was, contrary to expectations, negatively related. 
However, the fit of these models was worse than the fit of the economic 
uncertainty model (LOOIC= 131509.0, SE=215.5), which indicates that 
intergroup conflict had less importance than economic uncertainty in predicting 
preference for a dominant leader.  
Lastly, I ran a full model including all the variables. This model had the 
best fit of all models (LOOIC=131335.1, SE=217.0). This indicates that, although 
economic uncertainty is a stronger predictor than intergroup conflict, intergroup 
conflict is still an important predictor of preference for a dominant leader. In the 
full model, three of the economic uncertainty variables were positively associated 
with preference for a dominant leader (EcUnJOB: B=0.05, SE=0.01, 89% CI 
[0.03, 0.06]; EcUnFOOD: B=0.15, SE=0.02, 89% CI [0.12, 0.17]; 
EcUnMEDICINE: B=0.06, SE=0.01, 89% CI [0.04, 0.08]), while two of the 
economic uncertainty variables were negatively related (EcUnEDUCATION:    
B=-0.02, SE=0.01, 89% CI [-0.03, -0.01; EcUnCASH: B=-0.04, SE=0.01, 89% CI 
[-0.06, -0.02]); two of the intergroup conflict variables were positively related to 
preference for a dominant leader (InConINTWAR: B=0.06, SE=0.01, 89% CI 
[0.04, 0.08]; InConCIVILWAR: B=0.11, SE=0.01, 89% CI [0.09, 0.13]), while one 
was negatively related (InConTERRORISM: B=-0.05, SE=0.01, 89% CI [-0.07,    
-0.03]). Perceived lack of control had an unreliable effect on preference for a 
dominant leader as its credible interval crossed zero (B=0.00, SE=0.00, 89% CI 
[-0.00, 0.01]).  
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6.2.3.2.- Which variables predict preference for a prestigious leader? 
 Here I ran the same models as for preference for a dominant leader but 
with preference for a prestigious leader as outcome variable (Table 12). The null 
model (LOOIC=131903.6, SE=214.2) had a Variance Ratio of 0.06, justifying the 
use of multilevel modelling. Again, this null model had worse fit than the control 
model (LOOIC=131641.5, SE=215.7). Consequently, I used the control model as 
a base for constructing and comparing the model fit of the subsequent models.  
Unstandadardized 
Coefficients NULL CONTROL 
ECONOMIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
LACK OF 
CONTROL 
INTERGROUP 
CONFLICT FULL 
Intercept [1] 
-1.92 
(0.09) -2.06 (0.09) -1.65 (0.10) -2.07 (0.09) -1.80 (0.09) 
-1.60 
(0.10) 
Intercept [2] 
-0.37 
(0.09) -0.51 (0.09) -0.09 (0.10) -0.52 (0.09) -0.25 (0.09) 
-0.04 
(0.10) 
Intercept [3] 
1.60 
(0.09) 1.46 (0.09) 1.89 (0.10) 1.45 (0.09) 1.73 (0.09) 
1.94 
(0.10) 
Gender [Male]   0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Age   -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
mo (Subjective Social 
Class)   -0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.04) -0.04 (0.04) -0.03 (0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
mo (Income Category)   0.22 (0.10) 0.29 (0.08) 0.21 (0.10) 0.26 (0.09) 
0.30 
(0.08) 
mo (Political Ideology)   -0.11 (0.03) -0.11 (0.03) -0.11 (0.03) -0.12 (0.03) 
-0.12 
(0.03) 
mo(EcUnJOB)     0.05 (0.03)     
0.02 
(0.03) 
mo(EcUnEDUCATION)     0.29 (0.03)     
0.22 
(0.03) 
mo(EcUnFOOD)     -0.03 (0.04)     
-0.02 
(0.04) 
mo(EcUnMEDICINE)     0.19 (0.04)     
0.18 
(0.04) 
mo(EcUnCASH)     0.14 (0.04)     
0.14 
(0.04) 
mo (Perceived Lack of 
Control)       -0.03 (0.04)   
-0.01 
(0.00) 
mo (InConINTWAR)         0.16 (0.04) 
0.10 
(0.04) 
mo(InConCIVILWAR)         0.05 (0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.05) 
mo(InConTERRORISM)         0.15 (0.03) 
0.15 
(0.04) 
LOOIC 
13190
3.6 131641.5 131600.2 131864.0 131704.8 131541.0 
Variance Ratio 0.06 
Table 11. Unstandardized Coefficients (B) and their standard errors (in brackets) for each of the 
main ordinal regression models with preference for a prestigious leader as the outcome. Square 
brackets indicate reference categories for the categorical predictors. Ordinal predictors were 
modelled as monotonic effects and are labelled mo(variable). More regression models and further 
details can be found in the SM5b. LOOIC = leave-one-out cross validation information criterion 
(lower values indicate better fit to the data; see text for details). Variance Ratio represents the 
proportion of variance explained by the clustering of indiiduals within States. 
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 Supporting H1b, the economic uncertainty model (LOOIC=131600.2, 
SE=216.2) had a better fit than the control model (LOOIC=131641.5, SE=215.7).  
Four items were, as expected, positively related to preference for a prestigious 
leader (EcUnJOB: B=0.05, SE=0.01, 89% CI [ 0.04, 0.07]; EcUnEDUCATION: 
B=0.04, SE=0.01, 89% CI [0.02, 0.06]; EcUNFOOD: B=0.15, SE=0.02, 89% CI 
[0.12, 0.18]; EcUnMEDICINE: B=0.06, SE=0.01, 89% CI [0.04, 0.08]), while one 
item (EcUnCASH: B=-0.04, SE=0.01, 89% CI [-0.06, -0.02]) was, contrary to 
expectations, negatively related.  
 Contrary to H2b, the lack of control model (LOOIC=131864, SE=214.7) 
had worse fit than the control model (LOOIC=131641.5, SE=215.7). The inclusion 
of perceived lack of control to the economic uncertainty model hardly improved 
its model fit (LOOIC=131600.2). 
 Contrary to H3b, the intergroup conflict model (LOOIC=131704.8, 
SE=215.8) had worse fit than the control model (LOOIC=131641.5, SE=215.7).  
The full model including all the variables (LOOIC=131541.0, SE=216.6) 
had the best fit of all the models. In the full model, three of the economic 
uncertainty items were positively related to preference for a prestigious leader 
(EcUnJOB: B=0.05, SE=0.01, 89% CI [0.03, 0.06]; EcUnFOOD: B=0.15, 
SE=0.02, 89% CI [0.11, 0.18]; EcUnMEDICINE: B=0.06, SE=0.01, 89% CI [0.04, 
0.08]), while one item was negatively related (EcUnCASH: B=-0.04, SE=0.01, 
89% CI [-0.06, -0.01]) and another item had an unreliable effect 
(EcUnEDUCATION: B=-0.02, SE=0.01, 89% CI [-0.04, 0.01]); two of the 
intergroup conflict items were positively related to preference for a prestigious 
leader (InConINTWAR: B=0.06, SE=0.01, 89% CI [0.03, 0.08]; InConCIVILWAR: 
B=0.11, SE=0.01, 89% CI [0.08, 0.13]), while one item was negatively related 
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(InConTERRORISM: B=-0.05, SE=0.01, 89% CI [-0.08, -0.03]. Perceived lack of 
control had an unreliable effect of preference for a prestigious leader (B=-0.01, 
SE=0.00, 89% CI [-0.01, 0.00).  
6.2.4.- Discussion 
 In Study 1, I tested whether economic uncertainty, perceived lack of 
control and intergroup conflict positively predict preference for dominant and 
prestigious leaders. Previous research has focused on how these variables 
predict preference for a dominant leader but, to the best of my knowledge, no 
research has tested how these variables predict preference for a prestigious 
leader. Moreover, previous studies with data from the WVS (Kakkar and 
Sivanathan 2017) used group-level measures of the predictor variables, whereas 
I used individual-level measures, providing a more fine-grained analysis. 
 Similarly to Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017), I found that some of our 
measures of economic uncertainty predicted preference for a dominant leader. In 
my study, however, the same measures of economic uncertainty also predicted 
preference for a prestigious leader. The fact that economic uncertainty is related 
to preferences for both types of leaders casts doubt on previous claims of the 
specificity of the link between economic uncertainty and preference for dominant 
leaders. My results suggest that economic uncertainty might simply increase 
preference for leadership in general, instead of for dominant leadership in 
particular.  
Alternatively, the relationship between economic uncertainty and 
preference for both dominant and prestigious leaders might be mediated or 
moderated by respondents’ traits or states. Here, I examined the relationship 
between one of these individual variables, perceived general lack of control, and 
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preference for dominant and prestigious leaders. Perceived general lack of 
control has been proposed to be positively related to preference for a dominant 
leader and to be the psychological mechanism by which facing economic 
uncertainty makes an individual more likely to prefer a dominant leader (Kakkar 
& Sivanathan, 2017). I therefore proposed that perceived lack of control would 
also be positively related to preference for prestigious leaders. However, I did not 
find support for any of these predictions as perceived lack of control had an 
unreliable effect on predicting preference for both dominant and prestigious 
leaders. Consequently, perceived lack of control does not seem to be the 
mechanism that explains the higher preference for both dominant and prestigious 
leaders when facing economic uncertainty.  
Similarly to previous studies (Laustsen & Petersen, 2017; Little et al., 
2007), I found that some of my measures of intergroup conflict predicted 
preference for a dominant leader. Although the fit of the intergroup conflict model 
for predicting preference for a prestigious leader was worse than the fit of the 
control model, two intergroup conflict items were positively related to preference 
for a prestigious leader in the full model, which had the best fit of all. This again 
casts doubt of the specificity of the relationship between intergroup conflict and 
preference for a dominant leader. As I suggest above, dominant behaviours 
directed against outgroups might serve to gain prestige within the ingroup (Halevy 
et al., 2012). This explains why people might prefer an authoritarian over a 
democratic government when political repression is exercised against outgroups 
considered enemies of the ingroup (e.g., political dissidents in Stalin’s USSR). 
Although further research is necessary to confirm this, when respondents are 
asked about their preferences for dominant and prestigious leaders, it is likely 
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that respondents are imagining that the political authoritarianism and the 
expertise would be used in favour of the ingroup and/or against outgroups.  
Compared to previous studies, my study has the advantage of comparing 
preferences for different types of leadership (dominance vs prestige) when 
studying the effects of specific social contexts such as economic uncertainty or 
intergroup conflict on preferences for one type of leader.  Another advantage is 
the simultaneous use of different measures of economic uncertainty and 
intergroup conflict. As the results suggest, not all measures of these variables are 
positively related to preferences for dominant and prestigious leaders. It seems 
that being worried about not having or finding a job, and not having had enough 
food and medicine in the last 12 months are stronger predictors on preferences 
for dominant and prestigious leaders than being worried about access to 
education and not having enough income. Similarly, open intergroup conflict 
(inter-country or civil war) positively predict preference for dominant and 
prestigious leaders, while more unidirectional violence (terrorism) is negatively 
related to preference for both types of leaders. I am not sure why these different 
economic uncertainty and intergroup conflict variables are related to preferences 
for both types of leaders in different directions. However, the results make clear 
that selecting some of these variables might bias the conclusions of studies 
investigating the relationship between particular economic and intergroup 
contexts and preferences for different types of leaders. Consequently, I 
recommend using multiple proxies for economic uncertainty and intergroup 
conflict in future studies.  
Study 1 has the limitation of using measures of dominant (“strong leader 
who does not bother with parliament or elections”) and prestigious (“experts, not 
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government, [who] make decisions according to what they think is best for the 
country”) leaders that describe dictators and technocrats respectively. 
Dictatorship and technocracy are not incompatible forms of ruling a country. For 
example, technocrats occupied ministries and had special relevance in Franco’s 
dictatorship in the 1960s in Spain. Moreover, these measures 
(dictator/technocrat) are not totally comparable to the measures of dominance 
and prestige commonly used to study the dual evolutionary model of social 
hierarchy such as the scale developed by Cheng et al. (2010). This problem was 
addressed in Study 2. 
6.3.- Study 2 
6.3.1.- Introduction 
In this study, I first analyse how political ideology influences perceptions 
of political leaders as dominant or prestigious (H4 and H5; see Table 1). Following 
Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017), I use self-ratings of political ideology and ratings 
of the perceived dominance and prestige of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton 
collected during the campaigns for the 2016 US Presidential Elections. American 
politics provides a particularly clear ingroup vs outgroup within-country 
comparison, with only two major political parties (Democrats and Republicans) 
represented by single candidates (in 2016, Clinton and Trump respectively) that 
are divided on many political and social issues. In line with H4, I expect to find 
that liberal ideology is positively related to perceptions of Trump as dominant and 
negatively related to perceptions of Clinton as dominant. In line with H5, I expect 
to find that liberal ideology is positively related to perceptions of Clinton as 
prestigious and negatively related to perceptions of Trump as prestigious. 
Second, I compare the strength of political ideology and economic uncertainty in 
predicting preferences for Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton. Following H6, I expect 
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to find that political ideology is a stronger predictor of voting decision than 
economic uncertainty.  
While H4 and H5 are unexplored in previous research, H6 has been 
explicitly addressed by Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017). In a pretest to their Study 
1, they asked 120 Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) participants to rate the 
prestige (agreement with statements such as “I think compared to Hillary Clinton, 
Donald Trump is a kind of leader who is respected and admired by other 
members”) and dominance (agreement with statements such as “I think 
compared to Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton is a kind of leader who might be feared 
by some members”,) of both candidates  using an adapted shorter version of a 
validated scale of prestige and dominance (Cheng et al., 2010). Agreement was 
rated on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Participants also rated 
their own political ideology on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 
(conservative/republican) to 7 (liberal/democrat), but the authors did not use this 
for their analysis. The data was collected during the day of the third presidential 
debate (20 October 2016). The results showed that the ratings of dominance 
were significantly higher for Trump (M=5.5, SD=1.5) than for Clinton (M=4.7, 
SD=1.8), while the ratings of prestige were higher for Clinton (M=4.7, SD=1.7) 
than for Trump (M=3.54, SD=1.87), leading to Kakkar and Sivanathan equating 
Donald Trump with a dominant leader.   
On the same day, they asked 750 AMT participants about their intention 
to vote for Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton or neither, as well as their political 
ideology using the scale described above. They measured economic uncertainty 
using an aggregated measure of the rates of unemployment, house vacancy and 
poverty within the ZIP code of each participant,  extracted from the Distress 
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Community Index (Economic Innovation Group, 2016). A multinomial regression 
with economic uncertainty, political ideology and several control variables 
showed that economic uncertainty was positively related to preference for Trump 
over Clinton. As the coefficient of economic uncertainty was larger than the 
coefficient for political ideology they concluded that “economic uncertainty 
predicted a preference for Donald Trump over and above (…) political 
partisanship” (p. 6736). However, their coefficients were not standardized and, 
therefore, their conclusion might be misleading. In fact, the difference in 
proportion of variance explained by their models with (Adjusted R2 = 0.227) and 
without economic uncertainty (Adjusted R2 = 0.222) is only 0.5%, which 
diminishes the importance of economic uncertainty in predicting voting intention 
for Trump. In Study 2, I use the data from Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017). Like 
those authors, I conducted multinomial regressions, but I adopt a model 
comparison approach to make more reliable comparisons between the strength 
of economic uncertainty and political ideology, rather than comparing 
unstandardised coefficients. As I did not find a way to run multinomial Bayesian 
regression using ordered categorical predictors, I ran frequentist models using 
AIC instead of LOOIC for the model comparisons and treated ordered categorical 
variables as if they were continuous. A difference of at least two AICs is 
considered to constitute a reliable difference between models in their fit to the 
data. All the models were run in Stata 16 (StataCorp, 2019).  
6.3.2.- Methods 
 For testing H4 and H5, I used the data from the sample of 120 participants 
in Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017). For testing H6, I used the data from the sample 
of 750 participants in Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017). I also tested H6 using the 
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actual results of the US Presidential Elections of 2016. To this end, I conducted 
binomial regressions in which Donald Trump’s victory within each state was 
predicted by the level of economic uncertainty within the state and the percentage 
of votes obtained by the Republicans in previous Presidential Elections (2012) as 
a proxy for political ideology. 
6.3.3.- Results 
 As prestige and dominance have been conceptualized as two separate 
constructs (See Section 6.1.2) and the results of previous studies have shown 
that prestige and dominance barely correlate (Brand & Mesoudi, 2019; Cheng et 
al., 2013; Cheng et al., 2010; Kakkar, Gobel, & Sivanathan, Submitted; Monge-
López & Álvarez-Solas, 2017; Redhead, Cheng, Driver, Foulsham, & O'Gorman, 
2018), I first explored whether averaged ratings of prestige and dominance for 
each political candidate were correlated. Contrary to previous studies, I found a 
moderate negative correlation between the ratings of dominance and prestige for 
both candidates (Clinton: r=-0.42, Trump: r=-0.48; see Figure 9).  
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Figure 8. Relationship between the average dominance ratings and average prestige ratings for 
each candidate with 89% confidence intervals (grey area) and marginal histograms. Left: average 
dominance ratings and average prestige ratings for Hillary Clinton. Right: average dominance 
ratings and average prestige ratings for Donald Trump. 
  
Supporting H4, I found that liberal ideology was positively related to ratings of 
Trump as dominant (r=0.57) and negatively related to ratings of Clinton as 
dominant (r=-0.45). Supporting H5, I found that liberal ideology was positively 
related to ratings of Clinton as prestigious (r=0.44) and negatively related to 
ratings of Trump as prestigious (r=-0.56). See Figure 10.  
223 
 
 
Figure9. Relationship between the average prestige ratings and average dominance ratings for 
each candidate and political ideology of participants on a scale from 1 (conservative/Republican) 
to 7 (liberal/Democrat) with 89 % Confidence Intervals (grey areas) and marginal histograms.  
Left: Clinton. Right: Trump.  
  
To test H6, that political ideology is a stronger predictor of voting decisions 
than economic uncertainty, I carried out a number of multinomial logistic 
regression models (Finch, Bolin, & Kelley, 2014, pp. 131-133) with voting for 
neither Trump nor Clinton as the reference category (Table 13). First, I compared 
the fit of a null model with and without intercepts varying by State. The fit of the 
single-level null model (AIC = 1541.978) was better than the fit of the multilevel 
null model (AIC = 1544.296). Consequently, multilevel modelling was not 
necessary here. All the subsequent models are single-evel models. 
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 Second, I compared the fit of the null model with a control model, which 
included age, gender and income as predictors (AIC=1518.949). Given its better 
fit, I used the control model as a base for the following models. Third, I compared 
the control model with a model that also included separately the three economic 
uncertainty variables (poverty rate, unemployment rate, and housing vacancy 
rate). The model fit of this economic uncertainty model ((AIC = 1516.061) was 
slightly better than the control model. However, a model with the control variables 
and political ideology as predictors had considerably better fit (AIC = 1283.126) 
than the economic uncertainty model. Lastly, a full model was computed, which 
had the best fit of all models (AIC=1220.082). These results support H6, i.e., 
political ideology is a stronger predictor of voting decision than economic 
uncertainty. In the full model, liberal ideology positively predicted preference for 
Clinton (b=0.62, SE=0.07, 89% CI [0.51, 0.73]) and negatively predicted 
preference for Trump (b=-0.60, SE=0.08, 89% CI [-0.73, -0.47). Among the 
economic uncertainty variables, the only one that supports a greater preference 
for Trump (B = 7.29, SE = 3.39, 89 % CI [1.87, 12.70] than for Clinton (B = 0.52, 
SE = 2.90, CI [-4.10, 5.16] when facing economic uncertainty is housing vacancy 
rate. Poverty rate is negatively related to both preferences for Clinton (B= -2.42, 
SE=1.31, CI 89% [-4.52, -0.32]) and Trump (B = -0.96, SE = 1.57, 89% CI [-3.47, 
1.55]. However, the CI for Trump crosses zero indicating that the negative 
relationship is not reliable. Unemployment rate is also negatively related to 
preferences for both Clinton (-1.06, SE =1.44, 89% CI [-3.37, 1.25]) and Trump 
(B = -1.90, SE = 1.78, 89% CI [-4.76, 0.94]). For both candidates, this negative 
relationship is not reliable as both CIs cross zero.  
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Five alternative statistical procedures were conducted to confirm these 
results (see Appendix C.1). In all these, I found that political ideology was a 
stronger predictor of voting decision than economic uncertainty. 
Vote for Clinton 
Unstandardize
d Coefficients NULL CONTROL 
ECONOMIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY FULL 
Constant 
0.67 
(0.09) -0.47 (0.41) 0.68 (0.63) -3.57 (0.57) 
-2.47 
(0.20) 
Gender 
[Female]   0.45 (0.18) 0.44 (0.18) 0.27 (0.20) 
0.25 
(0.20) 
Age   0.01(0.00) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
0.01(0
.01) 
Income   0.14 (0.06) 0.11 (0.06) 0.17 (0.07) 
0.14 
(0.07) 
Poverty      -1.61 (1.21)   
-2.42 
(1.31) 
Unemployment   -2.21 (1.35)  
-1.06 
(1.44) 
Housing 
vacancy   1.41 (2.68)  
0.53 
(2.90) 
Liberal 
Ideology       0.62 (0.07) 
0.62(0
.07) 
Vote for Trump 
Unstandardize
d Coefficients NULL CONTROL 
ECONOMIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY FULL 
Constant 
-0.21 
(0.10) -1.51 (0.49) --1.41 (0.76) 1.07 (0.62) 
1.489 
(0.90)  
Gender 
[Female]   -0.24 (0.23) -0.23 (0.23) -0.21 (0.25) 
-0.16 
(0.25) 
Age   0.04 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
Income   0.13 (0.07) 0.13 (0.07) 0.08 (0.08) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
Poverty      -1.77 (1.47)   
)-0.96 
(1.57) 
Unemployment   -0.58 (1.61)  
-1.91 
(1.78) 
Housing 
vacancy   5.87 (3.08)  
7.29 
(3.39) 
Liberal 
Ideology       -0.59 (0.08) 
-0.60 
(0.08) 
AIC 
1541.9
8 1518.95 1516.06 1223.04 
1220.
08 
Pseudo-R2  0.03 0.03 0.22 0.23 
Table 12. Multinomial regressions with neither Trump nor Clinton as reference 
category and state as a random effect. Standard Errors are shown in 
parentheses. The model comparisons using the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) 
show that the political ideology model (in bold) has the best fit to the data. 
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Lastly, I tested H6 by comparing how well economic uncertainty and 
political ideology predicted the actual victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 
Presidential elections in each State (Table 14). I compared a null model 
(AIC=69.30) with a model with the economic uncertainty variables at the level of 
the State (AIC=67.30), a model with political ideology measured with the 
percentage of votes for Republicans in the elections of 2012 (AIC=19.37) and a 
full model that included both economic uncertainty and political ideology 
(AIC=20.52). Although the economic uncertainty model improved the fit of the null 
model, both the political ideology model and the full model had a better fit to the 
data. In the political ideology model, the percentage of votes for Republicans in 
2012 positively predicted the victory of Donald Trump in a State (b=0.81, 
SE=0.38, 89% CI [0.19, 1.44]). Three alternative statistical procedures were 
conducted to confirm these results (see Appendix C.2. for details). In all these, 
we found that political ideology was a stronger predictor of voting decision than 
economic uncertainty. 
 
Table 13. Binomial regressions predicting the victory of Donald Trump within each State of the 
US in the 2016 Presidential Elections. The model comparisons using the Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC) show that the political ideology model (in bold) has the best fit to the data. 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
NULL 
ECONOMIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY 
FULL 
Constant 0.41 (0.29) 4.70 (4.53) -37.61 (17.63) -149.89 (96.21) 
Housing   0.77 (0.30)   -1.55 (1.23) 
Unemployment   -0.45 (0.17)   0.15 (0.42) 
Poverty   0.55 (0.25)   1.62 (1.25) 
Political Ideology     0.81 (0.38) 2.89 (1.88) 
AIC 69.30 67.30 19.37 20.52 
Pseudo-R2  0.35 0.77 0.84 
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6.3.4.- Discussion 
 In Study 2, I first examined how political ideology influences ratings of 
prestige and dominance of political leaders, using Donald Trump and Hillary 
Clinton as stimuli. Second, I compared the strength of political orientation and 
economic uncertainty in predicting preference for Trump or Clinton.  
Contrary to previous studies that found that ratings of dominance and 
prestige for the same individuals are uncorrelated, the ratings of dominance and 
prestige for both Trump and Clinton were negatively correlated. This might be 
due to the polarized attitudes towards both candidates in the US at the time of 
collecting the data. Supporting this, I found that ratings of both dominance and 
prestige were influenced by political ideology. As predicted by H4 and H5, liberal 
ideology was positively correlated with ratings of Trump as dominant and Clinton 
as prestigious, and negatively correlated with ratings of Hillary as dominant and 
Trump as prestigious. This highlights the importance of exploring the relationship 
between individual variables such as political ideology with dominance and 
prestige before concluding that a politician is either dominant or prestigious. 
Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017) concluded that Trump was a dominant leader and 
Clinton a prestigious leader because ANOVAs comparing the ratings of 
dominance and prestige of both candidates yielded p-values smaller than 0.05. 
However, as the variation in the ratings was related to political ideology the 
inferences about the preferences for dominant or prestigious political leaders in 
this context is misleading. Consequently, future studies should pay careful 
attention to potential systematic variation in the perceptions of dominance and 
prestige of the stimuli to avoid potential misleading inferences (see Mileva, Jones, 
Russell, & Little, 2016, p. for another example of variation of perceptions of 
dominance and prestige related to participants' characteristics). This is especially 
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important when studying political issues, as the lack of political diversity in social 
science disciplines such as psychology, which is heavily skewed towards the left 
(Langbert, Quain, & Klein, 2016), might lead to less questioning of research 
methods that yield results in agreement with researchers’ own political views 
(Duarte et al., 2015, Martin, 2016), as well as biased results if psychology 
undergraduates are used as participants. 
Although the results of Study 2 show that perceptions of dominance and 
prestige of both candidates are associated with participants’ political ideologies, 
this does not mean that Clinton and Trump did not differ in their use of the 
dominance and prestige strategies during the presidential debates. Indeed, 
Witkower (2017) demonstrated that Clinton showed more demonstrations of 
knowledge and non-verbal displays associated with the prestige strategy such as 
smiling than Trump, while Trump made more verbal attacks and showed more 
non-verbal displays associated with the dominance strategy (e.g., occupying 
more space and extending his arms) than Clinton. As argued earlier, the use of 
the dominance strategy against outgroups (which for Republicans would be 
Democrats) might lead to higher prestige among members of the in-group. 
Experimental evidence, however, is necessary to test this prediction.  
Supporting H6, my results also contradict Kakkar and Sivanathan’s 
conclusion that economic uncertainty is a stronger predictor of voting decision for 
Trump than political ideology.  This is because I conducted model comparisons 
taking in and out both predictors, which I considered more appropriate for 
comparing the relative strength of economic uncertainty and political ideology 
than comparing unstandardized coefficients. Political ideology was also a 
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stronger predictor than economic uncertainty in predicting preference for Donald 
Trump when I used the data of the actual 2016 US Elections.  
A limitation of the study, however, is that the data does not include any 
measure of whether the popularity of Donald Trump in the 2016 elections was 
motivated by a cultural or political backlash against post-materialist values and 
political correctness as participants were not asked about these issues. 
Furthermore, when people decide to vote for a specific candidate in the elections 
it is also possible that they move towards the candidate’s ideology 12, which would 
explain why political ideology is such a strong predictor of voting decision. 
Supporting this, the results of a longitudinal study show that people tended to 
vote for the candidates of the same party in the US Presidential Elections of 2012 
and 2016 but that from one to the other there was a slight but important change 
in party identification in favour of the Republican party (Mutz, 2018b). The same 
study also found that personal economic hardship including subjective judgement 
of the economic situation did not predict voting for Trump. However, increases in 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), which is related to preference for group-
based dominance, positively predicted voting for Trump. The results of Mutz’s 
study are congruent with Inglehart and Norris’ cultural backlash hypothesis and, 
as in my study, they diminish the importance of economic uncertainty in predicting 
preference for Trump over Clinton (but see debate about the correct way to 
analyse and interpret the data; Morgan, 2018a, 2018b; Mutz, 2018a).  
                                                          
12 People can also vote against a candidate or political party, instead of in favour of a candidate/party. In 
this sense, some people who did not like Donald Trump voted for him because they dislike more Hillary 
Clinton and/or the Democrats. Some people who did not like Hillary Clinton voted for her because they 
dislike more Donald Trump and/or the Republicans.  
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6.4. – General Discussion 
 In this article, I first reviewed how the dual evolutionary model of social 
hierarchy has been used to explain the rise in popularity and electoral victories of 
right-wing populist leaders such as Donald Trump. Second, I highlighted the 
limitations of applying this model to large-scale democratic societies without 
clearly distinguishing between ingroups and outgroups. Third, I showed that both 
economic uncertainty and intergroup conflict predict preference for both dominant 
and prestigious leaders using data from the WVS. Consequently, it does not 
seem that either economic uncertainty or intergroup conflict have a unique link 
with increased preferences for dominant leaders, as previous research has 
suggested (Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017; Laustsen & Petersen, 2017; Little et al., 
2007). Third, I showed that perceptions of political leaders as either dominant or 
prestigious are not universal, but depend on people’s political ideologies. 
Conservatives perceive conservative political leaders as prestigious and liberal 
political leaders as dominant, while liberals perceive conservative political leaders 
as dominant and liberal political leaders as prestigious. This highlights the 
importance of distinguishing between ingroups and outgroups within societies 
when reaching conclusions about preferences for dominant or prestigious 
leaders. Fourth, I showed that political ideology is a stronger predictor of 
preference for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton than economic uncertainty, 
contradicting previous conclusions attributing greater importance to the economy 
than ideology in explaining Donald Trump’s victory in 2016 (see Kakkar & 
Sivanathan, 2017).  
 Although previous work has equated right-wing populist leaders to 
dominant leaders (e.g., Trump) and well-established (liberal) politicians (e.g., 
Clinton) to prestigious leaders (Kakkar & Sivanathan, 2017), Study 2 clearly 
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shows that people perceive the dominance and prestige of political leaders 
differently depending on their own ideological similarity to those political leaders. 
Furthermore, as economic uncertainty does not seem to affect people’s voting 
decision directly, I suggest looking at the political discourse of right-wing populist 
leaders and how it interacts with the discourse of other political actors to explain 
their rise in electoral popularity. Previous research has shown that particular 
features of information such as being simple (Heath & Heath, 2008), concrete 
(Heath & Heath, 2008), emotional (Eriksson & Coultas, 2014; Heath, Bell, & 
Sternberg, 2001; Heath & Heath, 2008; Stubbersfield, Flynn, & Tehrani, 2017) or 
negative (Bebbington, MacLeod, Ellison, & Fay, 2017) increases its chances of 
being transmitted accurately. As the right-wing populist discourse seems to 
contain these features in a greater proportion (e.g., higher emotional content; 
Breeze, 2018; Wirz, 2018) than the political discourse of traditional politicians, I 
suggest that this might explain the rise in electoral popularity of right-wing populist 
leaders. Nevertheless, the political discourse of part of the left (e.g., the emotional 
discourse of Greta Thunberg at the UN; PBS NewsHour, 2019) and against right-
wing populist leaders (e.g., the emotional reaction after the election of Donald 
Trump as President of the US; Campbell & Manning, 2018, pp. viii-xix) sometimes 
presents the same content characteristics (i.e., simple, concrete, emotional and 
negative). Consequently, I suggest that the study of the transmissibility of the 
right-wing populist discourse and the discourse against right-wing populism 
should always take into account the political ideology of participants and the 
interaction between ideological groups.  
 In conclusion, while there have been prominent claims linking the rise of 
right-wing populist leaders, via economic uncertainty, to the dominance strategy 
of social rank  acquisition and leadership, in this paper I have highlighted several 
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limitations of this thesis, alongside re-analyses and novel analyses to support my 
arguments. I hope to have contributed to continuing interdisciplinary efforts to 
improve our understanding of these major social and political trends that 
increasingly characterise our current times. 
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CHAPTER 7:  
General Discussion 
“It is a profound error to claim that learning is about replacing ignorance with 
understanding. Knowledge expands, but so does ignorance, as with a greater 
understanding of a subject also comes a greater appreciation for all the questions 
that remain unanswered”.  
Scott H. Young. Ultralearning, 2019, p. 256.  
7.1.- Summary of findings 
The key aim of this thesis was to answer two broad research questions 
derived from Henrich and Gil-White’s (2001) theory of the evolution of prestige: 
(i) the use of prestige cues for social learning (Chapters 2-4) and (ii) dominance 
and prestige as two strategies to acquire high social rank and social influence in 
human groups (Chapters 5-6). I have investigated these two research questions 
through literature syntheses across disciplines (Chapter 2 and Chapter 5), 
transmission chain experiments (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) and statistical 
analyses of publicly available survey data (Chapter 6).  
Chapter 2 reviewed ethnographic and experimental research on the 
adaptive value and actual use of prestige-biased social learning. Henrich and Gil-
White (2001) predicted a positive association between prestige and competence 
in valued domains for a social group. They also predicted a positive association 
between prestige and age, as knowledge/skill tends to increase with age. If these 
conditions are met, prestige-biased social learning would be adaptive. In the 
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literature, however, this positive association seems to depend on the existence 
of social and environmental stability. When the social and environmental contexts 
change rapidly, the predicted positive relationship between prestige and 
knowledge/skill might be disrupted by either (i) people conferring prestige 
according to old-fashioned values, while researchers measuring people’s 
competence in a newly important domain; or (ii) people conferring prestige 
according to new values, while researchers measuring people’s competence in 
no longer important domains. Henrich and Gil-White (2001) also predicted that 
people use prestige cues to select models from whom to learn. The empirical 
evidence reviewed in Chapter 2, however, provided mixed support for this 
prediction. Multiple factors affecting the use of prestige-biased social learning 
were identified such as the difficulty of the task (i.e., the greater the difficulty, the 
more likely one is to use prestige-biased social learning), the relevance of the 
domain for the individuals (i.e., the greater the relevance of the domain for the 
individuals, the more likely they are to use prestige-biased social learning), the 
existence of benefits or costs associated with the task (i.e., people tend to use 
more prestige-biased social learning when they are rewarded or punished by their 
performance, for example in a laboratory experiment), the availability of 
alternative social learning biases such as success bias (i.e., prestige-biased 
social learning should be less used when success-biased social learning is 
possible, which has not been found in the sole article studying this question 
reviewed in Chapter 2 (Atkisson, O'Brien, & Mesoudi, 2012; but see Brand, Heap, 
Morgan, & Mesoudi, 2019, December 12, for recent evidence supporting this 
prediction)), and the measure of social influence used (i.e., prestige seems to 
have a greater influence on behaviour than on subjective opinions).  
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Chapter 3 presented a transmission chain experiment to study whether 
the information provided by high prestige sources is better transmitted than 
information provided by low prestige sources, and how the relevance of the 
prestige of the sources for a given topic affects the cultural transmission of the 
information. The responses of 192 participants were included in this study, who 
were randomly assigned to 48 chains of four cultural generations. The materials 
to transmit across the chains were arguments in favour of and against the 
replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at primary schools, which were 
associated to three sources of information who varied in prestige and relevance: 
the Head of the Department of Education of a leading university (high prestige, 
high relevance), an airline pilot (high prestige, low relevance) and a cleaner (low 
prestige, low relevance). Contrary to prestige-biased social learning, the 
information provided by both high prestige sources was not better transmitted 
than the information provided by the low prestige source.  
 Chapter 4 presented another transmission chain experiment, which, 
instead of studying the cultural transmission of information provided by sources 
with different levels of prestige, studied the cultural transmission of prestige and 
dominance social rank cues. The responses of 120 participants randomly 
assigned to 30 chains of 4 generations each were included in this study. The 
descriptions of three football players, who were described using either 
dominance, prestige or medium social rank cues, were used as materials to 
transmit across the chains. It was predicted that both dominance and prestige 
cues would be better transmitted across cultural generations than medium social 
rank cues. This prediction was supported. It was also predicted that dominance 
cues would be better transmitted across cultural generations than prestige cues. 
However, this prediction was not supported.  
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 Chapter 5 reviewed the cultural evolution, social psychology and 
evolutionary psychology literature on the standard dual evolutionary model of 
social hierarchy (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001) and related areas of research. In this 
chapter I proposed a new integrated model, which distinguishes between three 
levels of analysis: strategies to acquire high social rank and social influence, 
dimensions of social rank and consequences of social rank. Similarly to the 
standard dual evolutionary model of social hierarchy, the proposed integrated 
model distinguishes between dominance and prestige strategies according to the 
mechanism used to attain social rank: the induction of fear in others vs the 
induction of admiration in others. However, this integrated model presents two 
key differences with the standard model: (i) it talks about dominance strategies 
and prestige strategies in the plural and (ii) it distinguishes between power (i.e., 
the asymmetrical control over resources) and status (i.e., the asymmetric level of 
respect, esteem and admiration than individuals received from others) as two 
different dimensions of social rank. The first key difference tries to accommodate 
conflicting findings in the literature and distinguishes between two dominance 
strategies (physical dominance and leverage) and three prestige strategies 
(competence, altruism/morality and development of social connections). The two 
dominance strategies seek to elicit fear in others but, whereas physical 
dominance elicits fear through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, 
leverage uses expert knowledge/skills and wealth to induce fear or threaten with 
the imposition of costs. These two dominance strategies seem to be used 
independently. In contrast, the three prestige strategies seem to be more 
dependent on each other and could be considered three components of the same 
strategy across many situations. The second key difference tries to adapt the 
standard model to apply to large-scale societies/groups with formal hierarchies 
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by synthesizing the standard model with the power-status distinction in social 
psychology. Importantly, the integrated model states that power can be attained 
either through dominance strategies or prestige strategies, while status can only 
be attained through prestige strategies. The consequences of social rank in the 
integrated model are very similar to the standard model as in both the type of 
social influence, attention and deference that high social rank individuals received 
depends on whether they are feared or admired.  
 Chapter 6 applies the dual evolutionary model of social hierarchy to the 
attainment of political power in large-scale democratic societies with formal social 
hierarchies. After reviewing some problems with the application of the standard 
dual evolutionary model of social hierarchy to this type of societies to explain the 
recent rise of right-wing populist leaders such as Donald Trump (Kakkar & 
Sivanathan, 2017), I tested whether economic uncertainty, perceived lack of 
control and intergroup conflict predicted preferences for dominant and prestigious 
leaders. Data from the longitudinal World Values Survey (Inglehart et al., 2018) 
for the period 2010-2016 pertaining to 52,325 respondents from 54 different 
countries was used. It was found that both economic uncertainty and intergroup 
conflict were positively related to preferences for both dominant and prestigious 
political leaders. This finding is contrary to claims that only dominant political 
leaders are preferred when people face economic uncertainty (Kakkar & 
Sivanathan, 2017) and intergroup conflict (Laustsen & Petersen, 2017; Little, 
Burriss, Jones, & Roberts, 2007). Next, I analysed how political ideology 
influenced the perception of the political leaders Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton 
as dominant and prestigious (N=120) and whether political ideology was a 
stronger predictor of preference for Donald Trump than economic uncertainty 
(N=750). Survey data collected by Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017) on the day of 
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the third US 2016 Presidential Election was used. It was found that liberal 
ideology was positively related to perceptions of Donald Trump as dominant and 
Hillary Clinton as prestigious, and negatively related to perceptions of Donald 
Trump as prestigious and Hillary Clinton as dominant. It was also found that 
political ideology was a stronger predictor of voting preference for Donald Trump 
than economic uncertainty, which again contradicts previous claims (Kakkar & 
Sivanathan, 2017). One important conclusion for this chapter was the need to 
take ingroup-outgroup relationships between different ideological groups into 
account when studying perceptions of dominance and prestige of political 
leaders.  
7.2.- Implications 
 One of the conclusions from reviewing the literature in Chapter 2 is that 
prestige-biased social learning might depend on the measure of social influence 
studied. For example, assessing the likability of a quote (Acerbi & Tehrani, 2018) 
is an easy task with no right-or-wrong answers and, consequently, people are 
more likely to be assessing it by themselves and less likely to be influenced by 
the prestigious. In contrast, designing an optimal arrow-head (Atkisson et al., 
2012) or responding correctly to quiz questions (Brand et al., 2019, December 
12) are more difficult tasks in which there exist optimal designs and correct 
answers. Therefore, people are more likely to use prestige-biased social learning 
in these types of tasks, above all when they could obtain higher rewards if 
attaining higher performance.  
 Another factor influencing prestige-biased social learning in experimental 
settings is how prestige (or social rank) is manipulated. This could explain the 
conflicting results in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. In both chapters, transmission 
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chain experiments were used, and the outcome measure in both chapters was 
the cumulative recall of information across chains of participants. However, the 
manipulation of prestige in Chapter 3 was done through the use of descriptions 
of three individuals by their job titles (i.e., Head of Education of a leading 
university: high prestige, high relevance; airline pilot: high prestige, low 
relevance; cleaner: low prestige, low relevance), which were artificially kept in the 
material irrespective of participant recall, while the content of the information (i.e., 
the arguments in favour of and against the replacement of textbooks by computer 
tablets) was the material to be cumulative recalled by participants. Consequently, 
prestige was manipulated here as a model-based transmission bias. In Chapter 
4, the information to transmit across the chains was prestige, dominance and 
medium social rank cues. Consequently, prestige (and the other types of social 
rank) was manipulated here as a content transmission bias. As model-based 
transmission bias, prestige did not have a reliable positive effect on cumulative 
recall (Chapter 3), while the content of the information (pro-tablets arguments vs 
anti-tablets arguments) did have a reliable effect on cumulative recall (i.e., the 
anti-tablets arguments were better transmitted than the pro-tables arguments). 
As a content transmission bias, prestige (and dominance) has a reliable positive 
effect on cumulative recall (Chapter 4), as prestige (and dominance) cues were 
better transmitted than medium social rank cues. This suggests that the content 
of the information itself is a more important factor on the cumulative recall of 
information than the prestige of the source of information. However, the fact that 
prestige cues are better transmitted than medium social rank cues suggests that 
the identification of prestigious individuals might be important for other tasks, 
which is shown in multiple experiments (e.g., Atkisson et al., 2012; Brand et al., 
2019, December 12; Chudek, Heller, Birch, & Henrich, 2012). If Henrich and Gil-
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White (2001) are correct and prestige evolved as a way to select models from 
whom to socially learn, it is understandable that people recall well prestige cues 
as they could use these cues to identify models from whom to socially learning 
valuable knowledge/skills such as foraging skills in a hunter-gathering society.  
Chapter 5 argued that power could be attained through either dominance 
strategies or prestige strategies, while status could only be attained through 
prestige strategies. Chapter 6 extends this by arguing that it is problematic to 
depict the strategies that Donald Trump and other right-wing political leaders use 
to attain political power through democratic procedures as dominance strategies. 
Because being voted for is a form of receiving voluntary support, this is well-tuned 
to prestige strategies, not dominance strategies. This does not mean that 
dominance strategies could not have a role in democratic societies. For instance, 
the use of threats or verbal attacks towards political rivals are still used by political 
leaders in democratic societies. However, these verbal attacks could be 
perceived as displays of competence by individuals who disagree with the 
political views of the verbally attacked political leader. In fact, Boyer and Parren 
(2015) have shown that sources that provide threat-related information are 
perceived as more competent. Consequently, carrying out these verbal attacks 
could be useful for attaining higher levels of prestige among people with similar 
ideology.  
 Chapter 6 also argued that people tend to perceive political leaders of 
rival political ideologies as dominant, while they tend to perceive political leaders 
of their own ideology as prestigious. Correlational analyses between ratings of 
dominance and prestige for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton and participants’ 
political ideologies gave support to this prediction. This result is probably due to 
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the perception of competence of political leaders who defend one’s own values 
and the perception of threat of political leaders who defend alternative values. It 
is, therefore, fundamental to control for the effects of political ideologies on 
participants’ preferences for dominant and prestigious political leaders. This is an 
important implication of the findings in Chapter 6 because politics is a research 
area in which researchers’ and participants’ own political attitudes and beliefs are 
likely to threaten the quality of inferences derived from empirical findings.  
 Chapter 6 also found that both economic uncertainty and intergroup 
conflict increase preferences for both dominant and prestigious political leaders, 
which suggests a preference for leadership in general under these contexts 
instead of a preference for dominant leaders in particular. This result has a clear 
implication for research on people’s preferences for dominant political leaders. It 
suggests the need of testing the preferences for both dominant and prestigious 
political leaders simultaneously, as testing only the preferences for one of these 
types of leaders might lead us to reach inaccurate conclusions.  
7.3.- Future Directions 
7.3.1- Prestige, Dominance and memorability 
 Chapter 3 studied how the prestige of the sources of information affects 
the cumulative recall of that information. Although an unreliable effect of prestige 
on cumulative recall was found, further tests (e.g., using different manipulations 
of prestige or different materials to recall) are necessary in order to 
confirm/disconfirm this unreliable effect of prestige on recall. In Chapter 3, a first-
order cue (i.e., job titles) was used to manipulate prestige. It is possible that 
second-order cues such as the asymmetric amount of attention received by 
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different models could have a clearer effect on recall. This could be tested by the 
use of videos featuring individuals providing a message while they are either 
being paid attention by others or being ignored by others. For example, the 
models could be university professors or sportspeople and the attentive or 
disengaged audience could be students or journalists, respectively.  
 In the discussion of Chapter 3, it was suggested that the unreliable effect 
of prestige on cumulative recall might be due to the artificial way prestige was 
manipulated. Participants in the experiment had never previously encountered 
the prestigious individuals, while in everyday life they have known and admired 
prestigious individuals for some time. It is, therefore, recommended to conduct 
similar experiments but using as sources of information individuals who 
participants already know and admire (e.g., a very popular university professor if 
the study is conducted with undergraduates). It might be the case that under 
these circumstances, prestige does have a reliable effect on recall. Similarly, the 
relevance of the material to recall for participants is another factor that it is 
necessary to look at. In Chapter 3, the information to remember were arguments 
about a society-level issue over which participants do not have much control. 
However, if the information to remember is advice that they could directly 
implement in order to improve some area of their lives, the effects of prestige on 
recall could be more reliable. For example, daily routines to increase productivity 
(e.g., waking up at 5am, having a high protein breakfast, doing the most important 
activity for the day just after breakfast) could be used as materials to recall. If 
participants are interested in improving their own productivity, it is likely to find 
prestige-biased effects.  
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 Chapter 4 studied the cultural transmission of prestige and dominance 
cues finding that both types of cues are better recalled than medium social rank 
cues, while there is no clear difference in cumulative recall between prestige and 
dominance cues. These findings might be influenced by the experimental 
materials. Consequently, it is necessary to do further tests to check the reliability 
of these results. In this study, descriptions of football players were used as 
experimental materials. Football is both a cooperative (within a team) and 
competitive (between teams) sport. It might be worth looking at other domains 
without either the cooperative or the competitive component to see whether the 
similar effects of dominance and prestige are kept. Similarly, the proximal 
mechanism by which dominance cues and prestige cues are better recalled has 
not been studied. In the discussion for Chapter 4, I suggested that the proximate 
mechanism could be a higher level of emotionality elicited by dominant and 
prestigious individuals or a higher level of concreteness of being at the top of 
dominant and prestigious hierarchies than people being at the middle of those 
hierarchies. Consequently, future studies might benefit by controlling the level of 
emotionality and concreteness of the experimental materials to test the 
predictions.  
7.3.2.- Transformations of prestige-biased social learning, dominance and 
prestige strategies in large-scale societies 
 A recurrent theme in many of the chapters has been the transformation of 
prestige-biased social learning. In Chapter 2, it was argued that cross-domain 
prestige-biased social learning is more adaptive in small-scale societies, in which 
it is more likely that prestigious individuals would be competent across domains 
(Acerbi, 2016), than in large-scale digital societies, in which there is a higher risk 
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of acquiring locally maladaptive information from globally prestigious individuals 
such as pop singers or Hollywood celebrities (Barkow, O'Gorman, & Rendell, 
2012). In contrast, within-domain prestige-biased social learning seems to be 
largely adaptive in large-scale digital societies. Chapter 3 distinguished between 
two types of prestigious individuals depending on their societal level of influence: 
(i) prestigious individual at the group level, i.e., individuals who are admired within 
a face-to-face group united by a common activity (e.g., a football team), and (ii) 
prestigious individuals at the society level, i.e., individuals who are admired by 
some valued knowledge/skill within a society but with whom people do not 
normally directly interact, and are only aware of due to digital or other forms of 
mass media.  
How large-scale and digital societies have transformed prestige-biased social 
learning and the use of dominance and prestige strategies are important issues 
that require more attention in the field. First, large-scale digital societies tend to 
have explicit prestige metrics such as number of followers on social media. These 
explicit metrics are likely more accurate prestige cues than assessing by oneself 
the attention and deference received by specific individuals from others within a 
face-to-face small community. However, it is not clear that the predicted 
correlation between receiving attention and being competent holds when the 
attention is received through social media as these platforms are specifically 
designed to capture people’s attention as long as possible (Alter, 2017). 
Consequently, future research needs to look at how explicit prestige metrics in 
the digital age affect the adaptive value and use of prestige-biased social 
learning.  
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Second, the relationship that followers have with prestigious individuals at the 
society and the group level are very different. Henrich and Gil-White’s (2001) 
argument only refers to the latter. At the group level, prestigious individuals and 
their followers know each other and prestigious individuals exchange proximity to 
them with deference, which is useful for acquiring their knowledge/skills. In large-
scale digital societies, however, prestigious individuals at the society level do not 
personally know their followers and do not exchange proximity for deference with 
most of them. Moreover, they face few constraints on the number of followers 
they can have as they can broadcast their expertise to millions of people through 
digital technologies. In turn, followers have online access to multiple prestigious 
individuals within a given domain, and they could potentially benefit from many of 
them without providing very costly forms of deference such as taking care of the 
children of prestigious individuals or giving presents to prestigious individuals. 
Instead, followers just follow prestigious individuals on social media or buy their 
products (e.g., books or online courses on how to become successful on a given 
domain). Comparing how prestige-biased social learning works at the group and 
society level is a promising new area of investigation.  
Third, prestige-biased social learning in large-scale digital societies often 
takes the form of socially learning from advice given by prestigious individuals, 
instead of observing their behaviour and copying it without the mediation of 
language, which is more common within face-to-face small groups. Advice-based 
social learning has been largely unexplored in the cultural evolution literature but 
it seems to be more used than observation-only-based social learning (Çelen, 
Kariv, & Schotter, 2010) and to enhance cumulative culture (Morgan et al., 2015; 
Zwirner & Thornton, 2015). Furthermore, much of the advice given by prestigious 
individuals in large-scale digital societies is transferable between domains. For 
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instance, one of Arnold Schwarzenegger’s rules for success is “to have a vision” 
(Heiman, 2018, December 20) by which he means to be clear what one wants to 
achieve. This advice has the advantage of not being constrained to the domains 
in which he has been successful (i.e., bodybuilding, acting, politics). Socially 
learning this type of advice from prestigious individuals and applying it to the 
domain of interest for what is socially learned could be called transferrable 
prestige-biased social learning, which is a third type of prestige-biased social 
learning that is different from within-domain and cross-domain prestige-biased 
social learning. Transferable prestige-biased social learning seems to be more 
common in large-scale digital societies, and if the advice given is really 
transferrable across domains would be largely adaptive.  
Lastly, digital technologies have created an information overload (Rodriguez, 
Gummadi, & Schoelkopf, 2014), which makes it difficult and costly for people to 
assess by themselves the quality of the numerous, and often contradictory, 
pieces of information found on the Internet (e.g., on diets). This is a condition that 
makes it more likely that prestige-biased social learning (and other forms of social 
learning) can be used to select the information that is worth paying attention to 
and learn. The effect of information overload on the use of prestige-biased social 
learning needs to be studied in the future.  
7.3.3.- Political discourse, political polarization and populism 
 In Chapter 6, I suggested that certain characteristics of right-wing populist 
discourse might make these types of leaders more attractive to part of the 
electorate. One of the features of their political discourse that might explain their 
success is their higher level of emotional content. Wirz (2018) conducted an 
experiment to test whether populist messages elicit higher levels of emotions than 
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pluralist messages and whether the elicitation of emotions mediates the 
relationship between populist messages and persuasion. To this end, Wirz 
created a number of messages about the topic of balanced wages, which 
captured either populist advocating messages (i.e., favouring the people), 
populist conflicting messages (discrediting outgroups) or pluralistic messages 
(e.g., seeing society as multifaceted). People rated how these messages elicited 
the emotions of hope, pride, anger and fear. The results show that the populist 
advocate messages elicit more hope and pride than pluralistic messages, while 
populist conflicting messages elicit more anger and fear. Furthermore, the 
elicitation of the emotions of hope and anger mediates the relationship with 
populist messages and persuasion but the elicitation of pride and fear does not. 
This supports the idea that the style of communication of populist leaders might 
be a key factor explaining their recent rise in popularity by their higher emotional 
appeal.  
 However, populist discourse does not act in isolation and its appeal might 
be in part explained as a reaction to the political discourse of other actors. For 
the case of the 2016 US Presidential elections, the discourse of left-wing identity 
politics seems to have played an important role (Masket, 2018). Left-wing identity 
politics shares with previous liberal movements such as the Civil Rights 
Movement in the 1960s, second wave feminism in the 1960s-80s, and the Gay 
Pride movement in the 1960s-90s, a political discourse opposed to racism, 
sexism and homophobia. However, they have different views of society 
(Pluckrose & Lindsay, 2018) and they frame their messages in different ways. 
Early liberal anti-discrimination movements tended to appeal to the common 
humanity of all the individuals in a society (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2018; Pluckrose & 
Lindsay, 2018) and, consequently, they framed their political discourse in an 
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inclusive way (e.g., we want a country in which people are judged by their 
character and not by their colour, gender, sexual orientation and other identity 
characteristics). These early movements fought for a society in which every 
individual has the same opportunity, freedoms and rights independent of the 
colour of their skin, their gender or sexual orientation (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2018; 
Pluckrose & Lindsay, 2018). In contrast, the more recent left-wing identity politics 
analyses social problems as differences in power between racial, gender and 
sexual orientation groups and seek to rectify these power imbalances between 
groups (Pinker, interview for Better Left Unsaid The Film, 2019). More extreme 
strands of left-wing identity politics appeals to a common-enemy (Lukianoff & 
Haidt, 2018), depicting white heterosexual men as a monolithic privileged group 
(Pluckrose & Lindsay, 2018) and, consequently, framing their political discourse 
in a divisive way (i.e., dividing people as oppressors/oppressed based on identity 
characteristics and criticising universalist and group-blind political discourse as 
discriminatory; Chua, 2018). One of the consequences of this new view of society 
is a concept creep (Haslam, 2016) or an extension of the meaning of terms such 
as racism, sexism and homophobia. For example, a white person practising yoga 
has been recently considered a form of racism called ‘cultural appropriation’ 
(Cambell, 2018). Another consequence is the development of a deeply emotional 
reaction to any criticism of this new view of society, which often leads to 
protesting, sometimes violently, for the silencing of speakers or the firing of 
dissident academics (Campbell & Manning, 2018; Lukianoff & Haidt, 2018). 
For many authors, this  discourse of left-wing identity politics has 
stimulated inter-group conflict (Campbell & Manning, 2018, pp. 257-258; 
Lukianoff & Haidt, 2018, p. 46) and produced a political environment that favours 
right-wing populist discourse and the electoral rise of their leaders (Chua, 2018; 
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Lilla, 2016; McConnell, 2016; Soave, 2016). According to Pinker (Better Left 
Unsaid The Film, 2019,), the mechanism by which left-wing identity politics gives 
fuel to right-wing populism is the following: when certain opinions cannot be 
expressed and they are silenced by identity politics activists, people suspect that 
the people who silence others are not able to show that these opinions are wrong. 
Consequently, people assume that these suppressed ideas might be true and 
become more susceptible to accept more extreme and dogmatic versions of the 
initial hypotheses. In this way, left-wing identity politics and right-wing populism 
feed each other.  
Nevertheless, there is only anecdotal evidence and verbal arguments in 
support of this link between left-wing identity politics and the rise of right-wing 
populism. Moreover, it does not seem to explain the rise of right-wing populism 
in all the countries in which there has been this rise. For instance, the result of 
the Brexit referendum in the UK does not seem to have been a reaction to left-
wing identity politics. In Spain, a reaction against left-wing identity politics seems 
to have played a role in the rise of the right-wing party Vox in 2019, but this rise 
seems to have been more driven by a reaction against the Catalan independence 
movement. 
Future studies need to look at how the exposition of left-wing identity 
politics and right-wing populist messages influence people’s political attitudes 
and see if this is a factor that drives political polarization. Transmission chain 
experiments could also be used to analyse whether certain characteristics of 
these types of political discourses, such as being simpler and more emotional, 
give them a transmission advantage over other types of political messages (e.g., 
more complex, less emotional centrist messages).  
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 Another important factor that could explain in part the electoral victory of 
Donald Trump is his ability to capture the attention of the public. According to Wu 
(2016, pp. 345-347), political contests can come in two different forms: an 
attention contest and a competence contest. Wu considers that Barack Obama 
prioritized the competence contest, while Donald Trump has mainly focused on 
the attention contest. In Chapter 5, it was argued that the prestige strategy 
requires one to capture the attention of other individuals to be able to attain 
prestige through displays of competence or generosity. Moreover, Henrich and 
Gil-White (2001) considered that receiving attention is a second-order prestige 
cue that people use to infer competence. It is, however, not clear how the 
enormous amount of attention received by Donald Trump during the electoral 
campaign influenced his electoral victory and whether this level of attention made 
him to gain prestige.  
On one hand, the attention that he received from the media was mainly 
negative, which contradicts the achievement of prestige via being admired by 
others. Neither Henrich and Gil-White (2001) nor previous chapters of this thesis 
have addressed how negative attention could influence perceptions of prestige. 
One possibility is that if people who an individual do not like or trust (e.g., because 
these people have political ideas with which the individual disagrees) express 
negative attention towards a political actor, this could increase the prestige of this 
political actor in the eyes of that person. As the saying goes, “the enemy of my 
enemy is my friend”. 
On the other hand, Donald Trump’s victory in the attention contest made 
him  extremely influential by making “almost all political thought either a reflection, 
rejection or at least a reaction to his ideas” (Wu, 2016, p. 347). Consequently, the 
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over-exposure to his ideas and the drowning out of alternatives as a result could 
have made his ideas more appealing to some people. Consequently, he could 
have gained prestige and votes due in part to redundant transmission (Morin, 
2016). 
Future studies need to look at the effects of negative attention from 
different groups (e.g., political groups) on perceptions of prestige and how 
redundant transmission could explain the popularity of ideas coming from 
influential individuals such as Hollywood celebrities and political leaders (see 
Section 3.4. in Chapter 3).  
7. 4.- Conclusion 
 In this thesis I have reviewed evidence on two key aspects of Henrich and 
Gil-White’s (2001) theory of the evolution of prestige and integrated research on 
cultural evolution, social psychology, anthropology and evolutionary psychology 
(Chapter 2 and Chapter 5); I have conducted two transmission chain 
experiments, one showing that the prestige of the sources of the information does 
not improve the transmission of information (Chapter 3) and another showing 
that both dominant and prestige cues are better transmitted than medium social 
rank cues (Chapter 4); and I have discussed the limitations of applying the 
dominance-prestige distinction to democratic large-scale societies and the rise of 
right-wing populist leaders, and provided evidence that contradicts the specific 
claims linking preferences for dominant leaders to both intergroup conflict and 
economic uncertainty (Chapter 6). In this final chapter, I have discussed the 
implications of these findings and future directions for research. Hopefully, some 
of these new research questions will be addressed in this new decade.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Chapter 3 
Appendix A.1: Supplementary Materials Associated with this Chapter.  
All supplementary materials can be found here: 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/1c7p5rdklzybt5x/AAC5lQeDii-csdq_Fe36iRLXa?dl=0  
SM1: Preregistered Documents:  
- SM1a: Preregistered Form 
- SM1b: Supplementary Materials for Preregistered Experiment 
- SM1c: Preregistered R script with Dummy Data  
SM2: Data Analyses for Experiment (R scripts) 
- SM2a: Data Analyses with Preregistered R Script 
- SM2b: Non-preregistered Bayesian Analyses 
- SM2c: Non-preregistered Manipulation Checks 
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Appendix A.2.: List of Professions and their Associated Ratings (Pretest) 
 
PROFESSIONS PRESTIGE RELEVANCE 
Mean SD MEAN SD 
1 Head teacher of 
primary school 
1.1 0.9 2.2 0.8 
2 Psychologist, expert in 
autism 
1.3 1.3 0.3 2.2 
3 Waiter -2.1 1.2 -2.2 1.2 
4 Award-winning 
musician 
1.8 1.0 -1.8 1.5 
5 Computer scientist 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.5 
6 Nurse 0.8 1.3 -0.4 1.6 
7 Marketing director 0.5 1.3 -2.1 1.3 
8 Architect 0.7 1.3 -1.7 1.5 
9 Primary school teacher 0.3 1.1 2 1.2 
10 Award-winning 
novelist 
1.5 0.8 -1.4 1.4 
11 Cleaner -2.6 1.0 -2.2 1.2 
12 Fishmonger -1.4 0.7 -2.2 1.2 
13 Call centre worker -2.2 0.9 -2 1.2 
14 League-winning 
footballer 
1.6 1.5 -2.1 1.3 
15 Aircraft pilot 1.5 1.2 -2.1 1.3 
16 Head of the 
Department of 
Infectious Diseases of 
a leading university 
2 0.8 -1.1 1.3 
17 Education researcher 0.5 0.5 2.7 0.5 
18 Doctor 1.9 0.7 0.3 1.8 
19 Estate Agent -0.6 1.3 -2 1.4 
20 Assemble-line worker -2.2 1.0 -1.9 1.3 
21 Award-winning sitcom 
actor 
1.3 1.4 -2 1.4 
22 Warehouseman -2.4 1.0 -2 1.2 
23 Member of World 
Health Organization 
(WHO)’s expert 
committee on 
vaccination 
1.8 1.2 -1.3 1.4 
24 Head of the 
Department of 
Education of a leading 
University 
1.6 1.1 2.4 0.8 
Table 4. Ratings of prestige and relevance of all sources in Pretest (Means and 
Standard Deviations). 
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    PRESTIGE       
    MEDIAN MIN MAX 
RES
=-3 
(%) 
RES
=-2 
(%) 
RES
=-1 
(%) 
RES
=0 
(%) 
RES
=1 
(%) 
RES
=2 
(%) 
RES
=3 
(%) 
1 
Head teacher of 
primary school 1 0 2 0 0 0 30 30 40 0 
2 
Psychologist, 
expert in autism 1.5 0 3 0 0 0 40 10 30 20 
3 Waiter -2.5 -3 0 50 30 0 20 0 0 0 
4 
Award-winning 
musician 2 0 3 0 0 0 10 30 30 30 
5 
Computer 
scientist 1 -1 2 0 0 10 30 50 10 0 
6 Nurse 1 -2 2 0 10 10 0 50 30 0 
7 
Marketing 
director 0 -1 3 0 0 20 40 20 10 10 
8 Architect 1 -2 2 0 10 0 30 30 30 0 
9 
Primary school 
teacher 0.5 -1 2 0 0 30 20 40 10 0 
10 
Award-winning 
novelist 1.5 0 3 0 0 0 10 40 40 10 
11 Cleaner -3 -3 0 80 10 0 10 0 0 0 
12 Fishmonger -1.5 -2 0 0 50 40 10 0 0 0 
13 
Call centre 
worker -2 -3 0 40 50 0 10 0 0 0 
14 
League-winning 
footballer 2 -1 3 0 0 10 20 10 20 30 
15 Aircraft pilot 1 0 3 0 0 0 20 40 10 30 
16 
Head of the 
Department of 
Infectious 
Diseases of a 
leading 
university 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 30 40 30 
17 
Education 
researcher 0.5 0 1 0 0 0 50 50 0 0 
18 Doctor 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 30 50 20 
19 Estate Agent 0 -3 1 10 20 10 40 20 0 0 
20 
Assemble-line 
worker -2.5 -3 0 50 30 10 10 0 0 0 
21 
Award-winning 
sitcom actor 2 -2 3 0 10 0 10 20 50 10 
22 Warehouseman -3 -3 0 60 30 0 10 0 0 0 
23 
Member of 
World Health 
Organization 
(WHO)’s expert 
committee on 
vaccination 2 -1 3 0 0 10 0 20 40 30 
24 
Head of the 
Department of 
Education of a 
leading 
University 2 0 3 0 0 0 20 20 40 20 
Table 5. Ratings of Prestige of All Sources in Pretest (Medians, Range and Frequency 
of Responses) 
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    RELEVANCE        
    MEDIAN MIN MAX RES=
-3 
(%) 
RES
=-2 
(%) 
RES
=-1 
(%) 
RES
=0 
(%) 
RES
=1 
(%) 
RES
=2 
(%) 
 RES
=3 
(%) 
1 Head teacher of 
primary school 
2 1 3 0 0 0 0 20 40  30 
2 Psychologist, 
expert in autism 
0.5 -3 3 20 0 10 20 20 10  20 
3 Waiter -3 -3 0 60 20 0 20 0 0  0 
4 Award-winning 
musician 
-2.5 -3 1 50 20 0 20 10 0  0 
5 Computer 
scientist 
0.5 -2 3 0 10 0 40 10 30  10 
6 Nurse 0 -3 1 20 10 0 30 40 0  0 
7 Marketing 
director 
-3 -3 0 60 10 10 20 0 0  0 
8 Architect -2.5 -3 0 50 10 0 40 0 0  0 
9 Primary school 
teacher 
2 -1 3 0 0 10 0 0 60  20 
10 Award-winning 
novelist 
-1.5 -3 1 30 20 20 20 10 0  0 
11 Cleaner -3 -3 0 60 20 0 20 0 0  0 
12 Fishmonger -3 -3 0 60 20 0 20 0 0  0 
13 Call centre worker -2.5 -3 0 50 20 10 20 0 0  0 
14 League-winning 
footballer 
-3 -3 0 60 10 10 20 0 0  0 
15 Aircraft pilot -3 -3 0 60 10 10 20 0 0  0 
16 Head of the 
Department of 
Infectious 
Diseases of a 
leading university 
-0.5 -3 0 20 20 10 50 0 0  0 
17 Education 
researcher 
3 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 30  70 
18 Doctor 1 -3 2 10 10 10 10 30 30  0 
19 Estate Agent -3 -3 0 60 10 0 30 0 0  0 
20 Assemble-line 
worker 
-2.5 -3 0 50 10 20 20 0 0  0 
21 Award-winning 
sitcom actor 
-3 -3 0 60 10 0 30 0 0  0 
22 Warehouseman -2.5 -3 0 50 20 10 20 0 0  0 
23 Member of World 
Health 
Organization 
(WHO)’s expert 
committee on 
vaccination 
-1 -3 1 30 10 30 20 10 0  0 
24 Head of the 
Department of 
Education of a 
leading University 
3 1 3 0 0 0 0 20 20  60 
Table 6. Ratings of Relevance of All Sources in Pretest (Medians, Range and Frequency 
of Responses) 
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Appendix A.3.: Experimental Materials for Online Transmission Chain Experiment 
 
[PAGE 1 CONSENT FORM] 
COMPUTER TABLETS AND TEXTBOOKS AT PRIMARY 
SCHOOL 
 
Welcome! This study has been created with the goal of studying the public’s opinions 
about the use of computer tablets and textbooks at primary school. If you would like to 
collaborate with this research, you can participate by answering some questions here.        
RESEARCHER   
Ángel V. Jiménez. I am a postgraduate research student at the the University of Exeter.  
My supervisor is Dr. Alex Mesoudi.       
PROCEDURE   
The study involves reading a text carefully and answering some questions about the text 
and about your own opinions. We will also ask you some questions about your 
demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, nationality, etc.).  
ELIGIBILITY 
You must be 18 years old or over to participate in this experiment. 
TIME DURATION   
The study takes less than 20 minutes to complete.      
PARTICIPANTS’ RISK, BENEFITS AND RIGHTS   
This study has been approved by the Biosciences Ethical Committee at the University of 
Exeter (Cornwall Campus). Your participation is anonymous, confidential and voluntary. 
There are no known risks associated with the experiment. If you decide to participate in 
this study, you will benefit by receiving £1.75 (as long as you comply with the instructions 
and pay attention to the questions) and learning about scientific research. You can 
withdraw from participating in the study at any time by simply closing the browser without 
having to give any kind of explanation.  
FURTHER INFORMATION   
If you have any question at any point during the study, please do not hesitate to contact 
me: aj419@exeter.ac.uk       
PARTICIPANTS' CONSENT   
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Before starting the study, please answer the following questions. 
[Q1] Are you 18 years old or older?    
YES 
NO 
[Q2] Have you read the information about the study? 
YES 
NO 
[Q3] Have you understood that you can withdraw at any time from the study without 
having to give any kind of explanation? 
YES 
NO 
[Q4] Do you give your consent to publish your anonymous responses (including quotes 
of your words) in scientific articles, reports, webpages, publicly available datasets and 
other research outputs? 
YES 
NO 
[Q5] Do you give your consent to participate in the study? 
YES 
NO 
 
[Following a negative answer to one or more of the previous questions, the participant 
will be redirected to Q6, ending his/her participation. If all questions are answered with 
“YES”, they will go on to Q7 and continue with the study] 
[Q6]  
Sorry, you cannot participate in this study because you do not meet one or more of the 
following requirements:   
a)  Be 18 years old or older   
b) Have read the information about the study   
c) Have understood that you can withdraw at any time from the experiment without 
having to provide any kind of explanation   
d) Give your consent to participate in the experiment and use your responses in scientific 
publications and other research outputs. 
[PAGE 2, PROLIFIC ID] 
Before you start, please:  
 – maximize your browser window; 
 – switch off phone/e-mail/music & anything else distracting 
 - and please enter your Prolific ID:  
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[PAGE 2: PREVIOUS QUESTIONS] 
We would like you to answer the following questions before starting with the actual 
experiment. Please answer honestly and without giving it much thought.  
Indicate your degree of agreement with the following statement: “If the decision were in 
my hands, I would replace all textbooks by computer tablets in primary schools” 
TOTALLY DISAGREE –3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3 TOTALLY AGREE 
Could you please indicate your degree of confidence in your response to the previous 
statement?  
VERY UNCONFIDENT -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3 VERY CONFIDENT  
Could you indicate your degree of familiarity with computer tablets?  
VERY UNFAMILIAR -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3 VERY FAMILIAR 
 
[PAGE 3 INSTRUCTIONS] 
In many schools across the world, computer tablets have started to replace traditional 
textbooks. This recent change has given rise to a heated debate about the benefits and 
risks of computer tablets and textbooks for children’s education. We have asked a 
number of volunteers at schools in Australia about their views on this issue. In the 
following, you will learn about two of these volunteers and about their opinions about the 
use of computer tablets at primary school.  
It is very important that you read the information at a pace that allows you full 
comprehension as you will be asked some questions about this information later.  
If you have understood the instructions, click on NEXT when you are ready to start.  
[PAGE 4: SOURCE OF INFORMATION + OPINION] 
[Participants are randomly assigned to one of the 12 versions of the experimental 
materials, which represent 3 conditions with a fully counterbalanced order of presentation 
of the sources and views. See table below. Participants first read the information about 
one source (e.g., cleaner) and then the arguments provided by that source (e.g., 
probooks). Afterwards, they read the information about the second source (e.g., pilot) 
and the arguments provided by the second source (e.g., protablets).  
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CONDITION VERSION 
ORDER OF 
SOURCES 
ORDER OF VIEWS 
Condition 1: Cleaner vs Head of 
the Department of Education 
1 
CLEANER-HEAD 
OF 
DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION 
PROBOOKS-
PROTABLETS 
Condition 1: Cleaner vs Head of 
the Department of Education 
2 
CLEANER- HEAD 
OF 
DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION 
PROTABLETS-
PROBOOKS 
Condition 1: Cleaner vs Head of 
the Department of Education 
3 
HEAD OF 
DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION -
CLEANER 
PROBOOKS-
PROTABLETS 
Condition 1: Cleaner vs Head of 
the Department of Education 
4 
HEAD OF 
DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION -
CLEANER 
PROTABLETS-
PROBOOKS 
Condition 2: Cleaner vs 
Footballer 
5 
CLEANER-
AIRLINE PILOT 
PROBOOKS-
PROTABLETS 
Condition 2: Cleaner vs 
Footballer 
6 
CLEANER- 
AIRLINE PILOT 
PROTABLETS-
PROBOOKS 
Condition 2: Cleaner vs 
Footballer 
7 
AIRLINE PILOT -
CLEANER 
PROBOOKS-
PROTABLETS 
Condition 2: Cleaner vs 
Footballer 
8 
AIRLINE PILOT -
CLEANER 
PROTABLETS-
PROBOOKS 
Condition 3: Head of the 
Department of Education vs 
Pilot 
9 
HEAD OF 
DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION - 
AIRLINE PILOT 
PROBOOKS-
PROTABLETS 
Condition 3: Head of the 
Department of Education vs 
Pilot 
10 
HEAD OF 
DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION - 
AIRLINE PILOT 
PROTABLETS-
PROBOOKS 
Condition 3: Head of the 
Department of Education vs 
Pilot 
11 
PILOT- HEAD OF 
DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION  
PROBOOKS-
PROTABLETS 
Condition 3: Head of the 
Department of Education vs 
Pilot 
12 
PILOT- HEAD OF 
DEPARTMENT 
OF EDUCATION 
PROTABLETS-
PROBOOKS 
] 
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[SOURCE 1: LOW PRESTIGE AND LOW RELEVANCE SOURCE] 
William Healey [Daniel Bryanson] works as a cleaner in a telemarketing company. 
Outside of his job, he volunteers for the Australian Learning Trust. As a volunteer, Mr. 
Healey [Mr Bryanson] visits schools once a fortnight and teaches the children about the 
importance of his job for society. He firmly supports the replacement of textbooks by 
computer tablets at primary school [He is firmly against the replacement of textbooks by 
computer tablets at primary school] for the following reasons:  
 [SOURCE 2: HIGH PRESTIGE AND HIGH RELEVANCE SOURCE] 
William Healey [Daniel Bryanson] is the Head of the Department of Education of a 
leading university. Outside of his job, he [also] volunteers for the Australian Learning 
Trust. As a volunteer, Professor Healey [Bryanson] visits schools once a fortnight and 
teaches the children the importance of his job for society. He firmly supports the 
replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at primary schools for the following 
reasons: [He is firmly against the replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at 
primary school for the following reasons:] 
 [SOURCE 3: HIGH PRESTIGE AND LOW RELEVANCE SOURCE]  
William Healey [Daniel Bryanson] is a commercial airline pilot who regularly flights 
between Auckland (New Zealand) and Madrid (Spain), Paris (France), Amsterdam (the 
Netherlands) and other European destinations. Outside of his job, he [also] volunteers 
for the Australian Learning Trust. As a volunteer, Mr Healey [Bryanson] visits schools 
once a fortnight and teaches the children the importance of his job for society. He firmly 
supports the replacement of textbooks by computer tablets at primary schools for the 
following reasons: [He is firmly against the replacement of textbooks by computer tablets 
at primary school for the following reasons:] 
 [PROBOOKS ARGUMENTS] 
The continuous use of devices with screens such as computer tablets gives long-term 
vision problems to our children. 
Children using textbooks learn much better as they are more engaged and understand 
the material better. 
Children are more easily distracted when using computer tablets because they can play 
games instead of attending to the lesson. 
The production of computer tablets requires the emission of a considerable amount of 
pollutants to the air, which contributes to the problem of the greenhouse effect. 
Children receive more support from their parents when they use textbooks than when 
they use computer tablets because parents offer personalized help.  
Textbooks can last hundreds of years and they don’t require electricity or batteries to 
work. 
[PROTABLETS ARGUMENTS] 
The continuous carrying of textbooks from home to school gives long-term back pain to 
our children. 
Children using computer tablets learn much better as they are more engaged and 
understand the material better. 
Teachers have less control over children’s learning when using textbooks because they 
cannot effectively manage what children are doing during the class. 
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The production of textbooks for our schools requires the consumption of tons of paper 
each year, which contributes to the problem of deforestation. 
Children need less support from their parents when they use computer tablets than when 
they use textbooks because tablets offer personalized lessons. 
Computer tablets permit the storage of hundreds of books and the instant access to 
those books from everywhere. 
 [PAGE 5: MANIPULATION CHECKS, ATTENTIONAL CHECKS AND DISTRACTOR 
TASK] 
Please answer the following questions.  
1.- The first person, William Healey [Daniel Bryanson] works as a:  
 a) Head of the Department of Infectious Diseases of a leading university 
 b) Cleaner 
 c) Head of the Department of Education of a leading university 
 d) Writer 
 e) Warehouseman 
 f) Airline Pilot  
g) Taxi Driver 
2.- To what extent is the first person, William Healey [Daniel Bryanson], a relevant source 
of information for a debate about the benefits and risks of tablets and books at schools?  
VERY IRRELEVANT -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3, VERY RELEVANT 
3.- If you are carefully reading the questions, select “Green”:  
 a) Brown 
 b) Yellow 
 c) Green 
 d) Red 
4.- Could you please say to what extent you consider that the first person, William Healey 
[Daniel Bryanson], is a prestigious individual within society?  
 a) Not prestigious at all.  
 b) Hardly prestigious 
 c) A bit prestigious 
 d) Very prestigious 
 c) Incredibly prestigious 
5.- The second person, Daniel Bryanson [William Healey], works as a:  
 a) Head of the Department of Infectious Diseases of a leading university 
 b) Cleaner 
 c) Head of the Department of Education of a leading university 
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 d) Writer 
 e) Warehouseman 
 f) Airline Pilot  
g) Taxi Driver 
6.- To what extent is the second person, Daniel Bryanson [William Healey], a relevant 
source of information for a debate about the benefits and risks of tablets and books at 
schools?  
VERY IRRELEVANT -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3, VERY RELEVANT 
7.- Could you please say to what extent you consider that the second person, Daniel 
Bryanson [William Healey], is a prestigious individual within society?  
 a) Not prestigious at all.  
 b) Hardly prestigious 
 c) A bit prestigious 
 d) Very prestigious 
 c) Incredibly prestigious 
[PAGE 6: SURPRISE FREE RECALL TEST FOR SOURCE 1] 
Now, we would like you to recall the previously presented arguments by the first person, 
William Healey [Danel Bryanson], about the use of computer tablets and textbooks at 
primary schools. Please try to be as accurate as possible. Bear in mind that we are NOT 
asking you about your opinion here. This task requires between 2 and a half minutes and 
5 minutes to complete.  
[Submit button will only appear after 2 and a half minutes] [countdown clock] 
[PAGE 7: SURPRISE FREE RECALL TEST FOR SOURCE 2] 
Now, we would like you to recall the previously presented arguments by the second 
person, Daniel Bryanson [William Healey], about the use of computer tablets and 
textbooks at primary schools. Please try to be as accurate as possible. Bear in mind that 
we are NOT asking you about your opinion here. This task requires between 2 and a half 
minutes and 5 minutes to complete.  
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[Submit button will only appear after 2 and a half minutes] [countdown clock] 
 
[PAGE 8: DEMOGRAPHICS] 
Now, we would like to know a few details about you.  
1.- What is your age?  
[Multiple options from 18 to 99] 
2.- What is your gender?  
a) Male 
b) Female 
c) Other 
3.- Where are you from?  
 a) USA 
 b) United Kingdom 
 c) Other 
4.- Are you a native English speaker? 
 a) Yes 
 b) No 
5.- What is the city where you live or the nearest city from where you live? 
 
6.- What is your profession?  
 
[PAGE 9: PERSONAL OPINIONS ABOUT THE ISSUE] 
Now, we would like to know your personal opinion about the issue.  
Could you please indicate your degree of agreement with the following statement: “If I 
were an education policy maker I would replace textbooks by computer tablets all over 
the country”.  
TOTALLY DISAGREE –3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3 TOTALLY AGREE 
Could you please indicate your degree of confidence in your response to the previous 
statement?  
VERY UNCONFIDENT -3, -2, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3 VERY CONFIDENT  
Could you please provide reasons to support one side or another in the debate about 
the question “should computer tablets replace textbooks at primary school?” Please write 
your opinion in the textbox below.  
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[PAGE 10: PARTICIPANTS’ FEEDBACK] 
What do you think the goal of this experiment is?  
Did you experience any technical problems when completing this study?  
Did you find something confusing or errors/typos? If so, please, explain.  
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4) Would you like to tell us anything else about this study? 
 
[PAGE 11: DEBRIEFING] 
Thank you very much for your participation in this experiment! 
 
The goal of this study is to study how accurately information related to admiration-based 
high social rank (prestige) and fear-based high social rank (dominance) is socially 
transmitted. To this end, we created three descriptions of three local footballers that 
varied in prestige and dominance: John (high prestige, low dominance), Bill (high 
dominance, low prestige) and James (low dominance, low prestige). Each participant in 
the experiment is part of a chain. The first participants in the chains read and recall the 
original materials created by us. Then, we pass the recall of the first participants to the 
second group, who recall this information. This procedure is repeated four times, for four 
steps in the chain. This method permits both the quantitative analysis of the amount of 
information recalled and the qualitative analysis of the transformations introduced by 
participants, as the material is passed along the chains. Our prediction is that information 
related to high dominance (Bill) and high prestige (John) is better transmitted along our 
chains than information related to both low dominance and low prestige (James). 
 
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me: aj419@exeter.ac.uk 
 
When you click on “NEXT”, you will be automatically redirected to the Prolific website, 
which will prove that you have taken part in this study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
280 
 
Appendix A.4.: Preregistered Table to Assess Recall 
ARGUMENTS PROTABLETS  PROBOOKS 
P1  
Anti - Health 
The continuous carrying of textbooks 
from home to school gives long-term 
back pain to our children. 
 
Textbooks, books, handbooks  back 
pain, problems in the back, etc.  
SCORE = 1 point 
 The continuous use of devices with screens 
such as computer tablets gives long-term 
vision problems to our children 
 
Tablets  vision problems  
SCORE = 1 point 
P2 
P3 
P4 
 
Pro-learning 
Children using computer tablets learn 
much better as they are more engaged 
and understand the material better. 
 
Tablets  learn better = 1 point 
Tablets  more engagement = 1 point 
Tablets  better understanding = 1 
point  
 Children using textbooks learn much 
better as they are more engaged and 
understand the material better. 
 
Books  learn better = 1 point  
Books  more engagement= 1 point 
Books  better understanding = 1 point 
P5 
P6 
 
Control vs 
Distraction 
Teachers have less control over 
children’s learning when using 
textbooks because they cannot 
effectively manage what children are 
doing during the class. 
 
Books  less control over children = 1 
point 
Tablets  control what children do = 1 
point  
 
 Children are more easily distracted when 
using computer tablets because they can 
play games instead of attending to the 
lesson. 
 
 
 
Tablets  children get more distracted = 
1 point 
Tablets  play games during lesson = 1 
point 
P7 
P8 
 
Anti-Environment 
The production of textbooks for our 
schools requires the consumption of 
tons of paper each year, which 
contributes to the problem of 
deforestation. 
 
Production of books  tons of paper = 1 
point 
Production of books  deforestation = 1 
point 
 The production of computer tablets 
requires the emission of a considerable 
amount of pollutants to the air, which 
contributes to the problem of the 
greenhouse effect. 
 
Production of tablets  lots of pollutants 
= 1 point 
Production of tablets  greenhouse effect 
= 1 point 
P9 
P10 
Parental Support 
Children need less support from their 
parents when they use computer tablets 
than when they use textbooks because 
tablets offer personalized lessons. 
 
Tablets  less need of support from 
parents = 1 point 
Tablets  personalized lessons = 1 
point  
 Children receive more support from their 
parents when they use textbooks than 
when they use computer tablets because 
parents offer personalized help.  
Books  children received personalized 
help from parents when using textbooks = 
1 point 
Parents are more familiarized with 
textbooks = 1 point 
 
P11 
P12 
 
Storage and access 
vs duration and no 
need of energy 
Computer tablets permit the storage of 
hundreds of books and the instant 
access to those books from everywhere. 
 
Tablets  lots of books in one device = 
1 point  
Tablets  access to books from 
everywhere = 1 point  
 Textbooks can last hundreds of years and 
they don’t require electricity or batteries 
to work. 
 
 
Books  last longer = 1 point  
Books  don’t need energy to work = 1 
point  
Table 17. Preregistered Table to Assess Recall.  
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Appendix B: Chapter 4 
Appendix B.1.: Supplementary Materials Associated with this Chapter 
All supplementary materials can be found here: 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/1c7p5rdklzybt5x/AAC5lQeDii-csdq_Fe36iRLXa?dl=0  
 
SM3: Preregistered Documents: 
- SM3a: Preregistered Form 
- SM3b: Supplementary Materials for Preregistered Experiment 
- SM3c: Preregistered R script with Dummy Data 
SM4: Data Analyses for Experiment (R scripts) 
- SM4a: Bayesian Data Analyses with Preregistered R script 
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Appendix B.2.: Experimental Materials for Online Transmission Chain Experiment 
 
[PAGE 1 CONSENT FORM] 
PUBLIC’S PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL FOOTBALL PLAYERS 
 
 
Welcome! This study has been created with the goal of studying the public’s perceptions 
of local football players. If you would like to collaborate with this research, you can 
participate by answering some questions here.        
RESEARCHER   
Ángel V. Jiménez. I am a postgraduate research student at the University of Exeter.  My 
supervisor is Dr. Alex Mesoudi.       
PROCEDURE   
The study involves reading three descriptions about three football players and answering 
some questions about those descriptions. We will also ask you some questions about 
your demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, nationality, etc.).  
ELIGIBILITY 
You must be 18 years old or over to participate in this experiment. 
TIME DURATION   
The study takes less than 15 minutes to complete.      
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PARTICIPANTS’ RISK, BENEFITS AND RIGHTS   
This study has been approved by the Biosciences Ethical Committee at the University of 
Exeter (Cornwall Campus). Your participation is anonymous, confidential and voluntary. 
There are no known risks associated with the experiment. If you decide to participate in 
this study, you will benefit by receiving £1.5 and learning about scientific research. You 
can withdraw from participating in the study at any time by simply closing the browser 
without having to give any kind of explanation.  
FURTHER INFORMATION   
If you have any question at any point during the study, please do not hesitate to contact 
me: aj419@exeter.ac.uk       
PARTICIPANTS' CONSENT   
Before starting the study, please answer the following questions. 
[Q1] Are you 18 years old or older?    
YES 
NO 
[Q2] Have you read the information about the study? 
YES 
NO 
[Q3] Have you understood that you can withdraw at any time from the study without 
having to give any kind of explanation? 
YES 
NO 
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[Q4] Do you give your consent to publish your anonymous responses (including quotes 
of your words) in scientific articles, reports, webpages, publicly available datasets and 
other research outputs? 
YES 
NO 
[Q5] Do you give your consent to participate in the study? 
YES 
NO 
[Following a negative answer to one or more of the previous questions, the participant 
will be redirected to Q6, ending his/her participation. If all questions are answered with 
“YES”, they will go on to Q7 and continue with the study] 
[Q6]  
Sorry, you cannot participate in this study because you do not meet one or 
more of the following requirements:   
a)  Be 18 years old or older   
b) Have read the information about the study   
c) Have understood that you can withdraw at any time from the experiment 
without having to provide any kind of explanation   
d) Give your consent to participate in the experiment and use your responses 
in scientific publications and other research outputs. 
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 [PAGE 2, PROLIFIC ID] 
Before you start, please:  
 – maximize your browser window; 
 – switch off phone/e-mail/music & anything else distracting 
 - and please enter your Prolific ID:  
[PAGE 3] INSTRUCTIONS 
In the following you will read three descriptions of three football players who play in 
different local football teams in the UK. We would like you to read these descriptions very 
carefully as you will be asked some questions about each of the football players later.  
It is very important that you read the information at a pace that allows you full 
comprehension as you will be asked some questions about this information later. 
If you have understood the instructions, click on NEXT when you are ready to start.  
[descriptions of the three individuals] 
PRESTIGIOUS (John) 
Everybody in the football team admires John. He is so skilful as a football player that last 
year he scored the most goals in the local league. Consequently, this year members of 
the team unanimously voted to make him captain of the team. They also tend to copy 
whatever he does. At team meetings, the other members always pay careful attention to 
what he is saying with their eyes fixed on him. Nevertheless, he is modest about his 
football skills and he always takes other team members’ wishes into consideration. 
Outside of the football team, he is also very popular. People often invite him to parties 
because they want to spend time with him. 
Words = 114 
 
286 
 
DOMINANT (Bill) 
Everybody in the football team is afraid of Bill. He is so violent as a football player that 
last month he injured two teammates during training. This year he self-appointed himself 
captain without the support of any team member. Other teammates tend to obey him. At 
team meetings, the other members always pay careful attention to what he is saying, 
though usually without making eye contact with him. He thinks he is the best player and 
he never takes other team members’ wishes into consideration. Outside of the football 
team, people also dislike him, but people invite him to parties because they don't want 
to make him angry. 
Words = 108 
 
MIDDLE SOCIAL RANK (James) 
People in the football team don’t have strong emotions towards James. He is an average 
football player in the team, scoring only a few goals last year. This year he wanted to be 
the captain of the team, but he only received two votes. He isn’t very influential among 
his teammates. At team meetings, the other members of the team often don’t listen to 
him very carefully and don’t tend to fix their eyes on him for long. He is modest about his 
football skills, and consequently takes other teammates’ perspectives in high regards. 
Outside the team, he is not particularly popular but he does get invited to parties held by 
his closest friends because they like to hang out with him. 
 
    [PAGE 4] FIRST INDIVIDUAL 
[Description of first individual] 
 [PAGE 5] SECOND INDIVIDUAL 
[Same as for first individual] 
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[PAGE 6] THIRD INDIVIDUAL 
[Same as for first individual] 
[PAGE 7: DEMOGRAPHICS] 
Now, we would like to know a few details about you.  
1.- What is your age?  
[Multiple options from 18 to 99] 
2.- What is your gender?  
a) Male 
b) Female 
c) Other 
4.- Where are you from?  
 a) USA 
 b) United Kingdom 
 c) Other 
5.- Are you a native English speaker? 
 a) Yes 
 b) No 
5.- What is the city where you live or the nearest city from where you live? 
 
6.- What is your profession?  
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7.- Could you indicate how much are you interested in football?  
Not at all                                 Somewhat         Very much 
      1             2              3                4                5              6              7  
[PAGE 8: SURPRISE RECALL TEST: FIRST INDIVIDUAL] 
Now, we would like you to recall the previously presented description of the first 
footballer, [name of the first footballer]. Please try to be as accurate as possible. This 
task requires between 1 and 3 minutes to complete.  
[Submit button will only appear after 1 minute] [countdown clock] 
 
[PAGE 9: SURPRISE RECALL TEST: SECOND INDIVIDUAL] 
Now, we would like you to recall the previously presented description of the second 
footballer, [name of the second footballer]. Please try to be as accurate as possible. 
This task requires between 1 and 3 minutes to complete.  
[Submit button will only appear after 1 minute] [countdown clock] 
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[PAGE 10: SURPRISE RECALL TEST: THIRD INDIVIDUAL] 
Now, we would like you to recall the previously presented description of the third 
footballer, [name of the third footballer]. Please try to be as accurate as possible. This 
task requires between 1 and 3 minutes to complete.  
[Submit button will only appear after 1 minute] [countdown clock] 
[PAGE 11: DEBRIEFING] 
Thank you very much for your participation in this experiment! The goal of this study is 
to study how accurately information related to admiration-based high social rank 
(prestige) and fear-based high social rank (dominance) is socially transmitted. To this 
end, we created three descriptions of three local footballers that varied in prestige and 
dominance: John (high prestige, low dominance), Bill (high dominance, low prestige) and 
James (low dominance, low prestige). Each participant in the experiment is part of a 
chain. The first participants in the chains read and recall the original materials created 
by us. Then, we pass the recall of the first participants to the second group, who recall 
this information. This procedure is repeated four times, for four steps in the chain. This 
method permits both the quantitative analysis of the amount of information recalled and 
the qualitative analysis of the transformations introduced by participants, as the material 
is passed along the chains. Our prediction is that information related to high dominance 
(Bill) and high prestige (John) is better transmitted along our chains than information 
related to both low dominance and low prestige (James).  
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me: aj419@exeter.ac.uk 
 
When you click on “NEXT”, you will be automatically redirected to the Prolific website, 
which will prove that you have taken part in this study 
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Appendix B3: Preregistered Table to Assess Recall 
 
PROPOSITION PRESTIGIOUS (John) DOMINANT (Bill) LOW SOCIAL RANK 
(James) 
1 Is admired Is feared Doesn't arise strong 
emotions 
2 Skilful Violent Average skill 
3 Highest goal score Injured teammates Few goals 
4 Chosen as captain Self-entitled captain Not enough votes for 
captain 
5 Is copied Is obeyed Isn’t very influential 
6 Is paid attention to / Is 
listened to 
Is paid attention to / is 
listened to 
Is not paid (a lot of) 
attention to / Is not 
listened to (very 
carefully) 
7 Received eye contact People avoid eye contact Rarely prolonged eye 
contact 
8 Is modest He think he is the best 
(arrogant/narcissist) 
Is modest 
9 Takes others into 
consideration 
Doesn't take others into 
consideration 
Take others' perspectives 
in high regard (Takes 
others into consideration) 
10 Is popular / liked Is unpopular/disliked isn’t particularly popular 
11 Invited to parties Invited to parties Invited to parties of 
closest friends 
12 People want to spend 
more time with him 
People don't want to 
make him angry 
Closest friends like to 
hang out with him 
Table 58. Preregistered Table to Assess Recall.  
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Appendix C: Chapter 6 
Appendix C.1.: Supplementary Materials Associated with this Chapter 
All supplementary materials can be found here: 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/1c7p5rdklzybt5x/AAC5lQeDii-csdq_Fe36iRLXa?dl=0  
 
SM5: Data Analyses for Study 1 (R scripts) 
- SM5a: Data Analyses for Predicting Preferences for Dominant Political Leaders 
- SM5b: Data Analyses for Predicting Preferences for Prestigious Political Leaders 
SM6: Data Analyses for Study 2 
SM6a: Data Analyses of the Relationship between Liberal Ideology and Perceptions of the 
Dominance and Prestige of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton (R Script) 
SM6b: Stata Code for Results in Table 13 and Alternative Analyses 
SM6b: Data Analyses for Results in Table 14 and Alternative Analyses (R script) 
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Appendix C.1.: Alternative Analyses to predict preferences for Donald Trump and Hillary 
Clinton using the data by Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017) 
Vote for Clinton 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients NULL CONTROL 
ECONOMIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY FULL 
Constant 
0.67 
(0.09) 
-0.47 
(0.41) 0.50 (0.53) -3.57 (0.57) 
-2.55 
(0.67) 
Gender 
[Female]   0.45 (0.18) 0.43 (0.18) 0.27 (0.20) 
0.26 
(0.20) 
Age   0.01(0.00) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Income   0.14 (0.06) 0.12 (0.15) 0.17 (0.07) 
0.14 
(0.07) 
Economic 
Uncertainty     -4.15 (1.45)  
-4.37 
(1.58) 
Political 
Ideology      0.62 (0.07) 
0.62 
(0.07) 
Vote for Trump 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients NULL CONTROL 
ECONOMIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY FULL 
Constant 
-0.21 
(0.10) 
-1.51 
(0.49) -1.43 (0.64) 1.07 (0.62) 
1.04 
(0.76) 
Gender 
[Female]   
-0.24 
(0.23) -0.24 (0.22) -0.21 (0.25) 
-0.21 
(0.25) 
Age   0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
Income   0.13 (0.07) 0.13 (0.07) 0.08 (0.08) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
Economic 
Uncertainty     -0.33 (1.69)  
-0.13 
(1.79) 
Political 
Ideology       -0.59 (0.08) 
0.59 
(0.08)) 
AIC 1541.98 1518.95 1512.40 1223.04 1217.88 
Pseudo-R2  0.03 0.03 0.22 0.22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
293 
 
  NULL 
CONTRO
L 
ECONOMIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY FULL 
Vote for Trump 
Constant 
0.66 
(0.09) 
-0.47 
(0.41) 
0.68 (0.63) 
-3.57 (0.57) 
-2.67 
(0.77) 
Gender 
[Female]   
0.45 
(0.18) 0.44 (0.18) 0.27 (0.20) 
0.25 
(0.20) 
Age 
  
0.00 
(0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Income 
  
0.14 
(0.06) 0.11 (0.06) 0.17 (0.07) 
0.14 
(0.07) 
Poverty  
    -1.63 (1.22)   
-2.42 
(1.32) 
Unemploym
ent     -2.14 (1.36)   
-1.07 
(1.44) 
Housing 
Vacancy      1.20 (2.72)   
0.45 
(2.90) 
Political 
Ideology       0.61 (0.7) 
0.62 
(0.07) 
  NULL 
CONTRO
L 
ECONOMIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY FULL 
Vote for Clinton 
Constant 
-0.22 
(0.12) 
-1.51 
(0.50) -1.44 (0.78) 1.24 (0.66) 
1.61 
(0.95) 
Gender 
[Female]   
-0.25 
(0.23) -0.23 (0.23) -0.21 (0.25) 
-0.16 
(0.26) 
Age 
  
0.04 
(0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
Income 
  
0.13 
(0.07) 0.12 (0.07) 0.07 (0.08) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
Poverty  
    -1.74 (1.52)   
-0.73 
(1.63) 
Unemploym
ent     -0.41 (1.67)   
-1.78 
(1.88) 
Housing 
Vacancy      5.24 (3.27)   
6.05 
(3.65) 
Political 
Ideology       -0.63 (0.09) 
-0.63 
(0.09) 
AIC 1544.30 1521.69 1519.02 1221.42 1220.79 
Table 19. Alternative Analysis 1 to Predict Preferences for Donald Trump and Hillary 
Clinton. Economic uncertainty = (housing vacancy rate + unemployment rate + poverty 
rate) /3 measured at the zip code level. Multinomial model with fixed intercepts.  
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  NULL 
CONTR
OL 
ECONOMIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY FULL 
Vote for Trump 
Constant 
0.66 
(0.09) 
-0.47 
(0.41) 
-0.51 (0.53) 
-3.57 (0.57) 
-2.53 
(0.70) 
Gender 
[Female]   
0.45 
(0.18) 0.43 (0.18) 0.27 (0.20) 
0.26 
(0.20) 
Age 
  
0.00 
(0.01) 0.00 (0.06) 0.01 (0.01) 
0.14 
(0.07) 
Income 
  
0.14 
(0.06) 0.11 (0.06) 0.17 (0.07) 
0.62 
(0.07) 
Economic 
Uncertainty     -4.17 (1.45)   
-4.41 
(1.59) 
Political 
Ideology       0.61 (0.7)   
  NULL 
CONTR
OL 
ECONOMIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY FULL 
Vote for Clinton 
Constant 
-0.22 
(0.12) 
-1.51 
(0.50) -1.43 (0.65) 1.24 (0.66) 
1.24 
(0.80) 
Gender 
[Female]   
-0.25 
(0.23) -0.25 (0.23) -0.21 (0.25) 
-0.20 
(0.25) 
Age 
  
0.04 
(0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01) 
0.02 
(0.01) 
Income 
  
0.13 
(0.07) 0.13 (0.07) 0.07 (0.08) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
Economic 
Uncertainty     -0.32 (1.72)   
-0.05 
(1.89) 
Political 
Ideology       -0.63 (0.09) 
-0.63 
(0.09) 
AIC 1544.30 1521.69 1519.02 1221.42 1220.79 
Table 20. Alternative Analysis 2 to Predict Preferences for Donald Trump and Hillary 
Clinton. Economic uncertainty = (housing vacancy rate + unemployment rate + poverty 
rate) /3 measured at the zip code level. Multinomial model with State as random intercept.  
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Vote for Clinton Vote for Trump 
                                       Standardized Coefficients 
Constant 0.9 (0.30) -0.54 (0.37) 
Gender [Female] 0.28 (0.20) -0.22 (0.25) 
Age 0.06 (0.10) 0.26 (0.12) 
Income 0.23 (0.10) 0.14 (0.12) 
Duration Living in Zip Code 0.14 (0.10) 0.10 (0.12) 
Total Population 0.05 (0.10) -0.17 (0.12) 
Density -0.06 (0.11) -0.08 (0.14) 
Number of Zips in the County 0.09 (0.11) 0.11 (0.14) 
Economic Uncertainty -0.26 (0.10) 0.01 (0.11) 
Political Ideology 1.08 (0.12) -1.01 (0.14) 
Pseudo-R2 0.23 
Table 21. Alternative Analysis 4 to Predict Preference for Donald Trump and Hillary 
Clinton. Full model with standardized coefficients with same controls as Kakkar and 
Sivanathan (2017). Multinomial model with fixed intercepts. Same controls as Kakkar 
and Sivanathan (2017). 
 
Vote for Clinton Vote for Trump 
                                       Standardized Coefficients 
Constant 0.09 (0.30) -0.62 (0.40) 
Gender [Female] 0.28 (0.20) -0.20 (0.25) 
Age 0.06 (0.11) 0.27 (0.12) 
Income 0.23 (0.10) 0.13 (0.13) 
Duration Living in Zip Code 0.14 (0.10) 0.09 (0.12) 
Total Population 0.05 (0.10) -0.18 (0.13) 
Density -0.06 (0.11) -0.10 (0.14) 
Number of Zips in the County 0.09 (0.11) 0.22 (0.16) 
Economic Uncertainty -0.26 (0.10) 0.01 (0.11) 
Political Ideology 1.08 (0.12) -1.09 (015) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 22. Alternative Analysis 5 to Predict Preference for Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton. Full model 
with standardized coefficients with same controls as Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017). Multinomial model 
with random intercepts. Same controls as Kakkar and Sivanathan (2017). 
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Appendix C.2. Alternative Analyses for Predicting Preference for Trump with the Data of 
the Actual Results of the 2016 US Presidential Elections 
 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients NULL 
ECONOMIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY FULL 
Constant 
0.41 
(0.29) -6.29 (2.62) -37.61 (17.63) 
-49.57 
(24.61) 
Economic 
Uncertainty   0.31 (0.12)   0.32 (0.27) 
Political Ideology     0.81 (0.38) 0.91 (0.48) 
AIC 69.30 63.60 19.37 19.79 
Pseudo-R2  0.11 0.77 0.79 
 
 
Unstandardized Coefficients NULL 
ECONOMIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY 
FULL 
Constant - 0.03 (0.28) -1.13 (2.20) -1.85 (1.48) -2.16 (2.40) 
Economic Uncertainty   0.05 (0.10)   0.02 (0.11) 
Political Ideology     0.04 (0.03) 0.03 (0.03) 
AIC 71.19 71.31 61.52 63.30 
Pseudo-R2  0.12 0.79 0.80 
Table 24. Alternative Analysis 2 to Predict Trump’s Victory within States. Logistic 
Regression for Proportional Data (outcome: percentage of votes for Trump in 2016). 
Proxy for political ideology = Percentage votes for Republicans in a State in 2012. 
Economic uncertainty = (housing vacancy rate + unemployment rate + poverty rate)/3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 23. Alternative Analysis 1 to Predict Trump’s Victory within States. Logistic regression (outcome: 
1=Trump’s victory in a State, 0=Clinton’s victory in a State. Proxy for political ideology = Percentage 
votes for Republicans in a State in 2012. Economic uncertainty variables (housing vacancy rate, 
unemployment rate and poverty rate) introduced as composite measure.  
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Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
NULL HOUSING UNEMPLOYMENT POVERTY 
ECONOMIC 
UNCERTAINTY 
POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY 
FULL 
Constant 
- 0.03 
(0.28) 
0.94 
(1.23) 
-0.68 (2.93) 
-0.81 
(1.39) 
0.84 (3.45) -1.85 (1.48) 
-1.58 
(4.40) 
Housing   
0.11 
(0.14) 
    0.14 (0.22)   
0.03 
(0.03) 
Unemployment     0.01 (0.07)   -0.07 (0.12)   
-0.07 
(0.24) 
Poverty       
0.05 
(0.09) 
0.06 (0.17)   
-0.01 
(0.14) 
Political 
Ideology 
          0.04 (0.03) 
-0.00 
(0.18) 
AIC 71.19 68.20 72.98 70.504 68.56 61.52 66.12 
Pseudo-R2  0.28 0.02 0.16 0.44 0.79 0.84 
Table 25. Alternative Analysis 3 to Predict Trump’s Victory within States. Logistic 
Regression for Proportional Data (outcome: percentage of votes for Trump in 2016). 
Proxy for political ideology = Percentage votes for Republicans in a State in 2012. 
Economic uncertainty variables (housing vacancy rate, unemployment rate and poverty 
rate) introduced as separate predictors.  
 
